

“Anything but War is Good Enough” – Conflict Mapping, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMCP	Aggressive Manifest Conflict Process
DPA	Dayton Peace Accords
EU	European Union
FBIH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GFP	Generations For Peace
GFPI	Generations For Peace Institute
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEBL	Inter-entity Boundary Line
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MCP	Manifest Conflict Process
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OHR	Office of the High Representative
RS	Republika Srpska
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence

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1. Introduction

Embroiled in the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and rocked by the ethnic violence of the Bosnian War (March 1992 – December 1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina is a deeply scarred state. Current challenges and conflicts are often considered inextricably linked to the ethnic tensions that fuelled the Bosnian War. However, there is an emerging post-war generation of young adults who have, since 2014, protested in the name of different challenges, causes and conflicts facing their country. This research attempts to identify and analyse what these challenges are, as well as their dimensions, causes and effects, with a view to assisting Generations For Peace (GFP) design and implement programmes to tackle these issues. Conflict mapping is a useful and robust way to do this.

This research will use Sandole's Three Pillar approach to conflict mapping since its emphasis on the inter-personal, inter-group and societal levels best suits GFP's focus.¹ Conflict mapping is important for future GFP programming to be as effective as possible in addressing the roots of current conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Focusing on Sarajevo, as it is the administrative, economic and political hub of the country, this study will use the data collected from 45 participants on what they believe to be the main conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive map of the most important issues facing every-day citizens at the inter-personal and inter-group level. The bulk of the research questions are aimed at uncovering the perceptions of the three main ethnic groups towards each other, the conflict, its causes, and any interventions that have already taken place. This emphasis on individual-level perceptions, dynamics and relationships is in line with GFP's grassroots focus.² GFP's programmes are guided by the desire to have a sustainable, positive impact in transforming conflict at the community-level. In order to achieve this, GFP needs to properly assess and understand the realities of the field before designing and implementing programmes.

Not a lot of the conflict analysis of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the literature has been in the form of a conflict map or chart, still less has focused particularly on Sarajevo or on the inter-personal dimensions at which GFP's programmes will be directed. In analysing the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of the existing literature almost exclusively focuses on the causes or effects of the Bosnian War. Given these narrow focuses, there is considerable scope and a remaining need to conduct contemporary, micro-level conflict analysis in Sarajevo in order to understand the present situation in the country. This research aims to contribute to this strand of the literature by focusing on grassroots conflict analysis. This paper will argue that although there are still conflicts which stem from the Bosnian War, there are other conflicts unrelated to the Bosnian War that are at the forefront of citizens' minds. While this paper does not discount the fact that the ethnic tensions that fuelled the

¹ Sandole, Dennis. "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach." *Peace and Conflict Studies* 5, no. 2 (1998). <http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/sandole.htm>

² Generations For Peace. "Generations For Peace Programming Framework," 2014.

Bosnian War still remain active today, it also highlights other types of tensions, which GFP programmes can address in the future.

2. Relevance for GFP

GFP is a non-profit peace-building organisation dedicated to sustainable, grassroots, community-driven conflict transformation. Focusing particularly on youth leadership, GFP works innovatively to engender “sustainable peace in actively tolerant communities through responsible citizenship” through its sport, arts, advocacy, dialogue, and empowerment programmes.³ GFP is also dedicated to and supported by rigorous research from its research and development arm, the Generations For Peace Institute (GFPI). This research project is relevant to GFP’s programme logic and development in several ways.⁴ It is intrinsically valuable because it accords with GFP’s ethos of being intentional, thoroughly contextual and community-focused. It is also consequentially valuable because it helps to satisfy, albeit on a slightly broader scale, one of the first steps of GFP programming design: conflict analysis.⁵ The ultimate recommendations and conclusions of this research show ample opportunity for the implementation of a range of GFP programmes in Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina more broadly.

GFP and GFPI’s commitment to sustainable and relevant conflict transformation depends on being thoughtful and intentional at every step of programme conceptualisation, design and implementation. The initial stages of GFP’s programme design requires an analysis of the conflict, which essentially requires a deep and nuanced understanding of local context, lived realities, and conflict situations.⁶ This research project aims to assist GFP and GFPI in deepening the understanding of the on-the-ground social realities in Sarajevo so as to facilitate the designing, planning, and implementation of GFP programmes. The rationale behind in-depth conflict analysis is that it is essential for relevant and effective programming. Essentially, one cannot appropriately develop programmes transforming conflict without a detailed understanding of a conflict. In this way, the logic of GFP’s initial steps of ‘conflict analysis’ in its programme design mirrors the logic of conflict mapping (discussed below), thus making this research pertinent.

This research is not only suited to the general rationale of GFP operations, but it is hugely relevant to two aspects of the *nature* of GFP’s programmes. The first is GFP’s community focus. GFP’s peace-building activities are targeted at grassroots change, which makes it important for GFP to identify and understand what issues affect communities, how these issues play out, and how they contribute to (patent or latent) conflict at the grassroots level. GFP’s approach to conflict transformation is intended to uncover and change the epicentre of violence and conflict in society (located in the structural and cultural systems of conflict and violence). It is often only through zooming in on social relations, community practices and norms, and individual experiences of institutional exclusion that one can

³ See GFP’s vision and values on their website: <http://www.generationsforpeace.org/en/pass-it-on/>.

⁴ GFP’s programming logic, aims and development is reflected in their Programming Framework.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

uncover these hidden systems of conflict. Since a lot of the contemporary conflict-mapping literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina has lacked this micro-level perspective, this research project's specific individual- and group-level focus is especially relevant to GFP's programme logic.

Second, GFP's programmes are issue-driven, meaning that each programme targets a specific issue that has already been identified as important and relevant by the local volunteers in the community in question. This project will assist in future choices about which issues GFP's programmes for Sarajevo should tackle. In order to make this choice it is necessary first, to identify the issues that matter most (i.e., are the most pressing) to the community in focus, and second, to properly understand why that issue is important, what it is about, and how it affects the daily lives of citizens in Sarajevo. This research project is the very first iteration of this process, and has extracted helpful information in this regard by explicitly asking participants to identify, explain, and then rank the challenges they perceive to be most pressing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. Conflict Context

3.1 History of the Conflict

3.1.1 Pre-Yugoslavia

It is difficult to decide how far back to begin when considering the historical context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many writers start from the pre-Bosnian War period of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) under Josip Broz Tito's presidency.⁷ But there are several notable periods that occurred before this that have had a lasting impact on the nature and structure of society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two important historical periods to consider are the Ottoman occupation (1463 – 1878) and the Austro-Hungarian occupation (1878 – 1918). The connection between these periods and Bosnia and Herzegovina's modern history is vital to understanding the emergence, development and sustainment of Bosnia and Herzegovina's three dominant ethnic groups (and their ethno-nationalist elements): Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats.⁸

The effect of these two periods has been widespread most notably in the lasting religious and multi-ethnic conditions that persist in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. Christianity had come to the Balkans long before Ottoman occupation, with the territories of Serbia and Croatia adhering to different types of Christianity (Orthodox and Roman Catholicism, respectively).⁹ Although the Ottoman Empire did not adopt a policy of forced conversions, it did spread Islam to the territories under its rule.¹⁰ As a result, one of the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniaks) follow the religion of Islam, but also coexisted with Orthodox Christians (Bosnian Serbs) and Roman Catholics (Bosnian Croats). Both the Ottoman Empire's occupation and the Austro-Hungarian occupation cemented multi-ethnicism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly Sarajevo.¹¹ Therefore, there is a strong and old tradition of multiple cultures, religions, and identities existing in the same city and territory — a tradition that spans from the Ottoman occupation until today.¹²

⁷ Kalyvas, Stathis, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violent Dynamics." In *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Vol. 2--Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions*, edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 191–230. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2005. 192; Kivimäki, Timo, Marina Kramer, and Paul Pasch. "The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multi-Ethnic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, March 2012. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/09418.pdf>; Also see 3.1.2 below for a discussion of the SFRY.

⁸ The labels 'Bosniak', 'Bosnian Serb', and 'Bosnian Croat' are used throughout this report in an attempt to disambiguate citizens of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (either in the pre-modern and post-modern period) from citizens of Serbia and Croatia. Where appropriate, this report will use the labels 'Serb' and 'Croat' to refer to a citizen of these states.

⁹ Romsics, Ignác. *Dismantling of Historic Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon*. Michigan: Social Science Monographs, 2002, 2–4.

¹⁰ Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93*. Armonk, New York: Sharpe Inc., 2000, 18–19.

¹¹ Ibid, 18-19

¹² Ibid, 18-19; Kivimäki, Timo, Marina Kramer, and Paul Pasch. "The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multi-Ethnic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina," 16.

Both periods of occupation saw the emergence, suppression and re-emergence of ethnic nationalism. Each period, but especially the Ottoman occupation, was punctuated with battles with and uprisings from Serbs who were demanding the end to occupation and the formation of an autonomous and independent Serb nation-state.¹³ Similarly under Austro-Hungarian occupation, calls for Croat separatism emerged and intensified.¹⁴ Austro-Hungarian rule in Sarajevo was abruptly ended when a young Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, triggering the First World War. It is important to recognise this thread of Serb nationalism throughout Bosnian and Herzegovinian (and, indeed, Balkan) history, because it has re-emerged at numerous points in history and has fuelled calls by Bosnian Serbs (and Serbia itself) for secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina and annexing parts of the territory to Serbia.¹⁵ These separatist and ethno-nationalist sentiments persist today and — as will be seen in the findings below — sometimes complicate relations between the various ethnic groups.

3.1.2 Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918 – 1943) and the SFRY (1943 – 1990)

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, created in 1918 after the First World War, was the realisation of an ambitious idea to unite all Slavic identities in one independent, pan-Slavic state.¹⁶ As a result of this ambition, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had a complicated ethnic profile with over 25 distinct nationalities.¹⁷ Inter-ethnic tension was high because none of the ethnic groups in the Kingdom besides Serbs were given any federal autonomy. In fact, they were all ruled by a highly centralised, Serbian elite, which essentially treated Yugoslavia as an extension of Serbia.¹⁸

The inter-ethnic tension and nationalism festering in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia erupted violently throughout the Second World War. During the Second World War Bosnia and Herzegovina was annexed by the fascist Ustaše movement in Croatia. The Ustaše was heavily supported by Germany during the war and subsequently undertook extensive extermination campaigns against Serbs, Jews and Roma in pursuit of Croatian nationalism.¹⁹ However, Serbs formed their own militia, the Chetniks, who, while also battling the German Army occupying Yugoslavia, engaged in significant inter-ethnic

¹³ See the timeline spanning both occupations at Tanner, Marcus. "Timeline: The Ottomans and the Balkans." *Balkan Insight*, 30 November 2010. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-ottomans-six-centuries-in-europe>; See this timeline with additional dates as Appendix 3.

¹⁴ Romsics, Ignác. *Dismantling of Historic Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon*, 14.

¹⁵ Most infamous were the comments made by Ratko Mladic on the eve of the Srebrenica massacre during the Bosnian War, that "the time has come to take revenge on the Turks." See the footage of this comment, which was played at Mladic's war crimes trial in The Hague: Borger, Julian. "Ratko Mladic Trial Shown Footage of General in Srebrenica." *The Guardian*, 17 May 2012. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/17/ratko-mladic-trial-footage-srebrenica>

¹⁶ Curtis, Glenn Eldon. *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*. Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1990. <https://www.loc.gov/item/91040323/>, 69.

¹⁷ Ibid, 70.

¹⁸ Tomasevich, Jozo. *The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1975, 8.

¹⁹ Kalyvas, Stathis, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violent Dynamics," 198-99; Kivimäki, Timo, Marina Kramer, and Paul Pasch. "The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multi-Ethnic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina," 16; Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93*, 37; Macdonald, David Bruce. *Balkan Holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian Victim Centered Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003: 134-35.

violence against Bosniak militias, the Croatian Ustaše, as well as members of the Partisans (Tito's relatively multi-ethnic, anti-German militia).²⁰ The result was that militarised inter-ethnic bloodletting, from and between all sides, characterised this period of Bosnian and Herzegovinian history.

Just before the end of the Second World War, the Partisans were successful in expelling the German Army from Yugoslavia.²¹ As a result, the SFRY was created and led by Tito's socialist communist dictatorship.²² The SFRY consisted of six socialist republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina — both territorially within Serbia, although considered to be autonomous).²³

The table below gives the demographic breakdown of ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina during last 40 years of the SFRY. There is a significant and visible population shift in ethnic composition from 1961 to 1991 for Bosniaks (increase) and Bosnian Serbs (decrease), as well a narrower downward shift for Bosnian Croats. This data is purely census data and so does not analyse how or why these shifts occurred over this time period. However, it can be argued that population shifts were influenced by ethno-nationalist affinities — expressed or unexpressed — to reside within the territories of Croatia, Serbia, or Bosnia and Herzegovina. This information helpfully illuminates the fact that, although the SFRY was multi-ethnic and no one region was populous enough to control the whole, smaller geographical regions and areas did display (even narrow) ethnic majorities.

	1961	1971	1981	1991
Bosniaks	25.7%	39.6%	39.5%	43.5%
Bosnian Serbs	42.9%	37.2%	32.0%	31.2%
Bosnian Croats	21.7%	20.6%	18.4%	17.4%

Table 1: Ethnic representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the SFRY (1961 – 1991)²⁴

Over the course of its existence, the SFRY remained complicatedly multi-ethnic. However, Tito suppressed the voicing of ethno-nationalism by any of the constituent republics.²⁵ Despite this suppression of ethno-nationalist sentiment, ethnicity still mattered in the SFRY, as ethnic discrimination (especially in the distribution of positions of power in the bureaucracy and the army,

²⁰ Betz, Frederick. *Societal Dynamics: Understanding Social Knowledge and Wisdom*. New York: Springer Science and Business Media, 2014, 215; Redžić, Enver. *Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War*. Oxford: Frank Cass, 2005, 90–91.

²¹ Betz, Frederick. *Societal Dynamics: Understanding Social Knowledge and Wisdom*, 215.

²² Kivimäki, Timo, Marina Kramer, and Paul Pasch. "The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multi-Ethnic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina," 16.

²³ Curtis, Glenn Eldon. *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*, 177; 190.

²⁴ Table reproduced from Milinović, Zdenko. "Demographics 2012." Sarajevo: Agency for Statistics, 2013. http://www.bhas.ba/tematskibilteni/BHAS_Demografija_BH.pdf Note that this representation excludes the numerous other nationalities (Turk, Roma, Ukrainian, Polish, Albanian, etc.) because they are not the focus of this research.

²⁵ Kalyvas, Stathis, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violent Dynamics," 192.

which tended to be dominated by Serbs) was evident.²⁶ Furthermore, Tito cracked down on dissent and ethnic protest, and was sometimes accused by Serbia of implementing anti-Serbian policies (notably concerning Kosovo and Croatia).²⁷ Still, compared to the period after his death, Tito's leadership did manage to prevent an upsurge in violent, explicit ethno-nationalist action in the SFRY. However, as will be explained in later sections, the national SFRY-identity created under Tito was relatively weak. Once the unifying factor of its leader was gone and the previously suppressed ethno-national identities resurged, the SFRY would slowly fall apart during the course of the 1980's and 1990's.

The death of Tito in 1980 saw increasing ethno-nationalist sentiment in the SFRY.²⁸ This nationalist sentiment saw the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and his successful campaigns to, for example, dissolve Kosovo's assembly and govern the province as a part of Serbia. Similarly, rising nationalist sentiment from Slovenia and Croatia eventually culminated in campaigns for secession.²⁹ These calls for independence caught on in the other constituent republics and the SFRY began to unravel. How Bosnia and Herzegovina responded to the dissolution of the SFRY is outlined below.

3.1.3 *The breakup of the SFRY and the Bosnian War*

In 1990, amid this unravelling and arguably prompted by this trend of secession from the SFRY, a coalition of three ethnically-based (Bosniak, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat) parties (representing the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina) replaced communist power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the future of statehood for Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e.,: what Burg and Shoup call 'the national question') was hugely contentious among these three parties (and their counterparts in Croatia and Serbia), which were each vying for different outcomes following the breakup of the SFRY.³⁰ Some of the more general ones of these will be outlined below.

For example, Bosniaks wanted Bosnia and Herzegovina to exist as an independent, sovereign state within its current borders and territory. Serb nationalists (i.e. Bosnian Serbs and parts of the Serbian population) preferred for the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which in 1990 had been reduced to Serbia and Montenegro.³¹ Failing this, Serb nationalists' second preference was to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina and collapse all Serb-populated territory into the FRY, and collapse the rest of the territory into Croatia.³² In contrast, Croat

²⁶ Ibid, 200.

²⁷ Ibid, 211.

²⁸ Ibid, 192-93.

²⁹ Ibid, 193.

³⁰ Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93*, 16-17.

³¹ The SFRY had, by this point, lost three of its constituent republics (Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia), which prompted Serbia and Montenegro to rename what was left of the SFRY the FRY. Keeping the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the FRY was therefore important to this whittling entity's identity.

³² Kivimäki, Timo, Marina Kramer, and Paul Pasch. "The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multi-Ethnic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina," 16; Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-*

nationalists (i.e. Bosnian Croats and parts of the Croatian population) initially also preferred partition but there was significant political opposition to this in Croatia.³³ Ultimately Croats and Bosnian Croats supported the preservation of the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, since the Bosnia and Herzegovian government was made up by a coalition, none of the parties had enough of a numerical majority to settle 'the national question' on their own.³⁴

The dispute over statehood led to Bosnian Serb representatives abandoning Parliament in 1991 (thus ending the coalition) and establishing the Republika Srpska (RS).³⁵ RS was the Serb-dominated autonomous regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina located in the eastern and north-western areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is unclear why RS did not immediately declare itself part of Serbia (and thus the FRY), but its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina was vehemently supported by Serbia and Milosevic (especially militarily during the Bosnian War).³⁶ Serbia's own national interest in establishing and maintaining the FRY (and, by extension, unifying all Serb-populous areas in the region) arguably meant that it had a stake in unequivocally supporting RS.³⁷

Following the diplomatic gridlock between the political parties, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence by referendum in 1992. Due to the political tensions, this referendum was boycotted by a majority of the Bosnian Serb part of the population. Shortly after, war broke out between ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war was fuelled by nationalist sentiment from all three groups surrounding the 'national question'. That is, the independence, partition or absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina — competing options for which different ethnic groups were desperately contesting. Although all parties to the conflict committed war crimes, Serb forces (from both RS and FRY) engaged in a systematic ethnic cleansing campaign in the territory making up the RS.³⁸ As visible in the table below, the war had a devastating human cost.

Herzegovina, 1990-93, 53-58.

³³ Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93*, 197.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 33; Kalyvas, Stathis, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violent Dynamics." 193.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Kalyvas, Stathis, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violent Dynamics." 212-23. After the war, some of the commanders from both the RS army and the FRY's army were among those indicted, charged and tried for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Status	Sex	Bosniaks	Bosnian Serbs	Bosnian Croats	Others	Total
Civilians	Men	19,715	6,299	1,230	1,482	28,726
Civilians	Women	5,894	1,181	445	453	7,974
						36,700
Military	Men	42,162	15,225	7,084	3,014	67,485
Military	Women	330	73	98	44	546
						68,031
Total		68,101	22,779	8,858	4,995	104,732

Table 2: Overall Number of Victims of the Bosnian War (1992-1995)³⁹

In addition to the civilian and military casualties, the Bosnian War also had devastating effects on Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy (which was just transitioning from socialism to liberal-market capitalism), infrastructure, and importantly its population. In 1994, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a total population of 4,368,514, of which over 104 000 people were killed during the war and thousands more raped, interned, injured, internally displaced, forced to flee, and traumatised.⁴⁰

3.1.4 The siege of Sarajevo

RS forces (with significant assistance from the FRY) besieged Sarajevo from 5 April 1992 until 29 February 1996.⁴¹ It was the longest siege in modern military history and resulted in widespread damage to the capital and attacks on the civilian population. RS forces quickly surrounded Sarajevo in the spring of 1992 and bombarded the city with artillery, tanks, snipers and mortar fire, and blockaded the population's access to food and water supplies. Western and European nations were alarmed at the rapidly developing humanitarian crisis, and petitioned the United Nations (UN) to intervene. However, despite UN safe-zones being declared in order to provide the population with humanitarian assistance and safe access to humanitarian aid, the military assault on Sarajevo would continue for almost four years.⁴²

Civilians and civilian buildings (streets, markets, hospitals, broadcasters, schools, places of worship) were intentionally targeted and terrorised by the snipers positioned in Sarajevo's surrounding mountains. UNICEF estimates that 40% of children living in Sarajevo at the time had been shot at, 51% had seen someone being killed, 39% had seen a family member killed, 19% had witnessed a massacre (such as the Markale Market massacres in which RS forces fired upon a busy civilian

³⁹ Ibid, 17.

⁴⁰ Zwierchowski, Jan, and Ewa Tabeau. "The 1992–95 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Census-Based Multiple System Estimation of Casualties' Undercount." Berlin: The Households in Conflict Network (HiCN) and The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), 2 February 2010.

http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_undercount_conf_paper_100201.pdf, 14-17.

⁴¹ Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93*, 33; Kalyvas, Stathis, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violent Dynamics," 193.

⁴² Andreas, Peter. *Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, Chapters 1 and 2.

market in the heart of Sarajevo on two separate occasions), and 73% had their homes attacked or shelled.⁴³ It is also estimated that nearly every building in Sarajevo had been damaged to some extent including cultural buildings like the National Library (which burnt down due to incendiary bombs). Following an UN-sanctioned NATO air-strike campaign and a ground offensive by a joint Bosniak and Croatian forces, the siege was finally lifted in February 1996.⁴⁴

Following a significant NATO air-strike campaign against RS ammunition sites, radio sites and command centres, the war ended with the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). The DPA created the Bosnia and Herzegovina constitution, which established a highly decentralised state structure and a system of governance based on power sharing, with many internal check mechanisms to prevent one of the three ethnic groups from dominating the others politically. The DPA also set up the Office of the High Representative (OHR), an office meant to represent the international community's oversight of the implementation of the DPA, and which is still operational.

Being the nation's capital, Sarajevo has always stood at the centre of tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Throughout history the city has been the cultural, economic, administrative, military and political pulse of the country. The Sarajevo canton is the strongest economic region in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of its large manufacturing, administrative, tourism, and informal markets.⁴⁵ Sarajevo city is the largest in Bosnia and Herzegovina and is the state and federal capital.⁴⁶ Sarajevo's prominence before, during and after the War makes it a key location for an analysis of, and possible solutions to, contemporary issues and inter-group relations.

The city was also socially, structurally and economically ravaged during an ethnically polarised (and polarising) siege. Whereas before the Bosnian War, the population of Sarajevo had lived for centuries in authentically (spatially and socially) integrated, ethnically tolerant and heterogeneous, the Bosnian War brought dramatic population shifts. The International Crisis Group estimates that between 1991 and 1997 Bosniak's increased from 50% to 87% of the population, Bosnian Serbs decreased from 28% to 5%, and Bosnian Croats decreased from 7% to 6%.⁴⁷ Following the end of the siege, the influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs), of which 75 000 were Bosniaks, 13 200 were Bosnian Croats, and 5 600 were Bosnian Serbs, further changed Sarajevo's demographics.⁴⁸

⁴³ UNICEF. "A UNICEF Report on War Trauma Among Children in Sarajevo." Belgrade: Office of Emergency Operations in Former Yugoslavia, February 1994.

⁴⁴ Andreas, Peter. *Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo*, 104.

⁴⁵ CIA. "The World Factbook," 2015. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ International Crisis Group. "Rebuilding a Multi-Ethnic Sarajevo: The Need for Minority Returns." International Crisis Group Bosnia Project, 3 February 1998. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/Bosnia%2013.pdf>, 2–3.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

Furthermore, the International Crisis Group assesses that the environment in Sarajevo is not conducive to a return to multi-ethnic tolerance and integration. There is damagingly inequitable representation in judicial and administrative institutions (such as the police force); segregationist education practices and divisive school curricula; discriminatory practices in securing employment and housing allocation (especially for returning IDPs); ethnically homogenous and ghettoised neighbourhoods; as well as attacks against religious institutions.⁴⁹ Thus, Sarajevo's economic and social regeneration could offer a telling microcosm for wider conflict transformation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, suitably making it the prime focus of this research.

3.1.5 *The 2014 civil unrest*

Unfortunately, the Bosnian War was not the last time that Bosnia and Herzegovina saw large-scale outbreaks of violence. In 2014, violent protests broke out in the north-western city of Tuzla, where workers from several newly privatised factories demanded government action over unemployment, unpaid salaries and pensions, corruption, and state paralysis.⁵⁰ These protests spread with violent clashes in Zenica, Mostar, Bihać, Brčko, and Sarajevo. What these protests exposed is that inter-ethnic tension may not be at the foreground of rhetoric for average citizens, rather it is these bread-and-butter issues that are more pertinent. However, these every-day economic issues can often create the unstable conditions, which can cause inter-ethnic tensions to bubble to the surface through scapegoating for economic hardship. Tamasevich argues that these societal processes are very similar to what happened in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before ethnic violence erupted during the Second World War.⁵¹ Preventing this scapegoating by building trust and increasing communication between communities should be a priority of community-based peace-building programmes in order to insure that underlying tensions do not emerge.

3.2 Dimensions of the conflict

It is important to assess the current dimensions of the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the historical trajectory outlined above. Although none of the dimensions below occur in a vacuum, disconnected from the causes and consequences of the Bosnian War or the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina more broadly, the discussion in this section will emphasise what these connections may mean for inter-personal and inter-group relations at the micro-level. This focus is important because is suitable for the work conducted by GFP, which is not aimed at top-down solutions to abstracted and macro-level issues.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 9–18.

⁵⁰ Pašić, Lana. "Social Protests, Democracy and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Balkananalysis*, 7 February 2014. <http://www.balkananalysis.com/bosnia/2014/02/12/social-protests-democracy-and-politics-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/>; Szpala, Marta. "Bosnia and Herzegovina – an Ongoing Erosion of the State." Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 30 March 2011. <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-03-30/bosnia-and-herzegovina-ongoing-erosion-state>; Judah, Tim. "Bosnian Protests: A Balkan Spring?" *BBC News*, 7 February 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26093160>

⁵¹ Tomasevich, Jozo. *The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945*, 12-21.

3.2.1 Political dimension

There are three interlinking aspects of the political dimension that play prominent roles in shaping of current disputes. The first is the role of outside actors. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been significantly internationalised by a number of actors. Before, during and after the war the 'national question' was approached from the outside in that Croatia and Serbia have always influenced debates about Bosnian and Herzegovinian statehood.⁵² Contrariwise, external loyalties and orientations especially those of RS toward Serbia and even from Bosnian Croats towards Croatia continue to shape behaviours and opinions of people involved in all of these states in various ways.⁵³ This research will partially be looking at whether participants feel any affinity towards Croatia or Serbia, what that affinity is based on (such as impending or current EU status), and what participants think about the nationalist elements in these communities, for example, RS President Dodik's announcement of a referendum on RS independence in 2018.⁵⁴

Moreover, following the Bosnian War, the international community as a whole has been given a formal role in supervising Bosnia and Herzegovina's reconstruction. The DPA set up the OHR, which can impose legislation (especially constitutional change) and to remove officials. But since 2006, the OHR has showed increased reluctance to use these powers. The OHR's most recent office bearers have come from EU member states, making the EU another prominent international actor in Bosnia and Herzegovinan politics. But more importantly, Bosnia and Herzegovina has plans to join the EU as a member (something that Croatia has already done, and Serbia also plans to do). However, EU conditionality requires certain gains in stability and growth to be achieved before Bosnia and Herzegovina can be considered a candidate for member status. Despite this close supervisory control by international actors, some analysts see both the EU and the OHR as ineffective and unhelpful.⁵⁵ The EU's integration policy has been pursued inconsistently, with only unclear and short-term demands that may not address the growing nationalism and divergence of interests of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina.^{56 57} The involvement of international actors is not only important because Sandole's framework mandates an examination of third-party interventions, but this involvement may also lead to a loss in appetite for, or belief in, the concept of outside intervention as a whole. If this were a common perception, it would be important for GFP to take this into account

⁵² Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93*, 5-7.

⁵³ Kivimäki, Timo, Marina Kramer, and Paul Pasch. "The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multi-Ethnic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina," 17.

⁵⁴ Bosnia Today. "Republika Srpska to Hold Independence Referendum in 2018," 25 April 2015.
<http://www.bosniatoday.ba/republika-srpska-to-hold-independence-referendum-in-2018/>

⁵⁵ Szpala, Marta. "Bosnia and Herzegovina – an Ongoing Erosion of the State," calls the EU 'powerless'.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ In March 2015 BiH and the EU signed the EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Council of the European Union). "Stabilisation And Association Agreement Between The European Communities And Their Member States, Of The One Part, And Bosnia And Herzegovina, Of The Other Part." Brussels: European Union, 6 June 2008.
http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/delegacijaEU_2011121405063686eng.pdf, which sets out certain requirements BiH must achieve before it can be properly considered as a candidate for membership. This agreement is recent so its influence is still uncertain.

before e.g. designing and planning advocacy campaigns or attempting to attract volunteers on the ground.

This leads to the second aspect of the political dimension. The constitutional structure set up by the DPA is highly federalised with numerous levels of state functioning. Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two “entities” (the RS in the East and North-West, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) in the South-West and centre) and a self-governing administrative district in the North called the Brčko District.⁵⁸ The “borders” of these entities are demarcated by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), which concretises the military front lines of the Bosnian War. The IEBL cuts right through the city and canton of Sarajevo, adding to the spatial (and therefore social) ghettoisation of ethnic groups in Sarajevo. Although GFP cannot change the state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this research hopes to explore how these spatial-constitutional boundaries impede inter-ethnic interaction and integration at the individual level (especially in Sarajevo, which is essentially divided in two).

Bosnia and Herzegovina is administratively stratified into four levels: (1) the centralised or state level; (2) the federal (or entity) level, where both RS and the FBiH entities have their own federal governments, parliaments (or assemblies), prime ministers, flags, police force, constitution, and administration; (3) the canton level (for FBiH); and (4) the municipal level.⁵⁹ At the state level, the head of state is a tripartite, 9-month rotational position between the chosen Bosniak representative, Bosnian Croat representative, and Bosnian Serb representative. There are numerous other mechanisms built into the constitution to prevent one ethnic group from dominating another politically.

However, the DPA’s hyper-fragmentation of the country has proven to be hugely problematic and is seen by some as the main cause of state paralysis, inertia, and the erosion of state-level authority.⁶⁰ The DPA’s fragmented state structure was intended to prevent deadlock. But it is being used for this precise purpose. RS and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) have used this vulnerability for paralysis to their advantage, often using the veto mechanism to stall decisions of the central government that go against their political interests.⁶¹ Further, because of this hyper-federalism the central government has no exclusive competencies of its own and lacks any ability to increase social cohesion by pursuing attempts at creating a pan-Bosnian identity or unity. This research hopes to explore whether state inertia (especially in the city where all state-, entity-, canton- and municipal-

⁵⁸ Note that the post-war RS territory is the same as the pre-war RS territory referred to above.

⁵⁹ Until 2005, each entity also had its own armed forces. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation.” Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council, 28 August 2008. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Europe/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/pdf/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-August-2008.pdf>, 10.

⁶⁰ Szpala, Marta. “Bosnia and Herzegovina – an Ongoing Erosion of the State.”

⁶¹ Deets, Stephen. “Public Policy in the Passive-Aggressive State: Health Care Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995-2001.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 1 (2006): 57–80, 63 and 68; Belloni, Roberto. *State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia*. Routledge, 2007, 69–70; Koneska, Cvete. *After Ethnic Conflict: Policy-Making in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia*. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2014, 133.

level offices are seated) and the political games played by the elite affect youth apathy, inter-personal cultural tolerance, or (the third political dimension) ethno-nationalism.

This third aspect, nationalism and separatism of the three ethnic groups, is really the focus of this research because it holds the most relevance for GFP as an organisation engaging in community-based peace building. This aspect has arguably become more entrenched due to the constitutional state structure and the dysfunction of the central government, discussed above. There seems to be no move towards a truly multi-ethnic political option for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead political nationalism has been strengthening from all sides.

Within FBiH Bosnian Croats have become more radical about the creation of a separate political entity due to increased feelings of marginalisation within the government by the (largely Bosniak) Social Democratic Party (SDP).⁶² In RS, especially under President Dodik (a known secessionist), there is a public nationalist agenda that is deeply concerning. The RS federal assembly has voted to hold two referenda in the immediate future: the Justice Referendum (which seeks to reconsider the authority of the OHR and the Bosnia and Herzegovina courts and Prosecutor) and the 2018 referendum on RS's secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶³ Both are seen as unconstitutional by the FBiH and clear steps towards succession.⁶⁴ Based on these trends, it is unlikely that a significant political motivation to engender tolerance and dismantle ethnic divisions will develop. Thus, there may not be any public faith in the nation-building and peace-building project from citizens on the ground due to the perception that these attempts will be thwarted at the political level. These political stalemates about unity may force the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to continuously categorise themselves and each other into the three ethnic groups, thereby keeping ethnic divisions prominent.

3.2.2 Economic dimension

Bosnia and Herzegovina's economic challenges arguably stem from the devastation to infrastructure caused by the Bosnian War and its disruption of Bosnia and Herzegovina's transformation from a socialist economy to liberal-market capitalism.⁶⁵ The economic dimension largely sparked the 2014 protests, and can be divided into three, mutually reinforcing, aspects: economic stagnation, unemployment, and corruption.⁶⁶

Bosnia and Herzegovina's economic growth has been stagnating especially after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been heavily dependant on foreign aid (mostly from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) but it lacks a long-term development strategy that is not aid-dependant. Because of the highly decentralised structure of the state, the government of Bosnia and

⁶² Szpala, Marta. "Bosnia and Herzegovina – an Ongoing Erosion of the State."

⁶³ Bosnia Today. "Republika Srpska to Hold Independence Referendum in 2018," note 50.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Donais, Timothy. *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia*. Oxford: Routledge, 2005, 1-7.

⁶⁶ Judah, Tim. "Bosnian Protests: A Balkan Spring?", Pašić, Lana. "Social Protests, Democracy and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina."; Szpala, Marta. "Bosnia and Herzegovina – an Ongoing Erosion of the State."

Herzegovina is struggling to implement a coordinated state-level policy of economic reform. Bosnia and Herzegovina's currency is pegged to the Euro so inflation has remained manageable and confidence has remained stable. However, there are growing concerns about debt (in the form of IMF loans, public debt accounted for 45% of Bosnia and Herzegovina's GDP in 2014), government spending (especially on the different levels of federal administrations) and foreign investment in the private sector (which has plummeted since the 2008 financial crisis).⁶⁷

By far the most pressing economic concern is the soaring levels of unemployment (44%), especially youth unemployment (estimated to be 60%).⁶⁸ This negative development is largely caused by the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina's industries during the war and perpetuated by the lack of private sector job growth. Reducing unemployment through job-creation was first on the list of demands during the 2014 protests with the foreclosure of a factory in Tuzla being what sparked the protests in that particular area.⁶⁹

Lastly, corruption continues to exacerbate Bosnia and Herzegovina's economic challenges, especially youth unemployment.⁷⁰ Getting employed is widely perceived as a matter of personal connections rather than merit. More broadly, politicians are perceived by the people as corrupt because of significant government expenditure going towards maintaining officials' lifestyles through state-sponsored vehicles and residences as well as exorbitant salaries. Many high-ranking officials have been implicated in allegations of corruption, one of the most notable being Zivko Budimir (then-President of the FBiH) who was arrested in 2013 along with four other officials on allegations of bribery.⁷¹ The overwhelming public perception is therefore that corruption is rampant in all aspects of state functioning (the government, the police, the judiciary, the public administration) and that the central government is not doing enough to ensure transparency and accountability.

Slow economic growth, youth unemployment, and corruption are mutually exacerbating conditions in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These economic issues, rather than the political or social dimensions discussed here, sparked the 2014 protests. However, as discussed above, it is important not to view these economic complaints as though they existed in a vacuum. Frustration about living standards and poor employment prospects can trigger feelings of animosity and blame between groups. Thus, although GFP might not be able to tackle the economic growth of Bosnia and Herzegovina, GFP programmes can definitely assist in developing community trust, respect and communication so that ethnic divisions do not become a proxy for socio-economic frustration.

⁶⁷ CIA. "The World Factbook."

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Judah, Tim. "Bosnian Protests: A Balkan Spring?"; Pasic, Lana. "Social Protests, Democracy and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina."; Szpala, Marta. "Bosnia and Herzegovina – an Ongoing Erosion of the State."

⁷⁰ Szpala, Marta. "Bosnia and Herzegovina – an Ongoing Erosion of the State."

⁷¹ BBC News. "Bosnia Court Detains Bosniak-Croat President Zivko Budimir," 28 April 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22328570>; The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Bosnia and Herzegovina." *The Economist*, 2015. <http://country.eiu.com/bosnia-and-hercegovina>, 24–8.

3.2.3 Social dimension

A consistent undercurrent of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been social relations between the three major ethnic groups. The horror of the Bosnian War arguably did not bring an end to the animosity between ethnicities and a step towards greater social cohesion and Bosnian unity. Although outright violence and animosity between groups has decreased, much of Bosnian and Herzegovinian society is still far from reconciled. The War involved and affected the lives of all civilians in Bosnia and is still within living memory of most.⁷² The trauma is therefore widespread and may be manifest especially in sites of violence (like Sarajevo) or in communities that have suffered many casualties.⁷³ It is difficult to imagine extensive reconciliation in the face of this trauma.

This view may be compounded by the fact that attempts at reconciliation have also been largely ineffective. The ICTY has had limited success in ensuring catharsis and reconciliation for Bosnian society. The majority of those charged and convicted by the ICTY were the high-ranking 'masterminds' of the Bosnian War and so many lay-people involved in the machinery of the war as administrators, soldiers, informants were never brought to justice.⁷⁴ Feelings of justice being denied for the victims of war crimes and, concomitantly, feelings of 'victors justice' or blame and guilt from those seen as perpetrators might also be obstacles to Bosnian unity. There is also academic debate whether the ICTY (and any criminal justice project) is *meant* to and actually does foster reconciliation and peace-building in the first place.⁷⁵ Forgiveness, acceptance and unity are not concepts endorsed by criminal justice. Without a national reconciliation strategy (which does appear to be absent in Bosnia and Herzegovina), feelings of blame, guilt and vindication may have actually made relations between the perceived victim ethnicities and the perceived perpetrator ethnicities worse. Mapping these feelings will be important in assessing the levels of reconciliation between ethnic groups for future GFP programming.

Moreover, there is no commonly accepted narrative regarding the past (and the Bosnian War specifically). There have been numerous denials by all parties to the conflict about aspects of the War. The Sarajevo Canton assembly unanimously voted to condemn the arrest of Bosniaks suspected of war crimes at the Silo Camp and Krupa army barracks.⁷⁶ And just recently, Bosnian Serbs attacked a convoy carrying the bodies of newly identified victims of the Srebrenica Massacre on its way to a 20-year commemoration ceremony. This lack of a collective memory and acceptance

⁷² Kalyvas, Stathis, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violent Dynamics," 215.

⁷³ International Crisis Group. "Rebuilding a Multi-Ethnic Sarajevo: The Need for Minority Returns.," UNICEF. "A UNICEF Report on War Trauma Among Children in Sarajevo." Belgrade: Office of Emergency Operations in Former Yugoslavia, February 1994; Kalyvas, Stathis, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violent Dynamics."

⁷⁴ Kalyvas, Stathis, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violent Dynamics," 215. Note that many of the victims of the war knew the names of the perpetrators of the violence because they were often neighbours or otherwise closely affiliated.

⁷⁵ Goldstone, Richard. "Peace versus Justice." *Nevada Law Journal* 6, no. 2 (1 January 2006).

<http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol6/iss2/6>

⁷⁶ Hadžović, Eldin. "Sarajevo Shuns Recognition of Bosniak War Crimes." *Balkan Insight*, 23 December 2011. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/sarajevo-shuns-recognition-of-bosniak-war-crimes>

of Bosnia and Herzegovina's violent and recent past is a significant obstacle to social cohesion. The past and speaking about it is therefore still a contentious and unsettled issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Multiple truths, stories (and thus heroes and villains) about emotionally fraught issues such as the Bosnian War can feed into inter-group alienation, distrust and animosity. Mapping these narratives will thus also be helpful to GFP in order to understand how ethnic groups position themselves and others in Bosnia and Herzegovina's historical context.

4. Literature Review

4.1 Conflict mapping

First developed by Wehr in 1979, conflict mapping is an essential tool and starting point of conflict analysis in that it provides a means of understanding a conflict from different perspectives.⁷⁷ The essential thesis of conflict mapping is that every conflict (at any level) has certain basic elements that can be isolated in order to produce a roadmap, which can then be used to understand what is going on.⁷⁸ “Unwise and costly decisions are made from a lack of understanding of what is occurring” and a conflict map is an essential initial step in conflict intervention because it provides comprehensive information about the conflict to actors (like GFP) so that planning and implementation of interventions and actions can be effective.^{79 80}

There are different conflict mapping techniques that have been developed from Wehr’s conflict map. Generally all conflict maps include information about the conflict’s arena, actors and agenda, and analyse the conflict from these angles.⁸¹ Wehr’s conflict map included the following elements: summary description; conflict history; conflict context; conflict parties (primary, stakeholders, interested third parties); issues (facts-based, values-based, interests-based, non-realistic); dynamics (mostly concerning the relationships between the parties in social conflicts); alternative routes to solutions; factors that can potentially regulate or limit the conflict.⁸²

Conflict mapping has been popular in the literature with researchers and writers building on Wehr’s conflict mapping technique. Fischer et al use Wehr’s conflict mapping technique to look at a specific moment in the conflict, quite like a snapshot.⁸³ Mason and Rychard use conflict mapping also at the very beginning of conflict analysis but in a far more simplified and pared down way to Wehr.⁸⁴ Their conflict map is intended to simplify and visually represent the actors and their power, their relationship to each other and the issues the conflict is about.⁸⁵ Sandole seeks to categorise everything in order to capture the total complexity of dynamics (especially inter- and intra-party dynamics) of a conflict.⁸⁶

⁷⁷ Wehr, Paul. *Conflict Regulation*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, 19.

⁷⁸ Wehr, Paul. “Conflict Mapping.” *Beyond Intractability*, September 2006. <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict-mapping>

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Langton, Christopher, and Elena Rathgeber. “Re-Appraising Conflict Analysis Methodology in the 21st Century.” *Independent Conflict Research and Analysis*, 2011. <http://www.icra.uk.net/Conflict%20Analysis%20paper.pdf>, 5; Wehr, Paul. “Conflict Mapping.”

⁸¹ Langton, Christopher, and Elena Rathgeber. “Re-Appraising Conflict Analysis Methodology in the 21st Century,” 5.

⁸² Wehr, Paul. *Conflict Regulation*, 19-22.

⁸³ Fisher, Simon, Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, Jawed Ludin, Richard Smith, Sue Williams, and Steven Williams. *Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action*. London: Zed Books, 2000, 22-5.

⁸⁴ Mason, Simon, and Sandra Rychard. “Conflict Analysis Tools.” Bern: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2005. <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Conflict-Analysis-Tools.pdf>,

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Sandole, Dennis. “A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach,” 4.

Bright combines Wehr's structure with Sandole's focus on the social interactions, orientations and dynamics between and within parties.⁸⁷

Although the conflict mapping process can be complex and time-consuming and is static in terms of viewpoint and time,⁸⁸ it is a hugely valuable first step in the process of planning a conflict intervention. When dealing with long-standing and multi-faceted conflicts like Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to investigate, account for and understand the many factors at play and how they interact and affect each other.

4.2 Conflict mapping: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Not a lot of the conflict analysis of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the literature has been in the form of a conflict map or chart, still less has focused particularly on Sarajevo or on the inter-personal dimensions at which GFP's programmes will be directed. The analysis that has occurred has either focused on one dimension, level or causal factor, or has mainly focused on the causes and immediate effects of the Bosnian War. Given these narrow focuses, there is considerable scope to conduct this conflict mapping research in Sarajevo, especially to isolate the sites, causes and conditions of inter-personal and inter-group conflicts twenty years after the war.

Starting with the actual mapping that has been conducted in the literature, Gillard's study of psychological conflict mapping analyses identity among youths in Mostar who had lived there during the war.⁸⁹ It is a useful starting point because it attempts to map ethno-nationalist affinities at the inter-personal level and therefore dovetails with the focus of this research project and the work of GFP. The study found that, of the 25 people interviewed, only 14 of them had any identification with an ethno-nationality and this ethno-nationality was the most important self-identification for only 10 of them.⁹⁰ Gillard's psychological mapping also extended to how youths perceive other ethnicities and showed that identity in Mostar had been renegotiated in sometimes conflicting (i.e. negative) but mostly positive terms.⁹¹ The study is ultimately quite small (using only a sampling size of 25 participants) and, as Gillard admits, conducted with participants who already had some involvement with peace-building, which makes it difficult to extrapolate and generalise his interesting findings. Another drawback is that Gillard's study focuses on a city that is much smaller in population size and economic, political and administrative activity than Sarajevo. There is nothing to suggest that the youth of Mostar think and feel the same as the youth of Sarajevo when it comes to ethnic identity and

⁸⁷ Bright, Shay. "The Conflict Mapping Chart," <http://www.in-mediation.eu/wp-content/uploads/file/ConflictMapping.pdf>, 2-8.

⁸⁸ Langton, Christopher, and Elena Rathgeber. "Re-Appraising Conflict Analysis Methodology in the 21st Century," 8.

⁸⁹ Gillard, Steve. "Psychological 'Conflict Mapping' in Bosnia & Hercegovina: Case Study, Critique and the Renegotiation Theory." Bradford: Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2000. <https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/handle/10454/940>

⁹⁰ Ibid, 5-7.

⁹¹ Ibid, 22.

ethno-nationalist identifiers. Ultimately, however, Gillard's does say something significant and encouraging about the waning potential of ethno-nationalist identifiers to automatically polarise groups. If similar results are uncovered through this study, it could mean that there exists a soft enough landing — an environment where the seeds of tolerance already exist — for future GFP programmes in Sarajevo.

In addition to Gillard, Kivimäki et al have conducted a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of the current conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹² This study suggests that the contemporary situation in the country is affected by two main dimensions (political and economic) and three main actors: the United Nations, the European Union and the post-war government. Moreover, Kivimäki et al argue that considerable cooperation between these actors is still needed in order to address the political and economic dimensions of the conflict.⁹³ These dimensions, however, are only analysed at the macro-level and provides only limited insight to grass root issues. Although the analysis of the political dimension includes ethnic tensions at the societal level, inter-personal and inter-group interactions are not studied in great depth. Similarly, the research done by Bieber and Yusuf for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) also emphasises current sites of conflict being economic (in terms of inequality) and political (in terms of public sector governance).⁹⁴ However, both of these studies stop short of analysing these dimensions at the inter-group or inter-personal level, which is the main purpose of this research.

The existing conflict analysis focuses mostly on the causes, conditions and antagonists of the dissolution of the SFRY and Bosnian War. In analysing the causes of ethnic tension (and specifically the ethnic cleansing and displacement of the Bosnian War), many writers focus on the question of geography or territoriality, which continues to play out in post-war territorial structure, minority returns and demographic integration. Toal and Dahlman predict that the question of partition or reintegration (what Brubaker refers to as the re-mixing of peoples) still hangs over Bosnia and Herzegovina and is a site of potential conflict.⁹⁵ Brubaker concludes that Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to be “re-mixed” in order to facilitate proper societal reconciliation between groups.⁹⁶ Although some legal processes have been put in place to facilitate this mixing, Brubaker argues that these have not been as effective as hoped due to the unaddressed trauma from the war and the lack of political will to address this

⁹² Kivimäki, Timo, Marina Kramer, and Paul Pasch. “The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multi-Ethnic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Bieber, Florian. *Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Bangura, Yusuf. “Ethnicity, Inequality and the Public Sector: A Comparative Study.” Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2003. <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan018646.pdf>

⁹⁵ Toal, Gerard, and Carl T. Dahlman. *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 142.

⁹⁶ Brubaker, Rebecca. “From the Unmixing to the Remixing of Peoples: UNHCR and Minority Returns in Bosnia.” Geneva: UNHCR, August 2013. <http://www.unhcr.org/520a4ccf9.html>, 2.

trauma.⁹⁷ Thus some cities (and, more importantly, neighbourhoods within so-called multi-ethnic cities) remain ethnically homogenous.⁹⁸

Analysing Toal and Dahlman's "home versus homeland" question is hugely important for this research project as it speaks to feelings of ethnic identity and belonging superseding pan-Bosnian identity, and therefore potentially impeding social cohesion, something that GFP hopes to create through its programmes.⁹⁹ Similarly, Brubaker's idea of remixing Bosnia and Herzegovina echoes GFP's contact-theory approach, which undergirds its programmes. Through the implementation of programmes that foster regular and genuine interaction between members of groups (through playing sports or creating art together), GFP attempts to engender some sort of remixing.¹⁰⁰

The contemporary literature on conflict analysis and conflict mapping of Bosnia and Herzegovina arguably leaves considerable scope for this research project. The focus of most of the analysis in the literature discussed above has been either on macro- and institutional-level causes and conditions of conflict, or narrowly on the causes and immediate effects of the Bosnian War. While some of the analysis around these issues will be relevant to the findings of this research project, there are numerous gaps this research can strive to fill that GFP cannot easily glean from the current literature; particularly inter-personal and micro-level group relations, youth behaviour, and the conflict dynamics in Sarajevo. In order to account for this information, this research will build on a specific branch of existing conflict mapping theory, which will be outlined in the section below.

4.3 Conflict mapping framework: Sandole's Three Pillar Approach

Sandole's Three Pillar approach will be used as a framework for this research project. It is preferred to the approaches discussed above because of its detail, flexibility, cross-disciplinary (or adisciplinary) structure, it's bridging of the gap between theory and practice, and its in-built emphasis on inter-personal, inter- and intra-group dynamics.¹⁰¹ These aspects of Sandole's framework arguably suit GFP's grassroots and multi-faceted focus than the frameworks outlined above, which have tended to be bound by a specific disciplinary lens, or time and place of reference. The multi-faceted, in-depth categorising approach of Sandole's Three Pillars are apt for mapping a complex and interlocking conflict situation such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 2-6.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Toal, Gerard, and Carl T. Dahlman. *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal*, 142.

¹⁰⁰ For a discussion of the history of inter-group contact theory and its empirical success, see Pettigrew, Thomas F., Linda R. Troop, Ulrich Wagner, and Oliver Christ. "Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 35, no. 3 (2011): 271–80; Dovidio, John F., Anja Eller, and Miles Hewstone. "Improving Intergroup Relations through Direct, Extended and Other Forms of Indirect Contact." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 14, no. 2 (1 March 2011): 147–60.

¹⁰¹ Sandole, Dennis. "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach," 4-5.

Sandole's approach aims to categorise all the information needed to understand the conflict(s) under three pillars.¹⁰²

Pillar 2	Pillar 1	Pillar 3
Conflict causes and conditions	The conflict (pre-MCP, MCP/AMCP)	Conflict interventions (3 rd party interventions)
Individual Level	Parties	Conflict Prevention
Societal Level	Issues	Conflict Management
International Level	Objectives	Conflict Settlement
Global/Ecological Level	Means	Conflict Resolution
	Orientations (competitive or cooperative)	Conflict Transformation
	Environment (competitive or cooperative)	(Conflict Prevention) ¹⁰³
		3 rd party approaches
		Competitive v Cooperative
		Negative v Positive
		Track 1 v Track 2

Table 3: Sandole's Three Pillars

Pillar 1 (located as the "middle" column of a conflict map) assesses the latent or patent conflicts at play. Sandole considers conflict to be a dynamic process rather than one catalytic event. Pillar 1 covers "manifest conflict processes" (MCPs), pre-MCPs, or "aggressive conflict processes" (AMCPs).¹⁰⁴ Sandole's framework allows conflict processes to be classified flexibly in that it recognises that conflict processes can be patent, latent, aggressive, non-aggressive, physical, or psychological, and allows the conflict(s) to be located at a certain stages of the conflict cycle (from initiation to de-escalation and termination). Pillar 1, and thus the analysis of the conflict(s), places much emphasis on the parties to the conflict(s), their perceptions of the issues, and their objectives, means, orientations, and environments.¹⁰⁵ Pillar 1 not only seeks to categorise conflicts *between* parties, but interlocking, internal conflicts *within* parties that need to be addressed before and in order for inter-party conflict to be solved.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Table reproduced from Ibid, 4.

¹⁰³ Sandole differentiates between conflict prevention (which he categorises as peacebuilding or conflict transformation) and conflict prevention, conflict settlement (peacemaking), and conflict management (peacekeeping). See Ibid, 13.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 1-2. Note that aggression in Sandole's framework covers both physical and psychological violence or destruction.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 5-15.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 6-8.

Pillar 1 will be a useful lens through which to analyse group dynamics between and within Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. In terms of inter-group dynamics, it will be useful for GFP to understand each groups' general orientations, that is, whether they are cooperative or combative to all groups, or particular groups; aims, what each group defines as its mission or project, and whether that is in competition with other groups' aims or not; means of interaction, which is particularly important for GFP's emphasis on contact theory; and the environments in which each group operates and is comfortable operating in. Despite having been the focus of most of the conflict analysis literature in Bosnia and Herzegovina, these inter-ethnic group dynamics remain very difficult to understand. Sandole's approach will bring renewed detail to *how* and *why* groups interact in certain ways with each other. Most importantly, however, Sandole's approach mandates an in-depth analysis of intra-group dynamics. This will be particularly important in refreshing the conflict analysis literature about ethnic tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as there might be generational or gender differences within ethnic groups that could be bridging (or utilised by GFP to bridge) divisions and tensions.

Pillar 2 (located to the left of pillar 1) assesses the operative causes and conditions of the conflict.¹⁰⁷ Potential sources of the conflict could be individual (biological, psychological, physiological), societal (political, economic, social), international, or global (ecological).¹⁰⁸ Such sources could impact the conflict from and at any level (interpersonal, intergroup, inter-organisational, international).¹⁰⁹ It is important to know at what levels these causes and conditions operate so that solutions can target specific levels. For GFP programming purposes, causes and conditions operating at the interpersonal and intergroup levels are the most important.

Sandole's second pillar is expressly cross-disciplinary (or "adisciplinary" as he writes),¹¹⁰ incorporating numerous fields of study, which are unfortunately often kept separate, and therefore outside of conflict mapping. Sandole is highly critical of single-factor theories of conflicts because, in analysing the conflict from only one disciplinary point of view, its complexity is not adequately reflected.¹¹¹ Conflicts can be caused and fuelled by many factors that, although covered by distinct academic disciplines (from economics to psychology to politics to anthropology), interact in interlinked ways and mutually reinforcing combinations. Analysing the conflict from only one of these disciplines is short-sighted at best and dishonest at worst. In seeking holistic, cross-disciplinary causes and conditions of a conflict, Sandole's approach avoids the tendency towards single-factor theories of conflict analysis, which may exacerbate, instead of help solve, the conflict.¹¹² Bosnia and

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 16.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Burton, John W., and Dennis Sandole. "Generic Theory: The Basis of Conflict Resolution." *Negotiation Journal* 2, no. 4 (1986): 333–44.

¹¹¹ Sandole, Dennis. "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach," 16.

¹¹² Ibid.

Herzegovina is probably the poster-child for complexity with potential conflict causes and conditions touching on many fields of academic study (from law to development to psychology to political theory to economics). The sensitivity of Sandole's approach to the multi-faceted (and therefore multi-disciplinary) nature of conflict not only suits the complexities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but is also something that no other conflict mapping approach incorporates.

Conflict intervention forms Pillar 3 (located to the right of Pillar 1) and assesses intervening actors, their objectives and their orientations.¹¹³ Sandole's conception of intervention is broad and could include any or some combination of peacekeeping (violent conflict prevention or conflict management), peace making (conflict settlement or conflict resolution), or peace building (conflict transformation) objectives, as well as various orientations (competitive to cooperative; negative peace and positive peace; track I and track II processes).¹¹⁴ This pillar is particularly important in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the current constitutional and political structure is the result of extensive third-party intervention culminating in the DPA. It will also be interesting to see how more micro-level third party interventions are perceived by the parties, especially programmes that are similar to GFP's.

Sandole's Three Pillar approach has been criticised in the literature to the extent that it falls under a "generic theory of conflict".¹¹⁵ Sandole is a supporter of the generic theory and locates the conflict mapping exercise within generic theory because it aims to present a common understanding of a particular conflict as it occurs at all levels (interpersonal, intergroup, inter-societal, inter-organisational).¹¹⁶ Generic theory asserts that, based on certain human needs shared by all people, there is an objective and general pattern and nature to conflict that transcends "observable differences" like race, culture or specific institutions.¹¹⁷ It is convincing that generic theory is part of the (un) consciousness of conflict analysis since the unit of conflict analysis has shifted from institutions to human beings (and their fundamental needs).¹¹⁸ It is similarly convincing that universal patterns of behaviour in conflict do exist and are thus relevant to conflict resolution as a whole.¹¹⁹ But there are two possible arguments against generic theory: first, critics assert that patterns of human behaviour are due to genetic or cultural influences, and thus cannot be aggregated and generalised;¹²⁰ second, that generalising the nature of conflict in this way results in abstracted

¹¹³ Ibid, 18.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 18-19.

¹¹⁵ Avruch, Kevin, and Peter W. Black. "A Generic Theory of Conflict Resolutions A Critique." *Negotiation Journal* 3, no. 1 (1 January 1987): 87-96.

¹¹⁶ Sandole, Dennis. "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach," 16.

¹¹⁷ Burton, John W., and Dennis Sandole. "Generic Theory: The Basis of Conflict Resolution," 333-34.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 334-35.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Avruch, Kevin, and Peter W. Black. "A Generic Theory of Conflict Resolutions A Critique", 90-92; 95. Although Avruch and Black mostly critique logical and conceptual flaws in generic theory, they do postulate at the end of this piece that their option would be to focus more on human culture subjectively rather than assume that several human needs are innate and can thus be extrapolated to form the basis of generic theory.

analysis which could lead to broad-brush programming that does not account for cultural or other differences.

The worry that this would produce broad-brush, one-size-fits-all interventions and analysis is overstated when frameworks, such as Sandole's Three Pillar approach, both emphasise detailed analysis about the parties to the conflict and respond to the dynamism of modern conflict situations. It is contended that the main difficulty with Sandole's Three Pillar approach is probably the opposite. It has the potential to be so complex and detailed that it may be too unwieldy and ambitious to be helpful to programmers seeking to address a distinct aspect of one of the operative conflicts. Sandole's insistence on avoiding single-factor theories may also risk adding too much complexity to the ultimate conflict map especially on factors that relate to disciplines unfamiliar and out-of-reach to analysts or programmers.

However, there are two significant advantages of Sandole's Three Pillar approach that made it particularly attractive for conflict mapping in preparation of GFP programme implementation. The first is that it is designed to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Sandole emphasises the "two-culture" problem with conflict mapping; there are two, often vastly differing, approaches to the conflict between academics (or analysts) and practitioners planning to intervene.¹²¹ Although conflict mapping by its nature is developed to connect these two spheres (regardless of the mapping framework), Sandole's Three Pillar approach requires an intervening party to assess not only the intricacies (patent and latent, inter-actor and intra-actor) of the conflict, but its own objectives and orientations and the effect this may have in exacerbating or ameliorating the causes and conditions of the conflict. The focus of the third pillar is exclusively on third-party intervention. And although this is meant to only analyse the interventions that have occurred already, it is inevitable that in mapping this third pillar a third-party intervener will pick out the mistakes to avoid and the successes to reproduce from the interventions that went before it. This is of clear importance to GFP, which focuses on making a sustainable positive impact on conflict situations instead of short-lived change or, worse, exacerbating conflict causes and conditions.

Second, the approach is especially useful when considering civil society-oriented reconciliation and peace-building efforts, which is the focus of GFP programming. This framework emphasises psychological aspects of the conflict (in both Pillars 1 and 2), which often manifest in members of civil society and frequently last long after violent conflict has ceased. These psychological aspects can keep latent MCPs bubbling under the surface because they impede social cohesion and reconciliation at the inter-personal level. Sandole's approach places these conflicts at the centre of its analysis and states that these inter-personal, intra-psychic conflicts need to be addressed before

¹²¹ Sandole, Dennis. "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach," 20.

more macro conflicts can be focused on.¹²² Mapping these intra-psychic conflicts is not only incredibly useful for the implementation of peace-building programmes, such as GFP's, directed at reconciliation and society-based peace-building, but will also generate data at the specific relational level at which GFP programming is aimed.

¹²² Ibid, 8.

5. Research Questions

Three main research questions have been developed for the purpose of this research in order to outline the focus and thereby facilitate the data collection and analysis. They are all linked directly to Sandole's Three Pillar approach and the factors this framework attempts to isolate and represent on the conflict map. Questions 1 and 2 relate to Pillars 1 (the conflict) and 2 (causes and conditions of the conflict) of Sandole's framework. Question 3 relates to Pillars 2 and 3 (third-party interventions) of Sandole's framework. The research questions were designed in this way to ensure that data relevant to all three pillars is collected and analysed. The structure and logic of the research questions is as follows:

1. Who are the main parties to the conflict?

- a. What do the respondents see as the main issues that the conflict is about?
- b. What are the respondents' objectives/goals?
- c. Where do the respondents interact with other groups and how (cooperatively, combatively)?
- d. Are there any other relevant minority groups?

2. How does each party perceive themselves and the other parties?

- a. Are there any signs of derogative or positive inter-group attitudes?
- b. Are there any signs of derogative or positive intra-group attitudes?
- c. How are these expressed and along what lines are these divided (class, territory, gender etc)?
- d. Are any parties perceived as spoilers of change or to blame for the conflict?
- e. How are other minority groups perceived?

3. What are the structural and cultural factors which impact on the conflict?

- a. Is the Bosnian War considered to be a direct or indirect factor?
- b. How are the interventions by third parties (particularly organisations similar to GFP) viewed?

These research questions place specific emphasis on inter- and intra-group perceptions of each other and of the conflict. This is for two reasons. First, Sandole considers both objective and subjective party dynamics within each pillar of his conflict-mapping framework. It will be interesting to compare any deviations between objective conflict issues and dynamics (such as those discussed in the conflict context and literature review of the conflict above) and actual perceptions of groups in Sarajevo. There may be important differences between what the existing literature holds to be objectively true and what residents of Sarajevo subjectively hold to be true. It is important for GFP to understand these multiple 'truths' since they shape and guide behaviour and attitude of a variety of actors that GFP programmes might seek to target.

This leads to the second reason for this emphasis. The overall goal of GFP's Programming Framework is to instil positive and sustainable behavioural change.¹²³ Subjective perceptions of other groups have the potential to greatly influence behaviour towards those groups, even if those subjective perceptions have no objective grounding. Feelings of guilt, persecution, isolation, anger or even camaraderie or solidarity with any of these feelings can drive groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina to act with apathy, animosity or affinity with other groups. It will be important for GFP to understand these dynamics in order to tailor programming strategically. For example, if there are notable feelings of affinity between youths regardless of ethnicity, this could be an important and useful entry-point into those communities in order to bring them together and affect wider change on parents who may be more apathetic or distrustful of other ethnicities.

Moreover, subjective perceptions are vital (perhaps more so than objective ones) to understanding intra-group dynamics and the lines along which these manifest. It would be short-sighted to assume that the fault-lines of Bosnia and Herzegovina are only drawn ethnically and not based on class, gender, age, religious or social conservatism or other classifications. Any of these could be a proxy for ethnic tension or a source of conflict in its own right. With an in depth understanding of intra-group dynamics, GFP can strategically develop ways in which to make its programmes most effective. One example could be the identification of specific issues that should be addressed obliquely at first because they are too sensitive or contentious within a group. Another could be the recognition of potentially unifying issues, such as sexism or drug abuse, that affect people across all ethnic groups. Arguably, insights into these types of issues and inter-group dynamics would greatly facilitate the designing, planning, and implementation of future cycles of GFP programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹²³ See the GFP Programming Framework in note 4 above.

6. Research Methodology

6.1 Approach and justification

The research approach that will be adopted is a concurrent, mixed-method approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. The mixed-method approach is increasingly popular in research, whereas using only quantitative or only qualitative methods is considered outdated and ill-suited to the complexity of today's research problems.¹²⁴

The founding idea of mixed-method approaches is that “by combining independent measures susceptible to characteristic and dissimilar forms of error”¹²⁵ it is possible to draw conclusions and make findings with confidence that they have not been contaminated with the errors of either method.¹²⁶ Put more simply, both quantitative and qualitative methods have shortcomings and blind-spots, but these are different. In combining these methods, the blind-spot of one is illuminated and accounted for by the strength of the other. Mixed-method approaches increase the likelihood of these shortcomings being exposed and remedied.¹²⁷

Before moving into the strengths and weaknesses of the mixed-method approach, it would be useful to explore the shortcomings of the qualitative and quantitative approaches, and why these matter in research and analysis about complex phenomena like conflict. As Wheeldon and Åhlberg pithily state, research is ultimately concerned with actually capturing what we say we are capturing.¹²⁸ ‘What we are capturing’ in social science research (and especially in conflict mapping) are often intangibles: feelings, justifications and motivations for behaviour, social and anti-social behaviour etc. These intangibles are difficult to capture (and map) without two important concepts: reliability (the consistency of measurement) and validity (accuracy of measurement).¹²⁹ Quantitative approaches are excellent at ensuring reliability and consistency because their numerical focus ensures high levels of objectivity and generalisability through controlled, exactly replicable, value-neutral processes.¹³⁰ However, statistical analysis is arguably unable to capture the full complexity and nuance of human behaviour and its justifications.¹³¹ Thus, while quantitative approaches achieve reliability, they do not

¹²⁴ Bergman, Manfred Max. “Introduction: Whither Mixed Methods?” In *Advances in Mixed Methods Research: Theories and Applications*, edited by Manfred Max Bergman, 1–8. London: SAGE Publications Limited, 2008, 1; Wheeldon, Johannes P., and Mauri K. Åhlberg. “Mapping Mixed-Methods Research: Theories, Models, and Measures.” In *Visualizing Social Science Research: Maps, Methods, & Meaning*, 113–48. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications Limited, 2011, 113.

¹²⁵ Fielding, Nigel. “Analytic Density, Postmodernism, and Applied Multiple Method Research.” In *Advances in Mixed Methods Research: Theories and Applications*, edited by Manfred Max Bergman, 37–52. London: SAGE Publications Limited, 2008, 37.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 39.

¹²⁸ Wheeldon, Johannes P., and Mauri K. Åhlberg. “Maps, Limitations, and Considerations: New Directions in Social Science Research.” In *Visualizing Social Science Research: Maps, Methods, & Meaning*, 173–96. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications Limited, 2011, 178

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 178; Wheeldon, Johannes P., and Mauri K. Åhlberg. “Mapping Mixed-Methods Research: Theories, Models, and Measures,” 114.

¹³¹ Wheeldon, Johannes P., and Mauri K. Åhlberg. “Mapping Mixed-Methods Research: Theories, Models, and Measures,” 114.

achieve validity or accuracy in terms of the detail and nuance of the justifications and behaviour of the participants (and the meaning they give to this behaviour). Lastly, quantitative tools are often structured and do not allow for unexpected information to be raised from the participants themselves. These contributions might prove to be useful data on unknown aspects of the conflict.

In contrast, qualitative methods do capture these subjective, nuanced elements of human behaviour by allowing for and exploring different constructions of reality, which the participants hold and use to guide their behaviour.¹³² The information gathered from participants through qualitative methods like interviews, journal-keeping, focus group exercises is much richer and more reflective of the subjective perceptions, behaviours and lived realities of participants in society. This is important in conflict-mapping research because parties to and actors in the conflict shape (through their behaviour) and are shaped by (through the effects and their perceptions of that behaviour) the dynamics of the conflict. But what qualitative approaches have in accuracy and nuance, they lack in reliability and consistency. The knowledge examined and data produced from qualitative approaches is not capable of generalisation because it is often relatively localised.¹³³ This is largely because it is not possible to conduct in-depth, consistent, qualitative interviews and methods with a large sample-size of participants without significant time, energy and financial resources. This means that when the inherently localised data is extrapolated or produced as general, it is often lacking in analytical rigour and reliability.¹³⁴

The mixed-methods approach compensates for the reliability and consistency of qualitative methods with the corresponding strengths of quantitative methods. Likewise, mixed-methods compensates for the accuracy and nuance weaknesses of quantitative methods with the corresponding strengths of qualitative methods in these areas. Mixed-methods approaches facilitate this through their flexibility; research methods or tools can be chosen and designed specifically to counteract the defects associated with the other (quantitative or qualitative) method.¹³⁵ As will be explained below, this mutually compensating and reinforcing nature of mixed-methods research is particularly useful in the conflict context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Fielding identifies three objectives of mixed-method approaches: triangulation (confirming the validity of conclusions by ensuring that blind-spots are not shared and multiplied); complementarity (getting a wider, more comprehensive and detailed view of a phenomenon); and trigonometry (combining models in order to get a view of the phenomenon at all).¹³⁶ Cresswell et al also identify two types of mixed-method designs into which these objectives fall: concurrent (using quantitative and qualitative

¹³² Ibid, 115.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 115.

¹³⁵ Fielding, Nigel. "Analytic Density, Postmodernism, and Applied Multiple Method Research," 50.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 37-38.

methods in parallel and at the same time) and sequential (implementing quantitative and qualitative at different phases so that one method builds on and is shaped by the other).¹³⁷ This study will use a concurrent and complementary mixed-method approach. In other words, quantitative and qualitative methods (discussed below) will be implemented in a single phase with the objective of getting a more detailed, comprehensive and complete understanding of the conflicts in Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.

This approach is chosen because it best suits (a) Sandole's conflict mapping framework, (b) the nature and focus of the research questions, (c) the highly complex and multifaceted nature of the conflict, and (d) the ultimate effectiveness of GFP's programmes.

The focus of this research is to map many aspects of the conflict(s) in Bosnia and Herzegovina according to Sandole's particular framework. Sandole's Three Pillars require qualitative and quantitative data about the conflict itself, its causes and conditions, and any third party interventions that have occurred. Quantitative data about, for example, how many interventions have occurred, what they were, how many times groups interact in Sarajevo and where, is important and necessary data required by Sandole's framework. Sandole's approach is explicitly cross-disciplinary and as such emphasises psychological, attitudinal and behavioural aspects of the conflict. These subjective aspects are as important and impactful on the existence of conflict as more objective factors, and therefore also need to be mapped. Mixed-method approaches have been used with success in assessing perceptions and attitudes.¹³⁸ Conflicts (and therefore conflict mapping) by their nature are complex and multi-faceted phenomenon that involve both objective and subjective factors that influence behaviour and conflict conditions on the ground. Mixed-method approaches, because they combine the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods to measure *both* the objective and the subjective, results in greater analytic density of data and more sophisticated findings because of this deeper engagement with the research topic.¹³⁹ This greater analytic density offered by a mixed-method approach means that both the subjective and objective aspects called for by Sandole's framework could be mapped. Using only quantitative methods would only capture objective and numerically measurable aspects in Sandole's conflict-mapping framework, and would miss subjective, psychological, perception-based factors, which his framework emphasises.

Guided by Sandole's framework, the research questions above thus also require a mix of qualitative and quantitative data. The bulk of the research questions are aimed at uncovering what are the

¹³⁷ Creswell, John, Vicki Plano Clark, and Amanda Garrett. "Methodological Issues in Conducting Mixed Methods Research Designs." In *Advances in Mixed Methods Research: Theories and Applications*, edited by Manfred Max Bergman, 66–83. London: SAGE Publications Limited, 2008, 68.

¹³⁸ Gogolin, Luanne, and Fred Swartz. "A Quantitative and Qualitative Inquiry into the Attitudes toward Science of Nonscience College Students." *Journal of Research in Science Teaching* 29, no. 5 (May 1992): 487–504; Jenkins, Jeanne E. "Rural Adolescent Perceptions of Alcohol and Other Drug Resistance." *Child Study Journal* 31, no. 4 (2001): 211–24.

¹³⁹ Fielding, Nigel. "Analytic Density, Postmodernism, and Applied Multiple Method Research," 39–40.

perceptions of the three main ethnic groups towards each other, the conflict, its causes, and any interventions that have already taken place. In analysing perceptions qualitative methods are useful at determining how actors understand each other and their environment. This is because qualitative methods are based on the assumption that there is no universal notion of 'the truth', rather different conceptions and constructions of reality exist and guide behaviour.¹⁴⁰ This search for meaning is missed in a purely quantitative approach. But the research questions also require objective information about demographics, how often groups interact, where, whether these interactions are on average cooperative or combative. These are best assessed quantitatively both to save time and in order to ensure that the results of these questions are numerically comparable across the entire pool of participants. With the information of "what" and "how often" objectively and consistently determined by quantitative methods, the qualitative methods could explore "why" participants think, feel or behave in these ways. In order not to leave out any of the research questions (and thus the components of Sandole's Three Pillars), both quantitative data about what people think and qualitative data about why they think that way is needed.

The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly complex and multi-faceted. In adopting either a qualitative or a quantitative approach, there is a risk that the data collected will not be rich or nuanced enough and could lead to important inaccuracies or oversights in the ultimate mapping of the conflict. Employing a mixed approach mitigates this risk largely because qualitative methods make up for what quantitative methods lack and vice versa. But more than this, adopting a multi-method approach is adopting an attitude that challenges the taken-as-true and straightforward assumptions of singular approaches.¹⁴¹ In conflict mapping, it is important to be wary of presuming what the root causes of the conflicts are. There may be unexpected causes, conditions, issues, perceptions and ways of prioritising these that may be missed by uncritically applying the assumptions of a single approach. Because quantitative and qualitative research has such divergent paradigmatic foundations (positivism for quantitative and constructivism for qualitative),¹⁴² merging the approaches ensures that none of these philosophical assumptions exclude valuable data from the outset.

Lastly, ensuring a much richer and more accurate set of results would benefit the effectiveness of GFP's programmes, ensuring that programmes are appropriate, relevant and suitable for specific groups in Sarajevo. In applied research (the area in which GFPI works), mixed-methods approaches are considered to be a practical necessity.¹⁴³ This is because the depth of analysis produced by mixed-methods approaches "has the effect of turning research 'projects' into research

¹⁴⁰ Wheeldon, Johannes P., and Mauri K. Åhlberg. "Mapping Mixed-Methods Research: Theories, Models, and Measures," 115.

¹⁴¹ Fielding, Nigel. "Analytic Density, Postmodernism, and Applied Multiple Method Research," 39.

¹⁴² Wheeldon, Johannes P., and Mauri K. Åhlberg. "Maps, Limitations, and Considerations: New Directions in Social Science Research," 177-9; Wheeldon, Johannes P., and Mauri K. Åhlberg. "Mapping Mixed-Methods Research: Theories, Models, and Measures," 114-15.

¹⁴³ Fielding, Nigel. "Analytic Density, Postmodernism, and Applied Multiple Method Research," 48.

‘programmes’”.¹⁴⁴ This is because the data gathered and analysed from mixed-methods approaches comprehensively reflects the multi-faceted and complex nature of social phenomena like conflict. Such depth, accuracy and sophistication of the data which will ultimately be reflected in the conflict map is incredibly important for GFP to properly understand all the operative causes and manifestations of the conflict in order to ensure that future peace-building programmes have maximum effect. This is the thesis of conflict mapping: effective and sustainable solutions are contingent on a nuanced and accurate understanding of the ‘problem’.

However, the mixed-method approach inevitably has a few limitations as well. First of all, contradictory findings may be produced and may be difficult to resolve without the collection of additional data (which is not possible for this project because the researcher is not based in Bosnia and Herzegovina). This does not necessarily have to be the result of using a mixed-method approach per se, but could be a result of errors in data collection.¹⁴⁵ A possible way to resolve this is to give ultimate priority to one form of data, decided based on which method was more fully developed and consistently applied.¹⁴⁶ Another way to mitigate this limitation is to design the different research tools to capture different kinds and weighting of the data to keep overlap (and thus the potential for contradiction) to a minimum.¹⁴⁷ The latter approach was adopted for the purpose of this research. Quantitative methods were limited to the surveys used, and qualitative methods were limited to the focus group discussions. The surveys and focus groups were, as far as possible, designed to answer distinct parts of the research questions and therefore collect data on separate pillars in Sandole’s framework.

Second, integrating both sets of data in a meaningful way can be difficult.¹⁴⁸ However, it is important that such integration occurs, or else the mixed-method approach will just be a presentation of the results of two separate studies in one.¹⁴⁹ Designing and implementing comparable topics and questions for both the qualitative and the quantitative arm can simplify integration.¹⁵⁰ Further, transforming data (for example quantifying some qualitative data) can also make integration easier.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Creswell, John, Vicki Plano Clark, and Amanda Garrett. “Methodological Issues in Conducting Mixed Methods Research Designs,” 72.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Wheeldon, Johannes P., and Mauri K. Åhlberg. “Mapping Mixed-Methods Research: Theories, Models, and Measures,” 121.

¹⁴⁸ Creswell, John, Vicki Plano Clark, and Amanda Garrett. “Methodological Issues in Conducting Mixed Methods Research Designs,” 73.

¹⁴⁹ Wheeldon, Johannes P., and Mauri K. Åhlberg. “Mapping Mixed-Methods Research: Theories, Models, and Measures,” 122.

¹⁵⁰ Creswell, John, Vicki Plano Clark, and Amanda Garrett. “Methodological Issues in Conducting Mixed Methods Research Designs,” 73 discuss a study on HIV/AIDS in Thailand that uses the same topical integration approach used in this research project. Open-ended interviews (qualitative) and surveys (quantitative) were designed to address similar themes or topics based on the research questions, which made integration of data much easier.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

Third, when collecting data concurrently (as it will be collected in this research project) there is a risk that one form of collection will bias the other.¹⁵² Although this risk is more prevalent in sequential, intervention studies, there is a risk that answers to survey questions might be influenced by the group-think and self-reflection that may have emerged through a focus group discussion. This is why the survey with participants will be conducted before the focus group discussion to limit bias.

Lastly, there are general, more logistical limitations for mixed-method approaches. The first is that it may be too ambitious within the timeframe provided. The second is that mixed-method research requires both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis skills.¹⁵³ Without an equal level of proficiency in both, there may be a tendency for researchers to place more reliance on the method with which they are comfortable, reducing a 'mixed-method approach' to a quasi-mixed-method approach.

This section discussed mixed-methods research as a research method (from mostly an academic point of view) and argued that it was an appropriate method to conduct research in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of the country's complexity. The next section will outline how mixed-methods research was actually implemented in this project and will discuss what tools were designed and used.

6.2 Chosen research tools

Respondent Profile

Research was conducted using two research tools: a survey and focus group discussions. The entire respondent group consisted of 45 people: 15 Bosniaks, 15 Bosnian Croats, 15 Bosnian Serbs, with equal overall representation of gender as well as equal overall representation of younger and older group members. The size of the respondent group was largely determined by the time available in the field (which is just under two weeks). Collecting data from more than 45 participants was not feasible given the time constraints and the particular research tools to be used.

The sampling strategies used were a combination of two non-probability sampling strategies. The first strategy was akin to snowball sampling.¹⁵⁴ Members of the GFP volunteer team on the ground contacted people within their professional and personal networks to either personally participate in the study or refer people they knew to do so. In some instances, participants themselves recommended people in their own private networks to participate. The limitations to this are discussed in detail in the limitations section below. The second strategy used was purposive

¹⁵² Ibid, 79.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Luborsky, Mark R., and Robert L. Rubinstein. "Sampling in Qualitative Research Rationale, Issues, and Methods." *Research on Aging* 17, no. 1 (1 March 1995): 89–113, 98.

sampling in which participants meeting the required ethnic, age, and sex characteristics were contacted through an advert disseminated to the Employment Bureau of Sarajevo Canton's database.¹⁵⁵

Participants were interviewed in groups of 4, with each ethnic group having 4 groups of 4 (two groups of men, one group 17 to 24 years old, one group 25 to 50 year olds; and two groups of women, one group 17 to 24 years old, one group 25 to 50 years old). The participants were stratified according to ethnicity, age and sex for two main reasons. The first is that, as explained above, the three ethnic groups of Bosniak, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat have been the main parties to conflicts in Bosnia since before the dissolution of the SFRY. These ethnic divisions were evident during the Bosnian War and are evident in the geographical structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was concretised at the end of the war.¹⁵⁶ It would be remiss to assume that these divisions are not still influential and relevant in society today. Furthermore, a large category in Pillar 1 of Sandole's framework requires examination of intergroup or interparty dynamics and a good way to do this cleanly and uncomplicatedly is to isolate the various groups.¹⁵⁷

Second, Pillar 1 also requires an examination into intra-group dynamics,¹⁵⁸ which is why there was equal representation of women and men, and equal representation of youths (aged 17-24) and adults (aged 25-50). It was expected that further isolating these differences within groups would uncover any generational or gender-based differences in opinions on matters concerning the conflict. Generational differences could be particularly interesting since they may reveal that the children of the Bosnian War consider the challenges facing the country to be different (or caused by different things) to their parents. Findings that confirm generational differences will be particularly useful to GFP, since many of the organisation's programmes target youth specifically. The discussion on focus groups below goes into more detail about why isolation is important for creating a safe space for expression (and therefore data generation) by individuals who might ordinarily be 'talked over' by others.

6.2.1 Surveys

There were two research tools used in this study. Surveys were the first, and corresponded with the first research question.¹⁵⁹ Participants completed the survey on the same day as (and just before) their scheduled focus group interviews. This means that surveys could and were analysed according to the corresponding focus group in order to understand the reasons for deviant or outlying survey results. For example, participant A's survey questions was analysed according to participant A's

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Creswell, John, Vicki Plano Clark, and Amanda Garrett. "Methodological Issues in Conducting Mixed Methods Research Designs," 73.

¹⁵⁷ Sandole, Dennis. "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach," 5-8.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ See appendix 1 for a copy of the survey disseminated to participants.

focus group discussion. This was in keeping with the mutually reinforcing nature of a mixed-method approach so that the qualitative discussion in a particular focus groups can 'fill in the gaps' possibly left by those participants' answers to the survey. But it also was in line with the complementary nature of the research questions.

The survey covered three broad types of questions. The first type was general demographic information (ethnicity, age, sex, area of residence). This provided a collection of data on the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample group as a whole but also it provided a basis for analysing any patterns between these characteristics and the responses to the second set of questions below. These patterns can then be explained using any qualitative data generated through the focus groups. Second, there were a set of direct questions assessing the frequency of interactions with strangers (with no assigned ethnicity) and frequency of interactions with members from the three main ethnic groups. The stranger-interaction question was included simply to provide a baseline against which to compare inter-group interactions. The main purpose of these questions was to assess how often and where inter-group relations and interactions occur (i.e. research question 1). This information will be particularly important for GFP as GFP's "Vehicles For Peace Building" these are based expressly on contact theory.¹⁶⁰ Intergroup contact theory posits that intergroup tensions, distrust, and prejudice is reduced through increased and structured contact between groups.¹⁶¹

Third are scaled questions, which make up the bulk of the survey. These questions are intended to assess inter-group attitudes, trust and comfort. The two types of scaled questions used are Bogardus's social distance scale (which measures the acceptance by a member of one group of relationships of different intensities with a member of another) and Likert scale (which measures different levels of acceptance or agreement).^{162 163} These questions provide the most quantitative data about inter-group relations. This data has more nuance because the scales indicate varying levels of agreement or disagreement with a statement. Nuanced data about inter-group interactions will be useful to GFP because it will allow GFP to know at what level they should pitch their programmes so that they diffuse hostility (if present) and build on amicability and trust (if present).

The survey questions directly relate to Pillar 1 of Sandole's approach and research question 1. Surveys needed to be short enough so that participants did not get bored or frustrated, but also needed to cover enough ground to provide quantitative data on the research question. A concern was

¹⁶⁰ GFP's vehicles for peace building are outlined in their curriculum, they are all intended as entry points into changing behaviours and attitudes by bringing people together to foster respect, cooperation, inclusion, trust, responsibility and acceptance.

¹⁶¹ See note 100 above for contact theory sources.

¹⁶² Bogardus, Emory S. "A Social Distance Scale." *Sociology and Social Research* 17, no. 3 (1933): 265–71.

¹⁶³ For the use of the Likert scale in assessing inter-group attitudes, see McGlothlin, Heidi, and Melanie Killen. "Intergroup Attitudes of European American Children Attending Ethnically Homogeneous Schools." *Child Development* 77, no. 5 (2006): 1375–86; Corenblum, Steven, and Walter G. Stephan. "White Fears and Native Apprehensions: An Integrated Threat Theory Approach to Intergroup Attitudes." *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 33, no. 4 (2001): 251–68.

that a survey would miss things that need to be accounted for in the conflict map. However, the 'limited' focus on Pillar 1 was justified in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina where group identities and relations are prominent, and quantitative data on this will be useful in order to draw comparable conclusions about patterns pertaining to certain ethnicities, ages or genders. The limitation was also well mitigated since the focus groups not only supplemented the Pillar 1 data generated by the survey (by giving participants opportunities to explain why they interact often, seldom, with or without particular orientations) but also generated data on Pillars 2 and 3 of Sandole's framework, which lend themselves to qualitative data and discussion of supporting but distinct themes.

6.2.2 Focus groups

The second tool used was focus group discussions.¹⁶⁴ A focus group is simply an informal but subtly guided discussion by a selected group of participants about specific topics.¹⁶⁵ Focus groups have been used by social scientists and psychologists since the 1920s¹⁶⁶ and are currently used in many other sectors and disciplines including market research, healthcare,¹⁶⁷ and political opinion polling.¹⁶⁸ There are roughly four broad approaches to focus groups: the academic approach; the market-based approach; the public or non-profit approach; and the participatory approach.¹⁶⁹ The approach that best suited this research was the academic approach because it focuses on the application of a research method in order to generate and analyse data about the context, experiences and perceptions of members of a particular society in order to better understand it.

Focus groups are a helpful qualitative tool that can be used in conjunction with quantitative tools such as surveys in order to produce richer data and mitigate some of the constraints of quantitative surveys (for example, upshots from the survey data — 'the what' — could be followed up by questioning during focus groups to explain 'the why'). Since this project used a mixed-method approach to data collection, this assistive function of focus groups made them an apposite research tool.

Focus groups also produce unique data on group interactions and dynamics that are not perceivable during one-on-one interviews.¹⁷⁰ Focus groups produce information about how and why groups interact in a specific way about an issue, and what the 'collective' or 'group narrative' about an issue

¹⁶⁴ See appendix 2 for a copy of the focus group outline which was used to structure each focus group discussion.

¹⁶⁵ Beck, Leif C., William L. Trombetta, and Scott Share. "Using Focus Group Sessions before Decisions Are Made." *North Carolina Medical Journal* 47, no. 2 (February 1986): 73–74.

¹⁶⁶ Colucci, Erminia. "'Focus Groups Can Be Fun': The Use of Activity-Oriented Questions in Focus Group Discussions." *Qualitative Health Research* 17, no. 10 (1 December 2007): 1422–33, 1423.

¹⁶⁷ Kitzinger, Jenny. "The Methodology of Focus Groups: The Importance of Interaction Between Research Participants." *Sociology of Health & Illness* 16, no. 1 (1993): 103–21, 104.

¹⁶⁸ Wilkinson, Sue. "Focus Group Methodology: A Review." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 1, no. 3 (1 January 1998): 181–203, 181–2.

¹⁶⁹ Hennink, Monique M. *Focus Group Discussions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 13–15.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

is.¹⁷¹ As the group interacts, members prompt and are prompted by the views of others, which makes them refine, clarify and add depth to their own and others' attitudes and perceptions.¹⁷² The group environment not only brings out different perspectives, but the ensuing discussion refines those perspectives through having to provide some examples for and the reasoning behind having those perspectives.^{173 174} This nuance and refinement is invaluable in a conflict mapping approach such as Sandole's that places huge emphasis on (inter- and intra-) group perceptions, attitudes and actual interaction.¹⁷⁵ The unique data on interactions and the quality of the data in respect of actual perceptions of different groups were strong reasons for choosing this qualitative research tool over one-on-one interviews.

Moreover, the time constraints in the field meant that one-on-one interviews with all 45 participants were not feasible. Focus groups are a popular and useful tool to quickly and inexpensively generate a large amount of qualitative data on group and interpersonal interactions, methods of communication, and understandings or interpretations.¹⁷⁶ Because time in the field for this project was limited to two weeks, a research tool that was efficient, and which covered a large pool of participants and still produced detailed qualitative data was essential. In line with this, the focus group guides used in this research were semi-structured, and correspond to all the three research questions discussed above (although their main focus is on questions 2 and 3). This allowed flexibility in the discussion in order for explanations to be teased out to generate detailed data, but also ensured enough structure to prevent the discussions from going off track and generating tangential, irrelevant data.

However, there is a real fear with mixed (ethnic, age, sex) groups that the discussion could turn acrimonious or uncomfortable and would not generate any useful data, or that certain identities (principally women and youths) would feel silenced by the presence of more dominant identities because of social norms and inequalities.¹⁷⁷ Isolating the groups creates a safe space where opinions that are not ordinarily expressed because of gender norming or ageism can be expressed. For this project each ethnic group (Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Serb) had four focus groups: two focus groups for 17-24 year olds (one all-male group and one all-female group) and two focus groups for 25-50 year olds (one all-male group and one all-female group). Stratifying groups into ethnicities, age groups and sexes within those age groups was important in order to isolate intra- and intergroup perceptions, behaviours and attitudes, which is vital to Sandole's emphasis on intra-group dynamics. But in a multi-facted conflict situation like Bosnia and Herzegovina, navigating such dynamics in

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 2.

¹⁷² Ibid, 3.

¹⁷³ Wilkinson, Sue. "Focus Group Methodology: A Review," 187.

¹⁷⁴ Hennink, Monique M. *Focus Group Discussions*, 2.

¹⁷⁵ Sandole, Dennis. "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach," 8.

¹⁷⁶ Kitzinger, Jenny. "The Methodology of Focus Groups: The Importance of Interaction Between Research Participants, 103-5.

¹⁷⁷ See the discussion about women being silenced in a mixed focus group containing men in Chabot, Cathy, and Jean Shoveller. "Fieldwork: Observations and Interviews." In *Designing and Conducting Gender, Sex, & Health Research*, edited by John L. Oliffe and Lorraine J. Greaves, 105–26. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications Limited, 2012, 123.

mixed focus groups can be troubling and threatening for participants, which made stratification vital to ensuring that participants felt safe and comfortable.

The biggest strength of focus groups — the group dynamic — can also be its biggest weakness. Focus groups depend on free-flowing discussion, which in turn depends on members of the group feeling engaged, present, safe and comfortable enough with each other to share their opinions. It can be difficult to establish comfort and engagement early in the focus group when everyone is unfamiliar; at any time during the focus group (but especially towards the end) when interest or attention dips; with particularly reclusive or more reflective participants; or on particularly sensitive issues.¹⁷⁸ Exercises or activity-oriented questions have been used to overcome discomfort, withdrawal and boredom. A range of activities have been used in the past including free listing, word association, pile sorting, role playing, storytelling.¹⁷⁹ These activities serve three purposes: first, they break the ice and get the participants used to contributing and discussing; second, they provide a non-threatening, indirect ways to approach and discuss highly sensitive issues that perhaps cannot or should not be asked directly; and third, they reinvigorate the focus group when participants grow fatigued towards the end.

The focus groups for this project made extensive use of such activities in order to warm participants up, gather information on contentious issues obliquely, and re-energise the group towards the end. Each focus group opened with a modified word-association activity. Instead of associating two words with each other as in traditional word-association exercises, participants were asked to associate a colour with a series of words and then discuss the reasons behind their chosen colour.¹⁸⁰ The series started with relatively uncontentious and innocuous words and gradually built up to discussing ethnic identifiers like “Bosniak”, “Bosnian Croat”, “Bosnian Serb”. The aim was not to analyse what colour was ultimately chosen, but the reasons behind the colour as a segue into what groups think of other groups, how they define other groups, and why. Colours were seen as preferable to words because they could indicate vagueness, hostility, amicability, trust, distrust, proximity, distance and various other sentiments in a non-threatening and somewhat subconscious way. Colours — and the sentiments they invoke — are more intuitive, sincere and subjective (and therefore less pejorative, clear-cut and committal) than words. This not only adds nuance to how the participants feel about other groups (which was far more complicated than a hate-love binary), but also allows insight into what participants *really* think — as opposed to what they might say they think for the sake of political correctness.

¹⁷⁸ Colucci, Erminia. “‘Focus Groups Can Be Fun’: The Use of Activity-Oriented Questions in Focus Group Discussions,” 1424.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 1424-26.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 1428. Similar analogy or personification techniques have been used by Colucci in the context of youth suicide.

The second activity-based question was a modified free-list which occurred at the end of the focus group discussion. Participants wrote down and displayed what they perceived to be the three most important challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina. After surveying them all they then had to pick one that most affects their daily lives and explained their choice to the group. This activity, much like the colour exercise, was used for a practical as well as strategic-methodological purpose. The exercise was an opportunity to reinvigorate the group in the final stages of the focus group interview and structure a discussion about possible conflicts present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, importantly, it was also an opportunity to gain insight into what participants subjectively perceived to be the most pertinent 'conflicts'. Sandole's approach emphasises objective and subjective information, meaning that it also treats perceived conflicts and subjective lived-realities as valuable information. Knowledge about what ordinary citizens perceive to be the most important, most immediate conflicts that affect their day-to-day lives is hugely relevant to GFP's grassroots programming.

6.3 Method of analysis

The general aim of the data analysis will be to seek out any differences or similarities between and within ethnic groups. The methods outlined below will focus on identifying any distinct patterns to the answers given by certain ethnic groups, and, if there are any intra-group differences or similarities, whether these are delineated by sex, age or area of residence. For example, if youth, across ethnicities, are more likely to be ethnically tolerant and more integrated, then this could be used by GFP as a suitable soft-entry point from which to effect wider social change.

In order to account for this information, the collected survey data will be quantified graphically (using a stacked graph to represent all answers to the scaled questions) per ethnic group in order to isolate inter-ethnic comfort with interactions. Analysis will then zoom into specific questions (for example inter-ethnic marriages) and use graphs in order to compare average responses across ethnicities, genders and ages. This approach aims to identify any patterns of behaviour or attitudes specific to ethnic groups (which is the inter-party element of Sandole's first pillar). Moreover, doing so will also enable identification and analysis of aspects where women and men (or youths and elders) think and behave differently. This is in turn an important part of the intra-party element of Sandole's first pillar.¹⁸¹ Graphical representation of the quantitative results is a simple but visually impactful way to compare overall answers and answers across groups.

Furthermore, demographic answers from the surveys will be analysed in order to perhaps explain differences in answers to the interaction questions. The direct questions will be analysed according to

¹⁸¹ Sandole, Dennis. "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach," 6–8.

the most frequently occurring option so that GFP knows where most of the inter-ethnic interactions in Sarajevo are taking place. This information could indicate 'safe spaces' that GFP could use for future programming.

The qualitative focus group data will be analysed according to Kruger's Framework Analysis because this is a manageable and thematic method of analysing large amounts of data from interviews.¹⁸² Since the focus groups will be conducted in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, the focus group interviews will be transcribed into English. These transcriptions are what will be analysed using Kruger's framework. The framework consists of the following steps: familiarisation with the data (in the form of transcripts of the focus group sessions), identifying recurring themes, indexing the transcripts according to those themes, charting (lifting quotes and statements and rearranging them under these themes), mapping and interpreting the data under the themes in relation to the research questions. Kruger's method of analysis is a manageable way of digesting, sorting through and ultimately analysing large quantities of transcript data (which is what the focus groups will generate). The Framework will help to direct and streamline the data-analysis process. But, more importantly, Kruger's thematic focus is relevant to the goals of this project's data analysis in that conflict themes and inter-group and intra-group patterns are being sought out in order to provide GFP with information about which issues to tackle, how, where, with whom, and in what order.

Information explaining inter-group interactions or intra-group divisions will be focused on because this could explain the patterns produced by the quantitative data. In particular, the colour exercise could reveal more sincerely held descriptions of other ethnicities and minority identities, that participants may not openly admit for the sake of political correctness or hypothetical comfort with close social interactions. Thus, this type of social desirability could be circumvented using this participatory exercise.

Equally important to the other two pillars of Sandole's framework will be narratives about the Bosnian War and about the country's historical development. Who is considered to be heroes, villains, morally blameworthy, morally guilty, and morally innocent could also reveal truths about inter-group trust and animosity. Most importantly, participants' perceptions of what the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina are (especially which conflicts are considered to be most important and most impactful on everyday lives) will be useful for GFP, which works at the micro-level. There may be a significant difference between what ordinary citizens feel are the most pressing issues (and the levels at which these operate) and what academics conclude to be the most pressing issues.¹⁸³ Sandole's approach allows

¹⁸² See a summary of Kruger's framework in Rabiee, Fatemeh. "Focus-Group Interview and Data Analysis." *Proceedings of the Nutrition Society* 63, no. 04 (November 2004): 655–60.

¹⁸³ For example, the conflict analysis of Bosnia and Herzegovina that has been conducted (discussed under section 4.2) only focus on inter-ethnic tensions as a source of conflict. There is only journalistic analysis of corruption and economic decline, but these are not analysed as sources of latent or patent conflict.

for both views to be accounted for (and often both represent two sides of the same coin) but information about micro-level causes and consequences of conflicts is what is useful and relevant for GFP programming.

7. Ethical Considerations

When conducting research that involves interviews with other people, ethical considerations are important to keep in mind.¹⁸⁴ Ethical considerations may even become more tangled when dealing with post-conflict trauma or memories connected to war or conflict. The researcher in this study did not have any experience with interviewing subjects who had lived-experiences of war-related trauma. Because of this, every care was taken to ensure that surveys and interviews were designed and conducted with respect, consent, confidentiality, and without (intended or unintended) coercion, manipulation or pressure. Participants were not asked direct questions that might bring up painful or uncomfortable experiences. And if such experiences happened to come up organically, participants were not required to say any more about these experiences than they wanted to.

Participants were asked to give their verbal consent (which was recorded on the Dictaphone at the start of the focus group sessions) to the focus group interviews being recorded and the data collected from the entire session to be used, anonymously, in the findings of this report. Anonymity was ensured throughout the interview and survey process. None of the surveys displayed the names of the participants and no names were used in the focus group interviews. Based on how the participants were seated, the researcher randomly assigned numbers 1 to 4 to each of the participants just in order to assist transcription and matching focus group answers with survey answers. None of the transcriptionists were made aware of the identities of the participants.

Finally, all transcriptionists signed a confidentiality agreement, in terms of which transcriptionists could not disclose any of the content of the Dictaphone recordings they received or the transcripts they produced. They also had to delete all files from their computer hard-drives when they had completed the transcription. These mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the study was conducted in the most ethically sound way possible.

¹⁸⁴ Woliver, Laura R. "Ethical Dilemmas in Personal Interviewing." University of South Carolina, December 2002. https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/298/docs/interviewing_techniques_ethical_dilemmas.pdf, 677–78.

8. Limitations

The limitations that this research project faced occurred during data collection. These limitations were identified as they arose and the research team managed to contain their effect on the data generated. Some limitations, like sample size, could not be completely mitigated and therefore will have a particular effect on the generalisability of this study.

8.1 Sample size

An obvious limitation is that the sample size of participants for this research project had to be restricted to 45 participants given the time constraints in the field. This means that while the data generated from the participants was useful and illuminating, it is only representative of a very small segment of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is arguably limiting the generalisability of the data obtained. However, restricting the pool of participants to 45 was necessary for the timely and proper execution of the research design, which emphasised time-intensive data collection through focus groups that were in turn designed to complement the quantitative data generated by the surveys. It would not have been possible, given the limited time available for data collection, to expand the pool of participants and still implement both of these research tools. That being said, steps were taken to ensure that the pool of participants were equitably representative of ethnicity, age, gender, class, and geographical location. Ethnic, age and gender divisions were an integral part of the research design of this project (as discussed above) because the aim was to tease out any intra-group differences along these identifiers. But geographical and (especially) class divisions were also illuminating at times (as will be seen from the discussion of the findings below).

8.2 Participant selection

Participant selection is also a limitation that was caused by time constraints, cancellations, lack of sufficient notice given to potential participants before the research team arrived in Sarajevo, and the particular snowballing-cum-purposive sampling strategy the research team used. A combination of these factors meant that some participants were pulled from the research team's personal contacts and often at short notice. An immediate problem with this was that many of the participants from the personal networks of the research team were already personally committed to or vocationally involved in peace building. This meant that the data these participants generated was possibly — but not necessarily — representative of the views of the average citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to mitigate this, the research team contacted the Employment Bureau of Sarajevo Canton and posted an advert for participants. A few people responded to the advert and did participate. They were a useful addition to the participant pool because they were all job-seekers who were directly

affected by Bosnia and Herzegovina's poor economic conditions, and therefore voiced different views, interests, and attitudes to some of the research team's filial connections.

However, this limitation must not be overblown. Not all of the participants were filially connected to members of the research team, so there was still significant data gathered from citizens who were not vocationally and personally pre-disposed to peace-building. Even for those participants who were from these personal networks, they did express views that were sincerely held and not necessarily always politically correct. Further, because the research design explicitly required equitable age, gender and ethnic representation, diverse views were recorded and the findings from the data generated are by no means one-dimensional or unhelpful.

8.3 Translation

Translation proved to be a difficulty during the focus group discussions in two senses. The first was that initially focus groups were conducted in English with the translator's service only used if the participants could not express themselves confidently in English. This proved to be suboptimal as it hindered organic and spontaneous discussion, and because it tended to alienate members of the group who were not confident in their English proficiency. This was quickly corrected and the discussions were conducted completely in Bosnian, Serbian or Croatian from the third focus group onwards.

This brought the second translation complication into play. Well into the research schedule the transcriptionists discovered that the translator working with the groups was giving a general interpretation or summary of what participants were saying, rather than translating their words verbatim for the moderator. This meant that the follow-up questions the moderator gave were often misplaced and stilted because she was getting a different picture of the conversation through the translator. This undoubtedly affected how much the moderator could uncover and direct discussion *during* the focus groups. This was particularly unfortunate because the strength of focus groups (especially the semi-structured type that was chosen for this study) lies in the moderator being able to pursue the participants' trains of thought and ask questions that open up reasoning, feelings and intentions that were not immediately forthcoming. This could not be rectified in the field because the translator could not be changed by the time it was discovered that translation was suboptimal. Transcripts were therefore wholly relied upon in data analysis in order to overcome this limitation.

9. Findings

The findings in this section will be structured according to the three pillars of Sandole's framework for conflict mapping. The findings will start with pillar 1, which focuses on the active conflicts, its parties, and their interactions, interests and orientations. The discussion will then move onto pillar 2, which discusses the causes and conditions of the conflicts identified in pillar 1. As will be seen, there are extensive overlaps and connections between the findings in pillars 1 and 2, but the structure here attempts to keep them as distinct as possible. Sandole's approach emphasises subjective perceptions as motivators for action and behaviour, so the discussions of pillars 1 and 2 will emphasise what the participants actually perceived to be the most important conflicts, parties, causes and conditions.¹⁸⁵ This is important for ensuring that GFP programmes actually target the issues that matter most to the every-day lives of citizens. Lastly, the findings for pillar 3, international interventions, will be discussed. The focus of this research has intentionally been on pillars 1 and 2, which makes the findings on pillar 3 comparatively shorter. This is mainly because Sandole's third pillar is outward-looking, in that it categorises macro-level intervention by international actors (such as NATO, the EU, the UN). Since GFP's focus is not at this level, the scope of pillar 3 was accordingly limited. Although the data generated from both the surveys and the focus group interviews was extensive, this section discusses only those findings that are directly relevant to GFP's focus and programming.

9.1 Pillar 1: Conflicts

Pillar 1 of Sandole's approach deals with the active and potential conflicts at play in a given context. Pillar 1 aims to categorise the conflicts that can and do exist; what issues are in contention within these conflicts; the parties to a conflict as well as their means, objectives, and orientations (combative or cooperative); and the nature of the conflict environment (combative or cooperative). All of the quantitative data gathered (and a lot of the qualitative data) corresponds to Pillar 1. The qualitative and quantitative methods employed were designed to focus primarily on potential conflicts that occur at the level at which GFP programming focuses so these are the conflicts that this section identifies and discusses.

9.1.1 Inter-group relations

The largest, and arguably most relevant, group of findings in this research relate to inter-group relations in Sarajevo, in particular, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in general. All of the quantitative data and a significant portion of the qualitative data relate to the nature and quality of relationships between the three main ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. These three groups can therefore be said to be the main actors (or parties, as per Sandole's framework) in

¹⁸⁵ See discussion of Sandole's framework at 4.3 above.

conflicts relating to intergroup relations in Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whenever participants spoke about the most salient problems facing the country — even when not speaking about inter-group relations — they spoke about the actors being these three groups. This means that ethnicity is still very much a part of the national discourse and, at the individual level, inextricably linked to self-definition and identification. The delineation of groups into Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb therefore cannot be discounted in this or any other conflict analysis, and it would not be wise for GFP to downplay the weight these identities and labels carry in the hearts and minds of citizens. This accords with the historical significance of these three ethnic groups discussed in the conflict context above. Throughout Bosnian and Herzegovinian history, these three ethnic groups have been major contenders in political, economic and social arenas.

Interestingly, other identified groups, such as the Roma and Jewish communities, were spoken of with consistent ambivalence and distance across all focus groups. During the colour-association exercise, participants almost always assigned these groups hazy and opaque colours like grey, brown or black, and described the Roma and Jewish communities as either exoticised or generic but distant caricatures, or simply unknowns. Statements like “I don’t really know much about them” or “they are different from others” were common.¹⁸⁶ Faceless stereotypes of the happy gypsy or the grumpy, rich Jew were also common but seemed to show no substantial integration or filial relationships with the Roma and Jewish communities.¹⁸⁷ This distance might be a latent conflict in itself, one that GFP would want to address, since it would not be the first time in history that minorities of ‘strangers’ were blamed for economic challenges and other hardships. However, the distancing by all Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats of the Roma and Jewish communities could arguably be used as common ground from which GFP can unthreateningly and obliquely tackle the “othering”, stigmatisation, and social distrust between Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats.

From the data generated, it seems that the issues characterising relations between Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats are twofold: (a) ethno-nationalism propagated mainly by the political elites; and (b) a lack of social integration (i.e. the prevalence of social distance).

(a) Ethno-nationalism

All focus groups listed ethno-nationalism as one of the most important and distressing challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina. The participants spoke of ethno-nationalism being driven by two sets of actors: political elites and expatriates. As the quote below illustrates, participants believe that expatriates tend to be the most vicious on social media and Internet chat-rooms, often propagating hateful and extreme ethno-nationalist sentiments:

¹⁸⁶ Focus Group 7 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 August 2015; Focus Group 11 with Bosniak women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

¹⁸⁷ Focus groups 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 used these stereotypes during the colour-association exercise.

Participant 2: And today on the Internet, young people are fighting.

Participant 1: But who fights on the Internet? Klix publishes something, Radio Sarajevo publishes something, and there are lots and lots and lots of comments. And I open profiles of the people that comment that, just to see.

Participant 4: Balavurdija. (Translation-slang: young uneducated kids from the block)

Participant 3: [T]he diaspora. I personally think that they are more extremist than people from here. I don't know who said it, but I like it: if only we had Internet in '90s, maybe we'd use keyboards, and not guns.¹⁸⁸

However, this quote also shows that online nationalist hate may not only be the work of the diaspora. Participant 4's use of the word "balavurdija" implies that local youths also engage in this type of activities. Although it is probably out of GFP's reach to prevent expatriates from commenting hatefully online, this is still an important aspect of inter-group relations and interactions for GFP to consider while designing and planning future programmes addressing underlying tensions affecting these.

The main reason for the growing ethno-nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina suggested from the focus groups was that politicians are manipulating ethnic divisions, especially in more rural parts of the country. As visible in the excerpt below, participants believe that politicians go beyond the common conduct of incentivising voters to vote for them and actually use fear-driven campaigns in order to mobilise support:

Moderator: And are there other differences in politics and thinking in politics between Bosnian Serbs living here in Sarajevo and Bosnian Serbs living elsewhere?

Participant 1: Yes, there is. In smaller cities and villages people are more likely to vote for parties which will give them some benefits.

Participant 3: Because some parties are so corrupt that they will go to some villages and they will give people some food or a little bit of money and ask them to vote for them.

Participant 2: Brainwashing.

Participant 1: And they go as far as to say to them, if you do not vote for us, there will be war.¹⁸⁹

All focus groups cited the conduct of politicians as the main reason that ethno-nationalism was still rife in Bosnia and Herzegovina, highlighting the role of political elites in shaping inter-group perceptions and relationships. This intentional fear-mongering by politicians is worrisome, since it threatens to further fracture society along ethnic lines by breeding distrust and suspicion. The above quote situates this type of campaigning in the smaller cities and villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina

¹⁸⁸ Focus Group 1 with Bosniak men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015.

¹⁸⁹ Focus Group 10 with Bosnian Serb men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4 August 2015.

— therefore situating the greatest potential for distrust in the less urbanised geographical areas of the country. Some participants went further, suggesting that the reasons politicians target these areas is because the populations here tend to be less educated, less worldly, and therefore more susceptible to manipulation. This highlights an additional perceived cleavage between urban and rural areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of inter-group attitudes. While different geographical areas might be targeted by politicians for a variety of different reasons, GFP should in other words not be too quick to assume (without further research conducted on this issue) that ethno-nationalist political campaigning is only conducted in less urban areas outside of Sarajevo. As the analysis of the data relating to social integration and social distance below will show, the position that Sarajevo is an island of tolerance and integration is not entirely true as per the participants' own accounts and responses. Still, participants were adamant that it was at the very least more integrated and thus more tolerant than smaller towns and villages.

That notwithstanding, it is concerning that a noticeable aspect of the political culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina is (or, at least, is perceived to be) so radicalised. The upshot of this could certainly be the worsening of inter-ethnic relations. Thus, programming aimed at increasing contact and trust between groups in general could be a bulwark against the fear-mongering strategies of politicians. If strong inter-personal connections exist between people from different ethnicities, there may be far less of a chance that politicians can sew seeds of inter-ethnic distrust.

(b) Social integration and social distance

All of the quantitative data generated through the use of focus groups and questionnaires was used to assess social distance and interaction between ethnic groups in Sarajevo. The data revealed several interesting findings, which were deepened by the qualitative data from by the focus group discussions.


The first finding relates to the predisposition of groups to co-mingle and interact socially. All groups, as shown by the table below, are significantly likely to interact with someone from another ethnic group when they first meet. This means, for the participants in this study, there was not much hesitation or discomfort with the idea of social interactions with members of other ethnic groups, even upon the first meeting.

	Bosniak	Bosnian Serb	Bosnian Croat
Likely	87%	53%	93%
Somewhat likely	7%	27%	0%
Neutral	0%	20%	7%
Somewhat unlikely	6%	0%	0%
Unlikely	0%	0%	0%


Table 4: Participants' likelihood of talking to a person from another group when they first meet

This significant predisposition towards integration on a purely social level was reinforced by the results shown in Figure 1 below, which demonstrates significant general levels of comfort with inter-ethnic friendships.

Bosniak participants' levels of comfort



Bosnian Serb participants' level of comfort



Bosnian Croat participants' level of comfort




Figure 1: Level of comfort with inter-ethnic friendships

Arguably, most of the participants representing either of the three groups expressed little or no reservation for either talking to members of other ethnic groups for the first time. Similarly, most of them also expressed relatively high levels of comfort in terms of having inter-ethnic friendships. These findings thereby seem to downplay the presumption that inter-ethnic tensions limit friendly inter-group interactions at the grass root level. These results were further corroborated by the focus group discussions in which participants openly spoke about their inter-ethnic friendships and neighbours. It was often these filial relationships that positively influenced how participants chose to

describe certain ethnic groups. This is well illustrated by the warmth with which the Bosnian Serb participants in the following excerpt speak about their Bosnian Croat and Bosniak friends:

Moderator: What colour did you choose for “Bosniak?”

Participant 3: Yellow. For Bosniak and Bosnian Croat. Because they are open and kind and they are my friends, I have a lot of friends. And they are so nice. (...)

Participant 4: I choose also yellow but different reason. One of my best friends is Bosnian Croat and her name is Sunshine and that’s the reason.¹⁹⁰


The significant and widespread levels of comfort with the idea of inter-ethnic friendships and interacting across all groups not only indicates that inter-ethnic interactions are common and often positive, but also perhaps bodes well for the success of programmes like GFP’s which aim to bring groups together and cement these levels of comfort. However, openness to and comfort with inter-ethnic friendships *hypothetically* does not automatically translate to widespread and significant *actual* integration in Sarajevo, especially not in an intimate emotional sense. As soon as questions started to pry deeper into inter-ethnic relations, calling for more intimacy and trust (especially on the issue of marriage), the responses from participants began to change.

All ethnic groups were more or less “neutral” about whether they would instantly trust a person from different ethnic group whom they just met, with a significant portion of participants answering that they would not be likely to do so. 27% of the Bosniak, 20% Bosnian Serb, and 27% Bosnian Croat participants surveyed agreed that they would not instantly trust a member of another ethnicity. 27% of Bosnian Croat participants also said they would not instantly trust a member of their own ethnicity, but for Bosniak and Bosnian Serb participants this outright denial of trust dropped to 6% and 14% respectively when it was someone from their own ethnic group.


This decrease in comfort with regards to more intimate relationships with members of other ethnic groups was particularly noticeable when it came to the topic of mixed marriages. Although comfort levels with inter-ethnic marriages amongst participant groups were generally high, when comparing Figure 2 with Figure 1 above, there is a noticeable drop in comfort when it comes to intimate relationships (marriage) compared with platonic relationships (friendship). These levels of discomfort were further delineated when participants were asked about how comfortable they were with a member from their own group marrying a member from another. There seems to be considerable hesitation about intimate relationships between ethnic groups, especially when the participants’ own ethnic group was one of the parties in such a relationship. The possible reasons for this are discussed further below.

¹⁹⁰ Focus Group 3 with Bosnian Serb women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 30 July 2015.

Bosniak participants' level of comfort



Bosnian Serb participants' level of comfort



Bosnian Croat participants' level of comfort




Figure 2: Level of comfort with inter-ethnic marriages

Although Figure 2 indicates more diffuse levels of comfort with inter-ethnic marriage, on the whole, participants were generally not totally uncomfortable with the idea, given that no single group's discomfort (calculated by adding each group's 'uncomfortable' and 'somewhat uncomfortable' percentages) was above 20%.

This arguably means that GFP will have to consider a few things before designing and planning future programmes. First, marriage (a hugely emotionally intimate relationship requiring much personal, social and emotional investment) was used here as a guide to gauge comfort levels in inter-ethnic relationships that were deeper, more emotionally significant, and less superficial than acquaintances or workplace friendships. The data generated by the participants does suggest that there is an acceptance for these kinds of emotionally significant, inter-ethnic relationships. This is encouraging for GFP's future programmes, but also for the state of inter-ethnic relations in general. However without a much broader study and without statistical information about the prevalence of inter-ethnic marriage, GFP cannot rely completely on the generalisability of these levels of comfort about inter-ethnic marriage when assessing levels of comfort in engaging in inter-group activities. This is especially the case as many of the participants were themselves children of such marriages. GFP can thereby not assume that the participants' comfort levels with intimate or filial inter-ethnic relationships is representative of society, and therefore points to a soft-landing for GFP programmes that are designed to foster filial inter-ethnic relations. Last, even if these levels of comfort with inter-ethnic marriage were true and could be extrapolated for the whole of Sarajevo, the participants seem to suggest that Sarajevo is unique in regards its ethnic co-mixing. Again, more research is required about the comfort levels of intimate inter-ethnic interactions if GFP would like to expand its programming to areas outside of Sarajevo.

In comparing Figures 1 and 2, it can be argued that the positive attitudes to inter-ethnic friendships and inter-ethnic marriages are not symmetrical. Table 5 illustrates the drop in comfort with inter-ethnic friendships and inter-ethnic marriages more explicitly. It is interesting to note that Bosnian Serbs have the biggest drop (at 38%) in comfort between inter-ethnic friendships and inter-ethnic marriages. Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats have the same percentage drop in comfort (11%).

	Bosniak	Bosnian Serb	Bosnian Croat
Comfort level for inter-ethnic friendships	60%	67%	84%
Comfort level for inter-ethnic marriages	49%	29%	73%
Difference	11%	38%	11%

Table 5: Change in levels of comfort for inter-ethnic friendships and inter-ethnic marriages

The drop in comfort is arguably influenced in part by differing trends of acceptance of relationships involving certain combinations of groups. Figure 3 below depicts the levels of comfort regarding inter-ethnic marriage, but with the parties to the marriage disambiguated. It shows that marriages where one of the parties is the in-group (e.g. Bosniaks) cause more discomfort than marriages where both parties are the out-group (e.g. Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats). These 'out-group-out-group' combinations elicit either considerable support or ambivalence, but no discomfort (unlike 'in-group-out-group' combinations).

From the spread of the data depicted in the graphs in Figure 3, it is clear that the Bosnian Serb participants had far more diverse reactions to inter-ethnic marriage, even where it was between both out-groups. On the other hand, Bosnian Croat participants were on the whole the most accepting of every combination of inter-ethnic marriage (including in-group combinations). Bosniak participants fell in between, displaying a little more acceptance of inter-ethnic marriage than the Bosnian Serb participants, but also matching the Bosnian Serb participants' ambivalence and acceptance of out-group-out-group marriages with varying disapproval of in-group-out-group marriages. Emotional out-group-in-group relationships, the type that GFP arguably seeks to build, can therefore be said to still be contentious among certain groups. The breakdown of the levels of comfort of the different combinations of inter-ethnic marriages are observable below.






Figure 3: Participants' levels of comfort regarding different combinations of inter-ethnic marriage

Regarding the data above, there are two possible and interrelated explanations for these trends visible in the quantitative aggregations of the questionnaires. The first is the distance with which the 'out-group-out-group' relationships are viewed. During the focus groups, many of the participants chose to describe and speak about out-groups in nebulous and distant language. For example, during the introductory colour-association exercise, participants most often associated groups with the colours of their flags and crests but could not explain or give any personal or relational characteristics when describing why they chose those specific colours. Some other participants openly regarded certain ethnicities with suspicion, speaking about Bosnian Serbs one participant said:

I chose white. Because they are people but I do not know or perceive them... It is not prejudice since I do have some [Bosnian Serb] friends. But I do have some distance.¹⁹¹

This distancing could explain why participants are ambivalent or even more comfortable with out-group marriages or friendships than they are if such concerned a member of their group. It is arguably understandable and easy to be comfortable with something that does not affect your identity directly, and an 'out-group-out-group' marriage would not. However, the distance with which participants spoke of other ethnic groups could reveal something more about inter-group relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, something beyond inter-marriage. Social distance could perhaps indicate minimal levels of social and personal exchange on a deep and meaningful level. Participants might associate and interact with members of other groups in every day life, but these interactions are arguably still at arms length and therefore are not examples of cohesive, emotionally invested and open inter-group relations. This view (of minimal integration in a significant sense) would accord with Brubaker's research discussed above, in the sense that Sarajevo needs to undergo significant and widespread re-mixing of ethnicities if inter-group relations and reconciliation is to exist.¹⁹²

The second explanation compounds the first and applies most often to Bosniak participants. In this case, religion was given as the primary reason against inter-ethnic marriage. Some participants viewed inter-ethnic marriage not so much as a union between incompatible *ethnicities*, but as a union between incompatible *religions*. Focus Group 7 (Bosniak women under 24) had this to say about inter-ethnic marriage:

Participant 1: No, never. Because apart from what happened, in Islam it is not allowed for a woman to be in a relationship with someone that is of a different religion, or to marry that person.

Moderator: And would you agree it applies to Bosnian Croats as well?

¹⁹¹ Focus Group 7 with Bosniak women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 August 2015.

¹⁹² Brubaker, Rebecca. "From the Unmixing to the Remixing of Peoples: UNHCR and Minority Returns in Bosnia," 2-6.

Participant 2: I am not that religious, it is the same for me, when you fall in love, you fall in love. The problem is, not maybe between the two people, but between the parents and families, for me it would be great to marry someone who you love, whether it is Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat but from Sarajevo, I think it would be easier, but if he is from Herzegovina, or Prijedor Republika Srpska, it would be much harder.

Participant 3: For me it is not acceptable. Because the problem arises when you get children, the names that you would give them, for both parts. You can choose a Muslim name but then you come to some obstacles.¹⁹³

Arguably, religion, family and social pressure (deriving from religious prohibitions on inter-religious marriage) are the main reasons for the discomfort about 'in-group-out-group' marriages. However, religion can also explain the ambivalence or acceptability for Bosniaks of 'out-group-out-group' relationships and marriages. Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs are Christian and so can arguably be seen as only (religiously) separated by denominations of Christianity and not by religious belief itself, in the same way Muslims and Christians are separated. Interestingly though, the quantitative data displayed in Figure 3 above show similar levels of discomfort about in-group inter-ethnic marriages for Bosnian Serb and Bosniak participants, while Bosnian Croat participants show a noticeable level of comfort with in-group and out-group inter-ethnic marriages. It was not clear from the focus group discussions by Bosnian Croat groups why this comfort level was so markedly high. Similarly, it was not clear from the discussions with the Bosnian Serb participants why, despite having a somewhat shared religious background, many of them felt ambivalent or disapproving of in-group-out-group marriages with Bosnian Croats. It is possible that this is the point at which technical religious boundaries end, and ethnic boundaries begin. Meaning that perhaps religion and ethnicity (and the fierce loyalties believed to be owed to these) produce a unique set of pressures or codes of behaviour that keep people from different ethnic groups apart, even if they broadly share the same religion. Religious-ethnic behavioural patterns and loyalty, which guide behaviour, will have to be borne in mind and navigated by GFP when designing, planning, and implementing programmes that primarily target ethnic divisions.

Returning to the framework guiding this research, Sandole's approach also asks for data categorising the orientations of the parties to a conflict.¹⁹⁴ There were two survey questions that yielded quantitative data on this point, each assessing participants' perceptions of their interactions with members of the three main ethnic groups. The results show that, when asked about interactions generally, the participants all categorised their interactions with members of other groups as frequently peaceful. Figure 4 shows that participants had peaceful interactions with members of other ethnic groups at a significant percentage.

¹⁹³ Focus Group 7 with Bosniak women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 August 2015.

¹⁹⁴ Sandole, Dennis. "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach," 8.




Figure 4: Peacefulness of interactions between groups

In general, a significant majority of the participants surveyed for the purpose of this research, regardless of ethnic identity, felt that their interactions with members of other ethnicity were always peaceful. Again Bosnian Croats are slightly differentiated from Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks in that no Bosnian Croats were agnostic (neutral) about or denied the peacefulness of interactions. Moreover, it is yet again unclear why Bosnian Croat participants in this study seemed to hold views that were consistently at the more positive, accepting or comfortable end of the scale, this might have been as a result of the sampling strategy which was skewed in the direction of attracting participants who were already involved in peace-building. Bosnian Serbs were the only group of participants where there was a sentiment that inter-group interactions are never peaceful, but there was no explanation for this sentiment given during the focus group discussions. This aspect aside, the overall snapshot provided by Figure 4 seems to suggest that the orientations of groups towards each other are not combative most of the time. This means that GFP programming aimed at building positive relationships between groups have relatively good soil in which to take root.

However, for the purposes of Sandole's framework, it must be noted that the absence of a combative orientation does not necessarily equate to the presence of cooperative orientations. These orientations must be read with the social-distance data and Brubaker's findings in mind, which indicate that far more genuine integration and contact between groups is needed in Sarajevo in order for conciliatory inter-group cooperation to be fostered. The second survey question isolated the combative orientations of groups vis-à-vis other groups further, the results of which are illustrated by figure 5 below.




Figure 5: Frequency of verbal abuse used against members of other ethnicities

For the purpose of this research, participants were asked how often they used verbal abuse against a member of another group. This question sought to gain more insight into the interactions between various groups and whether negative interactions can result in verbal violence rather than physical or structural violence. The findings were interesting, with Bosnian Serb participants displaying the lowest tendency to use verbal violence, and Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats simultaneously displaying a comparatively greater frequency of the same. This is interesting because Bosnian Serbs were the only set of participants to report 'never' having peaceful interactions with members of other ethnic groups (see figure 4 above). This comparison might suggest that some of the Bosnian Serbs interviewed feel that they were always peaceful but that members of other ethnicities were not. Such sentiments might feed into broader narratives of victimhood and disempowerment. These broader narratives may pose significant challenges to GFP programming because they might decrease the appetite for groups who feel disempowered to engage with the groups or people they feel are doing the disempowering.

Ultimately, based on the data captured by both questions in this section, it can be argued that the orientations of the parties are mostly peaceful (i.e. seldom combative), even though there is no indication that they are necessarily cooperative. It is unclear whether the use of verbal abuse is endemic to relations between ethnic groups, or whether it is just a personal tendency whenever a participant in this study gets into an altercation. Without further disambiguated data it would be difficult to conclude (on the strength of figure 5) that ethnic groups have a tendency to be verbally abusive towards each other.

9.1.2 Corruption

The second relevant conflict is corruption, which was seen by all of the participant groups as widespread and pervasive in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was also not seen as an issue only occurring at state level, but one that occurred at all levels, especially at the individual and societal levels. A Bosnian Serb youth wryly stated:

“Today corruption is everywhere. In school people can buy grades; or like prisons – there aren’t enough free spaces. In politics [and] employing family and close friends and unqualified people. It’s not only happening at the political level, it’s happening everywhere.”¹⁹⁵

The most notable element of the discussions about corruption was that it was not seen as something structural and therefore limited to politics (and politicians!) and the macro-level, but something that every citizen was affected by. All participants spoke about the ways in which corruption affected their every-day lives, especially in employment,¹⁹⁶ at university,¹⁹⁷ and in the rendering of health services.¹⁹⁸ Participants generally believed corruption in the country to be a general system of structural violence, in which one was inevitably and inescapably a trapped and which operated at a distinctly individualised level. It is precisely this individual-level aspect that makes corruption a relevant conflict within the scope of GFP.

Since corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina has both structural-level and individual-level manifestations, it is important not to see corruption as separate from the other conflicts raised in this paper (and elsewhere). For the focus group participants, corruption mattered most in the context of employment, but even this was not hermeneutically sealed off from other conflict issues. Some participants recanted stories about sexual harassment and grooming in order to get positions or interviews (this intersects with the gender conflicts analysed in the following section of this report). However, most of the participants spoke about corruption with specific reference to the (actual or perceived) discriminatory and nepotistic practices of ethno-nationalist groups in employing members from their own group only. Members of each ethnic group made statements like “If [Bosnian] Croats run a company, then it is very hard for a [Bosniak] to find a job” and “You can’t expect to get a job as [a Bosnian] Serb when you’re in a place where the majority is Bosniak”, with appropriate variations in in-group and out-group.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵ Focus Group 3 with Bosnian Serb women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 30 July 2015.

¹⁹⁶ One participant from Focus Group 10 with Bosnian Serb men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4 August 2015, summarised it thus: “Everyone wants to employ his cousin” and many other participants spoke about having to pay large sums of money to recruiters who would take the payment but could not guarantee that a job would be secured.

¹⁹⁷ A participant from Focus Group 3 with Bosnian Serb women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 30 July 2015, recounted a story where the assistant of a professor at her university refused to give her grades for a semester because he wanted a bribe. She was unable to get a grade for that course and ended up switching universities.

¹⁹⁸ Many participants, especially in Focus Group 8 with Bosniak women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015, mentioned having to “give the doctor an envelope” just to ensure an appointment and the rendering of medical care.

¹⁹⁹ Focus Group 9 with Bosnian Serb men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015, Focus Group 10 with Bosnian Serb men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4 August 2015.

This is an important part of the individual-level operation of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it indicates that corruption may fuel inter-ethnic animosity or perceptions of victimisation and disempowerment. And these practices might not be limited to employment. For example, as mentioned in the previous discussion regarding the conflict context, the International Crisis Group noted that housing allocations for now 'ethnic minorities' in Sarajevo (either returning from the war or moving because of economic prospects) are done in a corrupt way that prevents Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats from penetrating desirable or Bosniak-strong neighbourhoods.²⁰⁰ In light of this, it is easy to see how corrupt practices could compound inter-ethnic tension. Thus, although GFP's focus is not necessarily to tackle corruption at its structural-political source, there is considerable scope (and considerable need!) to target the way in which corruption affects other individual-level conflicts and inter-group tensions.

9.1.3 Gender issues

Another issue that was repeatedly raised in focus group discussions was women's rights. These rights can be categorised into the three headings below. But it is important to note that what (in)equality meant was contested throughout the focus groups. For example, in response to the question of whether women ought to be criticised, participants were divided. Those who answered affirmatively justified their answers in terms of formal equality, in other words, saying that "men and women should be criticised equally" but those who answered negatively justified their answers in terms of substantive equality, saying that women in Bosnia and Herzegovina are held to a higher and different standard than men.²⁰¹ Considering these divergent views on the content of 'gender issues', it may be difficult for GFP to properly ascertain which gender issue needs tackling, and which issue (if any) citizens themselves would be comfortable addressing, without being prescriptive. However, it can be argued that the three gender issues that were raised are worthy of attention not least because of their widespread nature (i.e. the fact that they were touched upon by almost every focus group), but because increased gender equality is something that GFP addresses in their programmes.

(a) Gender roles and employment

The discussions about gender norms and women's emancipation in society mainly centred on gender roles in the private sphere. Participants (mainly women, young and old) lamented that "women are raised to be housewives" but are also still seen as burdened with both employment and domestic and child-rearing work.²⁰² One participant said that women are treated like "slaves" in that they are expected to do housework, bring up children, cook, and still go to a full time job and earn a salary.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ International Crisis Group. "Rebuilding a Multi-Ethnic Sarajevo: The Need for Minority Returns," 11.

²⁰¹ The most often quoted example related to sexual partnerships: "If a woman has had two boyfriends in the past 6 months, she is like [an] immoral person, and a man is a stud." Focus Group 8 with Bosniak women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015.

²⁰² Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015, Focus Group 12 with Bosnian Croat women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

²⁰³ Focus Group 7 with Bosniak women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 August 2015.

When asked what would happen if a woman failed to do any of those things, participants answered “[the family] will believe she is not good”.²⁰⁴ This seems to suggest that the expectations on women are backed up by socio-cultural norms and pressure.

However, some participants were adamant that unfair gender roles are not just contained in the private sphere, but extend to employment as well. An example of this is employment opportunities for women being either limited to specific jobs deemed by society as suitable for women, or opportunities being limited altogether. The following quote shows the types of jobs which women are ordinarily thought to be suitable for, as well as examples of pervasive gender norming in mainstream public life.

Participant 2: Here you have drinks which are for girls, and you have cigarettes which are for girls, jobs...

Moderator: What kind of jobs?

Participant 2: A hostess. We have maybe two taxi drivers who are women or train drivers... And politicians: according to statistics, in the most popular Bosniak group, there are just 20% or 10% [are] women, the law states that you should have 50%, but nobody abides by that.

Participant 3: We are a traditional country, where by default women are under. [There is] less opportunity. You can see it in employment ratio. And yes, the fact is that we have fewer opportunities. The first question they ask women in job interviews is: “Do you plan to have a baby soon?” Which is terrible.²⁰⁵

These points raised in the excerpt above indicates that gender disempowerment is possibly a hard reality for the women of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the participants seemed to hold this issue at somewhat of a distance; simply stating that gender disempowerment was a lamentable problem (“It’s the tough truth”),²⁰⁶ actively shying away from labels such as “feminist”,²⁰⁷ or speaking of themselves and their families as emancipated, progressive and enlightened (but still exceptional).²⁰⁸ Some participants accepted particular gender roles in society. One participant in particular stated that she sometimes could not see men and women as equal because “woman are a gentle gender” and a man, by nature, needed to be “in front [of a woman] to protect her”.²⁰⁹ Similarly, none of the focus groups consisting of men articulated the problem with gender inequality in any depth. The male participants either denied it, justified it according to culture or religion, or spoke of it very distantly as something other men do in other parts of the country. This means that no strong social consensus is likely to exist about whether gender roles (in either or both the public and private

²⁰⁴ Focus Group 4 with Bosnian Serb women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 31 July 2015.

²⁰⁵ Focus Group 7 with Bosniak women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 August 2015.

²⁰⁶ Focus Group 1 with Bosniak men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015..

²⁰⁷ Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

²⁰⁸ Focus Group 8 with Bosniak women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015; Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015, Focus Group 12 with Bosnian Croat women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

²⁰⁹ Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

sphere) are seen as damaging problems. Consequently, GFP would have to be very intentional about whether, and at what level, to pursue gender empowerment programmes. However, it was more or less clear from all of the focus groups consisting of young women that gender inequality is burdensome and negative, and an issue that ought to be addressed.

(b) Body policing and shaming

Gender issues also play out in what seems to be a tendency toward body policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially among the younger focus groups. Body-policing and body-shaming involves making a moral judgment about a person because of how they choose to dress or physically present themselves in public.²¹⁰ Predominantly, male Bosniak participants were the most vocal during the focus group sessions about slipping standards of “morality” manifesting in how women dressed. The quote below illustrates how body policing can centre around clothing but mainly involve judgments about moral character, dignity, self-respect and worth.

Moderator: So you spoke about destroying morals. Is that happening in the Bosniak community?

Participant 1: That is in full effect now.

Participant 3: Our women are, let’s say half naked, but most of the women are half naked, and we don’t have shame, we’re losing shame.

Participant 3: One more thing: [if] we lose our morality, our modesty, [then] our woman won’t be able to raise kids, to raise generations.²¹¹

The excerpt above clearly illustrates how superficial judgements can influence the perception of a person’s character. However, the quote not only refers to the Bosniak community, but “most of the women” in the country. Moreover, participants in other focus groups similarly referred to just how much a woman’s (regardless of ethnicity or religion) dress is contested and reflects on her moral worthiness in society’s (and, especially, men’s) eyes. “In Sarajevo, a man mostly criticises a woman because of her looks.”²¹² There seems to be great pressure to look presentable, pretty, feminine, and demure. Participants said that women who do not fit this image were seen by many in society (both men and women) as deficient at best, and “sluts” at worst.²¹³ Although body-shaming was not by any means neatly confined to the all-male focus groups, there was a little more concern expressed when

²¹⁰ Body-shaming, body-policing and slut-shaming are concepts in contemporary feminist and medical literature. For a discussion of these concepts see Sheinin, Rose. “Body Shame: The Shaming of Women.” *Healthy Weight Journal* 11, no. 2 (1997): 36–37; Ringrose, Jessica, and Emma Renold. “Slut-Shaming, Girl Power and ‘sexualisation’: Thinking through the Politics of the International SlutWalks with Teen Girls.” *Gender and Education* 24, no. 3 (1 May 2012): 333–43; Bessenoff, Gayle R., and Daniel Snow. “Absorbing Society’s Influence: Body Image Self-Discrepancy and Internalized Shame.” *Sex Roles* 54, no. 9–10 (17 October 2006): 727–31.

²¹¹ Focus Group 1 with Bosniak men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015.

²¹² Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

²¹³ Ibid; Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

body shaming was discussed in the focus groups with women.²¹⁴ However, based on this research, there are not any obvious signs that members of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian society perceive this as a pressing problem. Still, it is an important aspect to flag for GFP because it could be an underestimated dimension of gender inequality that could do with more research and interrogation.

There is one item of clothing that was not criticised in gendered terms during the focus groups: the niqab (or full-face covering). Participants who said it was acceptable to criticise any person for what they wore were adamant that a woman wearing niqab ought not to be criticised because it is an exercise of her right to choose.²¹⁵ This was evident in the focus groups consisting of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. However, when asked about their *personal* thoughts on the niqab, participants first, differentiated between the hijab (headscarf) and the niqab; and second, found no offence with the former but had a personal aversion to the latter. The reasons for the aversion were mostly because of concerns of extremism and the “Arabisation’ of Bosnia [and Herzegovina]”, rather than women’s liberation.²¹⁶

The point about the “Arabisation” of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an interesting one. One participant (a female, Bosniak youth) differentiated between “proper Bosniaks” and “other Bosniaks” on the point of the niqab, hijab and beard. She explained that “proper Bosniaks” were not influenced by Arab culture and found it incongruous with Bosniak culture.²¹⁷ This observation is interesting because, contrary to what was discussed about inter-faith marriages above, there seems to be some degree of separation between ethnic identity and religious identity. This particular aspect is not explored in the literature regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina specifically, but it is clear that the development of Bosniak ethnic identity is distinct from Arab cultural identity (despite sharing the common religion of Islam) because of the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans.

(c) Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and harassment

A surprising but important finding has been the participants’ views of the prevalence of sexual harassment and SGBV in Sarajevo. Although some groups discussed and shared personal experiences of crime in the inner city, one group of women (Bosniak youths) opened up about domestic abuse, rape, and sexual harassment in public spaces and the workplace. As the following quote shows, that particular group viewed all of these issues as inextricably linked to the lack of women’s empowerment in society, especially economic independence.

²¹⁴ Bessenoff, Gayle R., and Daniel Snow. “Absorbing Society’s Influence: Body Image Self-Discrepancy and Internalized Shame.”

²¹⁵ Focus Group 2 with Bosniak men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015; Focus Group 8 with Bosniak women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015.

²¹⁶ Focus Group 6 with Bosnian Croat men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 August 2015; Focus Group 7 with Bosniak women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 August 2015.

²¹⁷ Focus Group 7 with Bosniak women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 August 2015.

Participant 2: Also we have a problem that women lose their self-confidence because they are raped.

Moderator: Is a rape big problem here?

Participant 2: Yeah, because here we do not know what is the meaning of sexual violence, because women are raised to serve.

Participant 1: When she loses her job, she has nowhere to go, and then there are children, she has to put up with everything mostly because of the children.

Participant 3: And she cannot go back home to her parents.

Participant 1: Because everyone will judge her.

Moderator: What does society say about sexual violence?

Participant 3: People are quiet, only the woman goes through that

Participant 2: She thinks she is guilty

Participant 1: She thinks she is guilty and she will hide it

Participant 2: Usually people look at sexual violence only as rape, but there are sexual comments, a lot of other things.²¹⁸

Arguably, the quote above suggests a link between all three of the gender issues discussed in this section, and particularly, shows that the perpetuation of gender inequality is structural and social. Especially the quote reading “here we do not know what is the meaning of sexual violence” might help to explain why the views on gender (dis)empowerment in Sarajevo (and Bosnia and Herzegovina, more broadly) are so divergent. For example, women might be troubled by forms of gender inequality in society, but just might not have the vocabulary or the space to articulate it. This is not to suggest that GFP must focus on providing women with that vocabulary, but it is to suggest that just because there appears to be no critical mass (not yet) or discourse around gender inequality in Sarajevo, this does not mean it does not exist or that it does not matter to the lives of women in the city.

Moreover, participants also expanded on the ways in which they or their friends have personally suffered from harassment: from the workplace, to university, to being verbally harassed in taxis and physically groped on trams. The participants argued that the social understanding of SGBV was limited to rape, and therefore not nuanced enough in society’s eyes to cover these apparently common forms of harassment and domestic abuse. Not only does the problem seem widespread, but also seems hushed up by society with no support available for victims. Feelings of guilt were presented as bundled up with a police and social practice of victim blaming, which in turn was seen to dissuade women from speaking out. The following quote illustrates this silencing further:

²¹⁸ Ibid.

Moderator: What would happen if a woman went to the police about this?

Participant 2: [The] first question would be “what were you wearing?”

Participant 1: Mostly they would say that you were leading him on, rarely they would do something about it.

Participant 2: Or if it was not rape, then it would not be a big problem.²¹⁹

Although it was not possible to ascertain the empirical reliability behind these statements, they at least illuminate a category of issues hitherto not explored in the literature surrounding Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, while gender inequality is deeply structural and, in certain ways, macro-level, there are ways in which harmful, gendered practices that disempower women can be curtailed. The discussion in this section particularly (i.e. on SGBV and harassment) arguably illuminates a clear instance of a gender justice issue that not only affects women at the individual-level, but can probably begin to be addressed at this level too. A much more focused study on SGBV (and gender inequality in general) is certainly warranted if this is a conflict that GFP chooses to tackle.

9.2 Pillar 2: Causes and conditions of conflicts

Pillar 2 aims to explore and categorise the causes and conditions of the conflicts identified in Pillar 1. Pillar 1 is arguably the meatier pillar of Sandole’s framework, because it requires more to be categorised, much of which touches on the causes and conditions outlined in Pillar 2. Although overlap is inevitable, some causes and conditions have been moved from Pillar 1 to this discussion here.

9.2.1 Inter-ethnic tensions

Two of the most cited causes for inter-ethnic tensions put forward by participants are mutually reinforcing: manipulation by politicians and lack of political education. As visible in the quote below, politicians tend to manipulate voters by intentionally pursuing campaign strategies that promote ethnic divisions:

Participant 2: And then some people can use religion to, how to say, manipulate with them.

Participant 1: For votes.

Participant 2: For example I am Muslim, you are Serb we shouldn’t like you.

Participant 1: “You should vote for Muslims.”

Moderator: And is it the politicians that are manipulating, or who’s manipulating?

Person 2: Politicians are manipulating.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

Person 1: Religious leaders also. For me number 1 problem is education. Because, educated people, they have no problems with that. Because they know... Education is the number 1 problem. Educated people, you cannot manipulate with them.²²⁰

This excerpt arguably also discusses something that was touched on in previous sections: the complex relationship between ethnicity and religion. The language of the politicians “I am a Muslim, you are a [Bosnian] Serb” is imbued with religion, as is the comment about religious leaders also being to blame for manipulation and fear-mongering.²²¹

However, although one of the participants in this excerpt mentions education as a possible bulwark against manipulation, GFP ought to be wary of apportioning a disproportionate amount of responsibility to education, even political education, in response to inter-ethnic tension. This is because some members of ethnic groups in Sarajevo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina might actually dispute the narratives undergirding a particular educational view more broadly. This is particularly true when speaking about the Bosnian War. One of the seemingly obvious causes of inter-ethnic tension is the trauma and memory of the Bosnian War, and especially, the different ways in which all three groups remember it. There is no commonly accepted pan-Bosnian identity or narrative about the war, with many participants getting emotional and angry about gaps (or alleged gaps) in collective memory. There was an obvious disconnect between groups on issues of who is perceived to bear more responsibility for painful events during wartime, and whether this burden is justified.²²²

Similarly, participants were themselves divided on what the solution to inter-ethnic tension would be. Some participants argued that the country should “move on” from the hatred of the war, but other participants, while understanding that this was needed, argued that it was difficult, and not intuitive, for people who had lost so much to forgive automatically, even if this was precisely what was necessary to overcome such a trauma.²²³ The literature itself is quite unhelpful on this point, because it mostly concerns macro-level solutions that require the dismantling of the bureaucratic and fissured DPA constitutional structure and a widespread economic overhaul. The takeaway is that the causes and conditions of inter-ethnic tension in Sarajevo (and in the country more broadly) are sticky, and bound up with still very raw emotions of fear, ethnic pride, victimisation and blame, the shockwaves of which are still being felt in the generation of 20-something-year-old youths that were interviewed. GFP will have to make sure not to select or seem to be selecting or preferring one group’s narrative about the war over another’s.

²²⁰ Focus Group 1 with Bosniak men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015; Focus Group 6 with Bosnian Croat men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 August 2015; Focus Group 9 with Bosnian Serb men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015.

²²³ Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015; Focus Group 12 with Bosnian Croat women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015; Focus Group 6 with Bosnian Croat men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 August 2015.

However, this research also unearthed more positive findings as well, findings which dovetail with Gillard's smaller study conducted in Mostar.²²⁴ The Pillar 1 results above show that Sarajevo might be a good entry point for the commencement of a wider, longer term project of inter-ethnic reconciliation and 'remixing', due to the city's mixed character already. There were several reasons given by the participants for the general levels of acceptance of inter-ethnic mixing. The first reason is that all of the participants believed that Sarajevo has historically been a multi-ethnic and multi-religious city, with many mixed marriages and lots of opportunities to meet and work or socialise with people from different ethnicities. As the following excerpt shows, this intermingling was considered by the participants to be part of the fabric of Sarajevo and something that gives its inhabitants the freedom and tendency to integrate:

Participant 1: In Sarajevo, I can say everyone is emancipated. Sarajevo has a long history in multi-ethnicity. Sarajevo has a church, synagogue next to it, and a mosque next to it. You can hear call to prayer and a church bell ringing at the same time. So in Bosnia, I don't think, In Sarajevo I don't think that anybody has a problem with anybody.

Moderator: Can you expand?

Person 1: All the Croats and Serbs I know in Sarajevo they cheer for Bosnia [and Herzegovina], they love this country, they are normal people, they see Bosnia as their country. Also Sarajevo has a long history in (translation: how do I say mixed marriages?). That's for me one of the symbols of Bosnia... One of the symbols of Sarajevo.²²⁵

Many participants had examples of their own demonstrating that their neighbourhoods were integrated as were their universities and social circles. Sarajevo was differentiated from other towns and cities by every focus group for being more tolerant, more integrated and less divided along nationalities or ethnicities. There was a qualification made by one group of participants that the war changed the demographics of the city dramatically, causing many Bosnian Serbs to leave Sarajevo, making the likelihood of inter-ethnic interaction and marriage with Bosnian Serbs statistically less likely. Despite this view, the overwhelming sense was that the city is historically more integrated and accepting of integration than other places in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Beyond this historical legacy of integration, a notable reason for the answers that were unequivocally supportive of inter-ethnic marriage and friendship is that many of the participants were either children of mixed-marriages or were in a mixed-marriage themselves. This might mean that the data generated suffers from an inherent bias, and therefore cannot be said to be representative of most of Sarajevo. Still, the long history of multi-ethnic co-existence was referred to by all participants, and

²²⁴ See note 89 above.

²²⁵ Focus Group 1 with Bosniak men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015. Note that, because the focus group interviews were conducted in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, there was a translator present. The transcriptionists transcribed everything that was said, including the translations by the translator in person.

punctuates the literature discussed in the conflict context above. However, while this history and the attitudes of the participants present a strategic opportunity of GFP to begin programming in Sarajevo first and then roll out to other parts of the country, it is important to be careful not to assume that Sarajevo is an oasis of inter-ethnic tolerance. There are several worrying institutional, social and spatial practices that continue to divide the city's population along ethnic lines. Housing allocations, which lead to the formation and ghettoising of ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods, education policies that effectively create segregated schools for children of different ethnicities, and — especially — the distant, vague and sometimes negative words with which participants in this study described other ethnicities are all clues that beneath the surface, inter-ethnic tensions are still present.

9.2.2 Corruption

It seems, from the participants' discussions during the focus groups, that corruption occurs at the state-level and also at the inter-personal level. The perceived causes of corruption seem to stem from three possible sources. First, the country's poor economic growth (and thus soaring unemployment) was widely cited by participants as an impetus for corruption. This is a macro-level cause, focusing on the political and structural ways in which corruption is entrenched and made desirable. The logic is simply that if there is not enough to go around, players will rig the game to ensure that they get a big slice of a small pie, as opposed to a small slice of a big pie. GFP programming is not directly focused on the macro-, structural-level causes and conditions of corruption. However, as will be shown below, programmes that deal with more individual-level manifestations and issues might very well powerfully influence and subvert the structural factors.

Second, the normalisation of corruption (and thus the creation of a culture of corruption); and third, ethnic group loyalty and nepotism was the main reason cited by the participants in this study. This cause occurs entirely at the micro-level, and is therefore something within GFP's focus. Many participants strongly believed that the cycle of corruption was enabled by society's compliance in inter-personal corrupt practices for services. Corruption at this level was seen as being maintained in two ways: either by people feeling fearful that they will lose out if they do not pay to get ahead or by people being desensitised to the immorality of engaging in corruption. This conundrum is powerfully articulated in this statement:

"Everything is corrupt here... So I just close my eyes and try to forget. In a different situation I would not close my eyes. But the system is such that if you do something, it is only you who are accountable."²²⁶

²²⁶ Focus Group 10 with Bosnian Serb men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4 August 2015.

This quote is indicative of the strong sense from the participants that it is better to turn the other cheek to corruption, because it is so systematic and entrenched, than to try and dissuade others from “pulling strings”.²²⁷ Some participants found this attitude to be reason that corruption was somewhat normalised in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and therefore the reason that corruption was rampant. The view that corruption is part of, and sustained by, a normalised social culture is reinforced by a related observation participants made in relation to the lack of feelings of *ownership* and *pride* from citizens when it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s assets and image. For example, participants in numerous focus groups were frustrated at the lack of consumer patriotism, questioning why citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were happy to drink Croatian water, when Bosnian and Herzegovinian water was cheaper and just as good. Other participants lamented the fact that youths feel no attachment, ownership, and pride over the cultural history and surroundings of Sarajevo. As a consequence, they are therefore more likely to allow infrastructure to be damaged (such as by graffiti on trams). These sentiments could compound the notion that there is a lack of social capital and resistance that prevent people from partaking in corrupt and socially damaging activities that have indirect negative costs for wider society. This might not be the root cause of corruption in Sarajevo, but it is certainly an aspect that GFP’s programming focus could potentially tackle.

This last source — ethnic favouritism — may simply be a perceived cause and was discussed at length above in Pillar 1. However, it is still important to bear in mind when considering causes of the conflict. Even if it is just a perceived rather than an actual cause of corruption, it was cited as a reason by a few of the participants in the focus groups when speaking about how they got employed and so could act as push factor for inter-ethnic tension and animosity.²²⁸

9.2.3 Gender issues

The participants named two causes of gender disparities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the participants regarded neither cause as endemic to the country. The first one was Bosnia and Herzegovina’s strongly patriarchal tradition, which was said to ground many of the restrictive, unequal and burdensome gender roles women participants felt existed. The following excerpt explains, by way of a commonly used saying, the primacy of men in Bosnian and Herzegovinian society.

Participant 1: In our society ... if a man does the same thing as a woman, for a man that would be ok, but for a woman not.²²⁹

²²⁷ Focus Group 8 with Bosniak women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015; Focus Group 5 with Bosnian Croat men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 31 July 2015.

²²⁸ In Focus Group 9 with Bosnian Serb men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015, the participants disagreed about whether this was actually a causal factor for corruption in employment, with the one participant adamantly stating: “But I had that situation. They openly told me: ‘You are here because of your name... not because you can do this or that.’”

²²⁹ Focus Group 8 with Bosniak women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015.

Participant 2: Our tradition is, a man always is right, you have one sentence which is very popular: 'First and in addition a man' [which means] we are lucky when your first child is a son.²³⁰

In other words, it can be argued that certain elements of the Bosnia and Herzegovian society is displaying elements of patriarchy. This is not saying that women are continuously viewed as subordinate or relatively inferior to men across the whole society. Rather, the issues raised in the excerpt above simply indicate that certain participants felt as though men are allowed to do certain things that women are not. The interests and attitudes of men can perhaps be seen to be a countervailing pressure on women who wish to break out of certain gender norms by, for example, dressing more casually, working in labour-intensive jobs, or asking for a divorce. Although the extent and expressions of gender inequality in Bosnia and Herzegovina might vary greatly within Sarajevo alone, this is an issue that some participants felt important enough to raise in the focus group discussions.

However, while the possible existence of gender inequality is an important finding of this report, it is important to note that the sample used for the purpose of this research was both relatively small as well as derived from a singular geographical location, Sarajevo. Thus, further research involving a larger sample with a wider demographic spread would be required in order to fully establish the nature and impact of these attitudes and norms. This is especially the case should GFP choose to address gender inequality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Designing and planning such a programme would make it extremely important to understand if, how and to what extent the primacy of men and male interests, comfort and desires constrain and shape the behaviour of women.

The second cause that was raised by the participants was religion — more specifically the alleged restrictiveness of Islam — and was named both by participants who were Bosniak, and those who were not. A group of Bosnian Croat women had the following discussion about the strictness of Islam:

Participant 4: This might sound wrong. It's generally most of the patriarchal men or women are met in the Bosniak community. There are also situations in [the Bosnian] Croat community that you have patriarchal society, but I met more examples in Bosniak community.

Participant 2: Me too. Because when I compare relationships in Herzegovina, and in Bosnia, in Bosniak communities, women are not allowed to do anything ... I see that they in Bosnia listen to what man say.

(...)

²³⁰ Focus Group 7 with Bosniak women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 August 2015.

Participant 4: Maybe more when you see their husbands. Sometimes, I see that on the streets. I see that if a girl is wearing short skirt, they always look at them like sluts. Always with hatred.

Person 2: But now, in Sarajevo, there are lot of Arabs. Much more scarves and niqabs, and people with beard. And they are really strict.

Participant 4: They only say, 'Go to your man and ask him about your clothes. Did he see you going out like that?'²³¹

Although one participant here brought in the "Arabisation" of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a distinct perception (shared by Bosniaks and other groups) that gender roles are more deeply entrenched in Islam as a religion, rather than Arab influence. The younger group of Bosniak men confirmed that:

"A woman has to do better than a man. Even Islam said that ... because she is raising children. She has to be a role model. She has to be something positive. She has to be something good. And in Islam, on the first pages it says: mother. Mother, then father."²³²

It is difficult to disentangle these statements, grounding gender inequality in religion, from the same statements, which ground gender inequality in patriarchal social norms. However, perceptions of religious subjugation of women in Islam do not completely explain the general view expressed by the participants that society confines women (regardless of religion and ethnicity) to specific and disempowering roles. It can be argued that religious patriarchy reinforces traditional societal patriarchy, but it seems a stretch to conclude that the former *causes* the latter. If it were true that gender inequality was only caused by religious restriction, then the personal experiences of gender inequality recounted by the female participants in the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat groups would not stand. Religion and religious customs, practices and teachings are not monolithic or homogenously conservative, and it would be dishonest to assume, without more, that a religious group is automatically an oppressive one. Further, it would not only be unwise, but quite possibly divisive, if GFP or any other organisation adopts the view that one of the three religions at play is the most influential or proximate cause of gender inequality, in a complex ethno-religious conflict situation such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. While this perception might and does exist among citizens (especially about members of other ethnic groups), it might not point to an inherent characteristic of the 'perceived group' per se, but rather a placeholder of the social distance and distrust that the 'perceiver group' holds towards the 'perceived group'. In this sense then, sources of gender inequality that map onto religious identities can illuminate more about inter-ethnic relations and distrust, than actual sources of gender inequality themselves.

²³¹ Focus Group 12 with Bosnian Croat women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

²³² Focus Group 1 with Bosniak men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015.

9.3 Pillar 3: Third-party interventions

Sandole's third pillar focuses on detailing and outlining any interventions in the conflict made by third-party, international actors. Contrary to the length of the discussion here, Sandole's third Pillar includes extensive categories to describe, detail, and ultimately sort the types of interventions that have occurred, the orientations of the intervening parties, and the legacies they have left. However, Sandole's third Pillar is explicitly aimed at the macro-level because it places exclusive emphasis on outside, *international intervention*. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina has had, and continues to have, a relatively high level of international intervention by bodies such as NATO, the UN and the EU, such interventions are outside the scope of this study because they will not be targeted by GFP's grassroots level of operations. Thus, the questions directed as Pillar 3 were short, and focused only on the participants' perceptions of the types of programmes that are similar to those implemented by GFP.

Partly because of the sampling strategies used, and partly through coincidence, many participants were involved in NGO projects aiming to better relations between ethnic groups. However, these projects seemed also to lack sufficient support from government authorities so participants often felt they were a waste of time. The following quote illustrates this point further:

Moderator: Can you tell me about some organisations that have started any programmes, or are trying to help relations between groups?

Participant 2: I'm the leader of local BM (Budi muško, translation: Be a Man) club that is quite international, and we now have a group of 9 kids from 14 -17, and we talk with them about living heavy lifestyles, violence, gender stereotypes...and this September, October, November and December I'm going to be at my local high school taking one class at a time with them. And with Dina, my friend I'll be doing classes among elementary kids as well.

Moderator: Do you think they are effective?

Participant 2: Mostly ineffective. Nobody listens to them. Mostly these organisations can pull kids out of classrooms, and that's how you get them there. That's how they got me I just wanted to skip school. I think the problem is government not supporting these programmes enough.²³³

Arguably, the above quote demonstrates not only that there is a lack of government support for grassroots initiatives, but also that these initiatives do not seem to be thoughtfully designed or implemented. Selecting participants at short notice, where their main motivation seems to be a short-lived break from the classroom, does not seem to be a successful strategy for creating sustainable

²³³ Focus Group 9 with Bosnian Serb men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015.

change. This therefore reveals not so much an inherent problem with the idea of grassroots work, but more highlights issues related to design and implementation of programmes.

Moreover, there was also the sense among some participants that change from international intervention was either corrupted by government or not sustainable to have any lasting impact. It seems, from the quote below, that some participants were generally distrustful of outside organisations because change is so incremental and difficult to be seen. Another reason for this distrust could be that the government is seen as a corrupting force that prevents positive change from being engendered sustainably from the get-go. The quote below illustrates these feelings of disillusionment and suspicion well.

Moderator: Can you think of some organisations that are trying to make a difference here?

Participant 2: I can't think of any, surely I think that they exist but I always think that somebody steals something.

Participant 3: There are too many of them! And I don't think that people here take their work seriously.

Participant 1: I've been a member of many NGOs, many trainings, but still I'm suspicious about the change. I think that when it's all done, we all go back to our normal life. I do not and cannot see any change soon.

Participant 2: I don't think that international NGOs are focused really on helping us. I don't know, maybe I'm not informed, but somehow I get that impression.²³⁴

Beyond the much-laboured point that all conflicts and issues and sources seem to be connected to each other in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an important thing to note from the two quotes above is that participants view the *government* as the corrupting force when NGOs are involved. This may very well be the case, but it is also suspected, judging from the explanations of the 'culture of corruption' discussed above, that government might not even be involved in some of the situations where money for a project mysteriously goes missing.

Moving away from corruption, one man from the older Bosniak group argued that running programmes aimed at improving inter-ethnic relations (especially through sport!) were so common and tired, that they tended to reify divisions by making them relevant again and a core focus point of the activity. The participant makes this argument in this quote, when asked about local community-based projects:

²³⁴ Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 august 2015.

Moderator: Can you think of any local projects or community based projects that are helping relations among people?

Participant 2: I worked for one. It is project from Milan, it is a project of soccer for children and I worked like a coach in this programme with children from all groups, Serbs, Croats, Gypsy. It was pretty good. It was children from Sarajevo from Herzegovina. I did not feel any tension, children played, parents talked to each other, it was good.

Participant 1: Most of the programmes here are based on this. It is much easier to get some project to run if you say “we will work with Croats or Serbs” but that is the irrelevant thing, that is something that holds the tensions between two persons, how you can say to someone “this project is based on accomplishing something together but you are still a Serb”. For me that is a bad thing. Rather give me something to build, and we will build it but I do not have to know if he is Serb, Croat or Bosniak because it is irrelevant.²³⁵

Although ‘participant 1’ in this quote feels that the ethnic labels are irrelevant, this report has argued that they continue to hold significant sway socially and behaviourally. And whilst it might be true that focusing on these labels in certain ways tends to cement and reify them, it is difficult to see how they can be transcended without admitting their existence in the first place and wrestling with their existence in the second. Fatigue over ethnic delineations may be apparent throughout Sarajevo, and if this is the case, it might impact how well-received a programme targeting these delineations might be, does not necessarily mean a total decrease in interest for community-based programmes targeted at improving inter-ethnic relations. It can just imply that programmes need to be more sensitive about how they navigate these labels.

Many participants lamented the fact that there was not enough action being taken by ordinary citizens about things that they could change like drinking Bosnian water instead of Croatian water. Moreover, the participants that did participate or run NGO workshops on various societal issues found them to be effective even if it was only on a small scale. This Pillar makes these NGO workshops visible to GFP, even if they were not very effective or well-run, so that GFP can gauge the general appetite for community-based programmes similar to its own. Ultimately, sport-based programmes seem to have been used in Bosnia and Herzegovina often in the past, with varying success. GFP should be aware of any instances of fatigue or boredom that it may encounter if it chooses to run another sports-based programme in Sarajevo. It should also very carefully judge how it chooses to identify the groups that will participate in GFP’s future programmes. The above quote perhaps indicates that a programme that obviously and openly targets ethnic groups might frustrate some people who believe that classifying participants according to ethnic categories tends to reify these divisions.

²³⁵ Focus Group 2 with Bosniak men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015.

10. Conclusions

This research project attempted to draw a conflict map of the most pressing and most relevant latent and patent conflicts affecting every-day lives in the city of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina today. The ultimate aim of this project was to provide GFP with at least some of the contextual understanding it requires, from a different perspective, in order to begin its programme design and implementation in Sarajevo. GFP is committed to youth-led, community-driven, grassroots change that is positive, impactful and sustainable. In order to achieve these goals, GFP needs to be intentional, careful and rigorous in its preparation before it decides to implement programmes in the field. This project hopes to add to these preparative stages by providing a different perspective, highlighting the most important conflicts, actors, and dynamics in Sarajevo using a broad analytical framework.

Conflict mapping is not a simple or straightforward task as the conflicts one tends to map are often both multifaceted and spread over long periods of time. The conflict context in Bosnia and Herzegovina made this challenge even more acute: Bosnia and Herzegovina has a long and disputed history of conflict and resistance, and in order to engage with this context, one must engage with as many aspects of this history as possible. The conflict mapping framework used to guide this research — Sandole's Three Pillar approach — breaks down a conflict situation into three pillars: Pillar 1 (the conflict); Pillar 2 (the conflict's causes and conditions); Pillar 3 (third-party interventions). Sandole's approach is ambitious and detailed, aiming to categorise and examine precisely the interconnectedness and multiple facets of conflict, which adds to this complexity. The result was a sprawling framework, with never-ending variables that could be plugged into one of the three pillars and therefore never-ending possibilities for further research.

This research therefore tried to pare down Sandole's approach and select only those conflicts, causes, issues, and interventions that were directly relevant to GFP's grassroots, community-level peace-building focus. This paring down was done both in the research design stage and in the data analysis and presentation stage. Ultimately, Sandole's approach is a useful, thorough and dynamic framework for conflict mapping. It has never been used to map the conflict in Sarajevo (or Bosnia and Herzegovina) before. Its detail, cross-disciplinary nature, focus on subjective lived-realities, and emphasis on intra- as well as inter-group dynamics truly sets it apart as a conflict mapping framework, and makes it highly malleable to the purposes of GFP.

Three conflicts relevant to the work of GFP were identified: (a) inter-ethnic relations; (b) corruption; and (c) gender inequality. Inter-ethnic relations come as no surprise. Much, if not all of the conflict analysis literature on Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina centres almost exclusively on inter-ethnic relations, but analyses these in the context of the Bosnian War (or immediately after). Not a lot

of current conflict analysis has been done so far with youths born at the end of or after the Bosnian War (who are now young adults and leading the charge of civil protests seen since 2014). However, as this research confirms, the literature is correct to emphasise inter-ethnic tension as a site of potential or existing conflict in Sarajevo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina more broadly. The detail with which the findings of this report go into on inter-ethnic relations and attitudes suggests that this issue is still at the forefront of national consciousness 20 years after the end of the Bosnian War. This report found and concludes that the causes of inter-ethnic tension are multiple and include: (a) a history of ethnic tension; (b) the traumatic collective memory of the Bosnian War; (c) the lack of genuinely emotionally intimate relationships and interactions; (d) ethno-nationalist fear-mongering by politicians; and (e) the effects of other potential conflicts such as corruption. These are all aspects that need to be taken into consideration when designing and implementing future community-based peace-building programmes.

However, the findings presented in this report on inter-ethnic relations and tensions go beyond the conclusion that they remain relevant since they are part of a long and indelible history of ethnic violence (and therefore are part of the collective memory of citizens). The findings in this report show that Sarajevo seems to be viewed as a site of relative (at least theoretical) tolerance and integration, making it the perfect entry point for GFP programmes that address inter-ethnic tension. However, the findings also show that, despite general levels of comfort and acceptance of inter-ethnic interactions and friendships, citizens are still relatively distrustful of members of other ethnic groups, still tend to hold them at a distance socially, and lack emotionally intimate and filial inter-ethnic relationships. This demonstrates that, while Sarajevo might technically or hypothetically be thought to be an example of integration and tolerance, a lot of integration would still be useful in order to achieve positive and sustainable change. This means that GFP has a potential scope to do significant programming to augment inter-ethnic trust and interaction.

Moreover, corruption was found to be cause not only at a macro- and structural-level, but at an individual-level too through the prevalence of a damaging 'culture' of de-sensitivity towards corruption and destructive behaviour. Participants listed corruption as one of the most crippling, urgent and impactful issues that they face everyday. Because of its individual-level dimensions in Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina generally, corruption has the potential to perpetuate negative inter-ethnic attitudes and relations furthermore. Many participants held the perception that corrupt employment practices were motivated by ethnic loyalty, resulting in family and ethnic-group members getting positions of employment instead of the most meritorious candidate. On a broader level, the normalisation of corruption in every-day life was found to perhaps also speak to a greater issue of apathy and a lack of pride in and ownership of common public goods such as the cultural or natural heritage of Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These might be additional areas, which GFP might want to target in order to create a climate that fosters inter-group inclusion.

Last, gender inequality and gender issues came up as a surprising and novel finding in this conflict mapping research. The gender issues raised by participants as the most pertinent related to three things: (a) pejorative gender norms relating to the roles women were expected to fulfil at home, in public and in the workplace; (b) body shaming, which centred mainly around how women chose to dress and how this reflected their morality and self-worth as human beings, but shaming was also related to the non-fulfilment of gender roles and to victims of SGBV; and (c) the lack safety and the prevalence of and silence around SGBV in Sarajevo. These conflicts were largely thought to be caused by the ingrained patriarchal norms, expectations and notions of masculinity and especially femininity.

However, other causes raised were also the lack of safe spaces and support structures for women to meet and share their experiences about these issues, and, especially in the context of SGBV, the ringing silence of society and criminal justice institutions when it comes to supporting a victim of SGBV. The way forward for gender inequality issues in Sarajevo (and Bosnia and Herzegovina, at large) is less clear than for the other conflicts. Participants were not unified in their diagnosis of the problems (or even acceptance that there was one that needed to be addressed) or the types of strategies that would be needed and wanted to overcome these issues. GFP will have to do a lot more background work in order to properly gauge the environment in Sarajevo before rolling out a fully-fledged gender empowerment or advocacy programme, but it is argued strongly in this report that this is an area that GFP should aim to target in future programmes.

Ultimately, this report concludes that there is considerable scope and appetite for GFP programmes to be implemented in Sarajevo, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the future. Although there are organisations that have done and are doing similar work in the form of youth-based sports workshops, this by no means suggests that the market is 'saturated' so to speak or that GFP's rigorous and systematic approach will not have a positive impact. The following section outlines what that positive impact might look like by suggesting a few action points for GFP and GFPI.

11. Recommendations

Following on from the conclusions discussed above, this report makes several recommendations to GFP in order to assist future programme design and implementation in Sarajevo initially, and Bosnia and Herzegovina more broadly. These recommendations will be grouped around three themes: (a) further research; (b) possible focus issues and action points; and (c) potential sticking points.

11.1 Further research

There are quite a few areas that could benefit from (or even require) further research by GFPI before programming can begin in earnest. The first area would be to use this conflict map of Sarajevo as a starting point and conduct further research in the city in order to expand GFP's line of vision. This study suffered from a number of limitations that prevented the generalisability and extrapolation of its results, meaning that it really only is a 45-person snapshot of a wider conflict map. It is therefore recommended that GFP and GFPI consider doing a few more iterations of research with participants from all over Sarajevo canton (especially RS) without relying on snowballing sample strategies that start with individuals already personally or vocationally involved in peace-building activities. Although further research is expensive and time-consuming, it is argued here that extending the scope of this study to include more randomly selected, geographically and class diverse participants might counterweight (or corroborate) some of the results contained in this project, and would ultimately stand GFP's future programming in the city in good stead.

The second area which could use further research would be the issue of gender inequality and SGBV in Sarajevo in particular and Bosnia and Herzegovina more broadly. This research was not exclusively dedicated to unpicking the issue of gender inequality in Sarajevo but the sub- and fore text of focus group discussions with young female participants from all ethnicities seem to suggest that this is a pervasive but hugely secretive conflict that could do with a lot more intentional, dedicated and zoomed-in research. The full dimensions of the discourse around gender issues, their causes and the sentiments about these issues themselves, could not be fully captured by this study, which makes the recommendations made on this issue less reliable than what is desired. The risk is that, without further research, GFP will not properly grasp a hugely divisive issue and may end up doing the opposite of what is intended in every GFP programme: lasting, relevant and sustainable positive change.

The last area for further research would be to conduct conflict mapping in different areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina to see whether any of the results in this study are replicated or countered by results from inhabitants in other parts of the country. Specifically, it will be useful to test whether Sarajevo actually is more tolerant, integrated and progressive than other cities, and, if so, how can the

experiences of running programmes in Sarajevo be replicated in more challenging peace-building environments in other parts of the country. If Sarajevo is just the starting point — which it should be since lasting, overall, nation-wide change is the only sustainable, long-term option — GFP and GFPI will need to conduct more conflict mapping research in other parts of the country such as smaller ‘multi-ethnic’ cities, and ethnically homogenous areas in RS and Herzegovina.

11.2 Possible focus issues and action points

There are three possible focus issues that this research report recommends tackling through GFP programming, all of which correspond to the latent and patent conflicts identified and explained in Pillars 1 and 2 of Sandole’s framework. The first issue is inter-ethnic group relations. The findings suggest that although Sarajevo might be a more conducive environment for the formation of inter-ethnic friendships, and although most of the participants were comfortable with inter-ethnic relationships, these interactions tend to be superficial and there seems to be a significant lack of trust, intimacy and emotional investment in inter-ethnic interactions. GFP’s programmes and vehicles for peace building are all based on contact theory: engendering trust and respect between groups by bringing them into regular and meaningful contact with each other. It seems that regular inter-ethnic contact in some parts of Sarajevo is happening, but it is recommended that GFP programming (a) target those areas where even this basic integration is absent (perhaps in the RS neighbourhoods of Sarajevo), and (b) keep the goal of programmes to build sincere, emotionally intimate, filial connections between groups because superficial mingling does not seem to be engendering massive levels of trust, reconciliation and positivity between groups. Possible concrete steps could be to identify schools or campuses in the RS neighbourhoods of Sarajevo and run sports programmes there, or wherever programmes are run that people from RS are contacted to participate. Another option would be to organise events and programmes at universities since these can tend to be spaces to which many citizens from many different backgrounds are drawn. GFP’s programming in Sarajevo needs to be long-term and incremental in order to engender the type of filial connections needed. The risk with implementing short-term programmes is that only superficial interaction between groups will happen, which wouldn’t be any different from the status quo.

The second issue is SGBV and harassment. Although the other gender equality issues require a lot more thought and research in order to minimise the risk of making gender relations acrimonious or damaging the goodwill of GFP’s presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is recommended that GFP target the issue of SGBV, especially support for SGBV survivors in Sarajevo. GFP’s advocacy and empowerment vehicles for peace building would be hugely suitable here even just to initially provide a space where victims can feel heard so they do not have to suffer in silence, guilt and shame. Decreasing the risk of SGBV is obviously contingent on long-term changes to internalised and socialised patriarchal structures, but there are ways in which GFP can tackle some of the urgent

needs of victims of SGBV in the meantime. One such way may be to organise educational sessions informing women about what sexual harassment is and helping to create a supportive community to which victims can turn.

The third issue is social culture of apathy and silence about corruption. Corruption was found to operate at a very individualised, societal level. Although corruption cannot be totally stopped by changes in social receptiveness and apathy to corruption, such shifts in social attitudes can arguably put pressure on structural factors from below. GFP could design anti-corruption and 'say no' advocacy campaigns, focusing on inter-ethnic trust, interaction, and cooperation in order to prevent the normalisation of corruption in every-day life. Relatedly GFP could also reach the wider issue of social apathy and a lack of ownership in the cultural and natural assets of Sarajevo (and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole) through advocacy campaigns encouraging people (especially youth) to buy local and watch local. An online social media campaign could be useful here especially at targeting youth behaviour.

11.3 Potential sticking points

There are a few potential obstacles the GFP should be aware about which could arise during programming directed at these issues. Most of these relate to tackling the particularly complicated conflict of inter-ethnic tension, but they can be extrapolated further.

The first potential sticking point is political correctness, which was not expected at all during research design. The participants took a while to warm up and truly speak their minds (and some never did) during data collection, indicating that social desirability could have impacted on some of the findings. Most participants seemed to stick to political correctness in some way, whether it was painting Sarajevo as an integrated oasis or their friendship group as proof of authentic inter-ethnic integration. At times this produced contradictions in the views they shared, but it most often than not obscured honest and frank discussion about the health of inter-ethnic relations in Sarajevo, which was unhelpful. This is something to bear in mind when planning future research about inter-ethnic tensions.

The second sticking point is the possibility of using 'other' groups such as the Roma and Jewish communities as 'safe' identities through which to bring people together and obliquely get Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats to interact. This is an attractive and recommended strategy but there are two factors to consider before pursuing this path. First, the data produced in the colour-association game revealed that Roma and Jewish communities are highly stereotyped in a 'positive' (i.e. fetishised/exoticised) or negative fashion. Negative stereotyping abounds with Jewish communities across Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. It is especially noticeable with the

Bosniak participants, who negatively associated Jews in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the state of Israel. This might mean that interactions between groups, even under the pretext of including Jewish and Roma elements may not be as 'safe' an option as first thought. Second, because of these vague, often negative stereotypes for the Roma and Jewish communities, it might be worth implementing programmes aimed at them in their own right, and not as a ruse for Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian Croat relations.

The third sticking point is so-called sports fatigue, which was discussed under pillar 3. GFP has been a leader in its field in sports-for-peace programmes, and these could undoubtedly have a powerful role to play in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But there have also been much iteration of these sports-for-peace programmes run in Sarajevo and the country before, and the reactions to them have not all been positive (or, even if they have been positive, citizens have seen them before). It might be worth first pursuing an advocacy drive and perhaps another vehicle for peace-building in order to create some cache for GFP's name in Sarajevo first before running a fully-fledged sports-for-peace programme, just to stave off any 'sports-fatigue' that might discourage people from participating.

The final sticking point is the interaction between macro-level concerns and micro-level concerns (and vice versa). Although GFP's focus is grassroots, micro- and community-level issues and activities, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the archetypical example of the interconnectedness of being. Micro-level issues influence and shape macro-level issues, which then influence and shape micro-level issues, and the cycle continues. In order to make sure that the steppingstones to sustainable, long-lasting, positive change are being laid, it will be necessary for GFP and GFPI to constantly have one eye fixed on the micro-level, and one eye fixed on the macro-level.

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Focus Groups

Focus Group 1 with Bosniak men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015.

Focus Group 2 with Bosniak men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 July 2015.

Focus Group 3 with Bosnian Serb women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 30 July 2015.

Focus Group 4 with Bosnian Serb women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 31 July 2015.

Focus Group 5 with Bosnian Croat men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 31 July 2015.

Focus Group 6 with Bosnian Croat men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 August 2015.

Focus Group 7 with Bosniak women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 August 2015.

Focus Group 8 with Bosniak women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015.

Focus Group 9 with Bosnian Serb men under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2015.

Focus Group 10 with Bosnian Serb men over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4 August 2015.

Focus Group 11 with Bosnian Croat women under 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

Focus Group 12 with Bosnian Croat women over 24, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 August 2015.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Survey questions

Note that in-group-out-group questions were tailored to reflect whichever ethnicity was the in-group in the session. The survey questions are presented as they were formatted for the participants and run to 4 pages.

1. What is your age?
2. What is your sex? (Please circle your answer) M / F
3. What ethnic group do you identify with? (Please circle your answer)
 - a) Bosniak
 - b) Bosnian Serb
 - c) Bosnian Croat
 - d) Other, please specify: _____
4. What religious group do you identify with? (Please circle your answer)

- a) Christian (Orthodox)
- b) Muslim
- c) Christian (Roman Catholic)
- d) Jewish
- e) Agnostic/atheist
- f) Other religion (please specify): _____

5. Where were you born? _____

6. How long have you lived in Sarajevo? _____

7. On the scale below, please circle how often you meet new people?

1	2	3	4	5
Never		Sometimes		Frequently

Please circle the most appropriate response from the list below.

8. Where do you most often meet new people?

- a) in my neighbourhood
- b) in my school/university
- c) in my workplace
- d) in restaurant/bar/coffee shops
- e) sports clubs/games/tournaments
- f) other, please specify: _____

9. Circle where you most often interact with Bosnian Serbs?

- a) in my neighbourhood
- b) in my school/university
- c) in my workplace
- d) in restaurant/bar/coffee shops
- e) sports clubs/games/tournaments
- f) other, please specify: _____

10. Circle where you most often interact with Bosnian Croats?

- a) in my neighbourhood
- b) in my school/university
- c) in my workplace
- d) in restaurant/bar/coffee shops

e) sports clubs/games/tournaments

f) other, please specify: _____

11. Circle where you most often interact with Bosniaks?

a) in my neighbourhood

b) in my school/university

c) in my workplace

d) in restaurant/bar/coffee shops

e) sports clubs/games/tournaments

f) other, please specify: _____

For questions 12-23 please circle the number on the scale that best represents your opinion.

12. If you do meet a Bosnian Serb for the first time how much would you trust them?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all		Medium amount		Very much

13. If you do meet a Bosnian Croat for the first time how much would you trust them?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all		Medium amount		Very much

14. If you do meet a Bosniak for the first time how much would you trust them?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all		Medium amount		Very much

15. When you do meet a Bosnian Serb for the first time how likely are you to talk to them?

1	2	3	4	5
Not likely		Uncertain		Very likely

16. When you do meet a Bosnian Croat for the first time how likely are you to talk to them?

1	2	3	4	5
Not likely		Uncertain		Very likely

17. When you do meet a Bosniak for the first time how likely are you to talk to them?

1	2	3	4	5
Not likely		Uncertain		Very likely

18. Would you describe your interactions with Bosnian Serbs as peaceful?

1	2	3	4	5
Not Peaceful		Neutral		Peaceful

19. Would you describe your interactions with Bosnian Croats as peaceful?

1	2	3	4	5
Not Peaceful		Neutral		Peaceful

20. Would you describe your interactions with Bosniaks as peaceful?

1	2	3	4	5
Not Peaceful		Neutral		Peaceful

21. On the scale given below, how do you feel about...

- a) A Bosnian Serb marrying a Bosnian Croat
- | | | | | |
|---------------|---|---------|---|-------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Uncomfortable | | Neutral | | Comfortable |
- b) A Bosnian Serb marrying a Bosniak
- | | | | | |
|---------------|---|---------|---|-------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Uncomfortable | | Neutral | | Comfortable |
- c) A Bosnian Croat marrying a Bosniak
- | | | | | |
|---------------|---|---------|---|-------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Uncomfortable | | Neutral | | Comfortable |
- d) A Bosnian Serb being friends with a Bosnian Croat
- | | | | | |
|---------------|---|---------|---|-------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Uncomfortable | | Neutral | | Comfortable |
- e) A Bosnian Serb being friends with a Bosniak
- | | | | | |
|---------------|---|---------|---|-------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Uncomfortable | | Neutral | | Comfortable |
- f) A Bosnian Croat being friends with a Bosniak
- | | | | | |
|---------------|---|---------|---|-------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Uncomfortable | | Neutral | | Comfortable |
22. How often do you use verbal abuse against Bosnian Serb?
- | | | | | |
|-------|---|-----------|---|-------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Never | | Sometimes | | Often |
23. How often do you use verbal abuse against a Bosnian Croat?
- | | | | | |
|-------|---|-----------|---|-------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Never | | Sometimes | | Often |
24. How often do you use verbal abuse against a Bosniak?
- | | | | | |
|-------|---|-----------|---|-------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Never | | Sometimes | | Often |

Appendix 2: Focus group guide

Note that in-group-out-group questions were tailored to reflect whichever ethnicity was the in-group in the session.

A. Introductory remarks

Welcome back everyone, I hope you enjoyed the tea and coffee. You've completed the survey questions so we are going to move into the group discussion now. The discussion will be about a few topics about Bosnia and Herzegovina and I really want to know what your opinions and beliefs are. I will be asking some questions to start us off and then only smaller ones from time to time.

There are no right or wrong answers, only differing opinions and I am interested in all of them so please share what you really think: the negative and the positive; both are useful and important. You do not have to agree with others but please respect each other's opinions.

I am taking some notes and we are recording this because we don't want to miss anything you say. Please try to speak one at a time so that the recording is clear. We will keep your identity a secret and no names will be used in the report, but please tell me now if anyone has a problem with this discussion being recorded?

Are there any other questions before we begin? We are using a translator but please stop me if there is something you don't understand or hear. *(8 minutes)*

B. Group agreement exercise: differences and similarities between groups

10 mins intro and example; 10 mins colour assignment; 1h 30 mins discussion

To get us comfortable with each other we're going to play a little game with colours. In front of you is a sheet of paper and a pen. When I say a word, write down the colour that best describes what you feel or think about that word. And then we'll discuss why you chose that colour afterwards. Example (food). I'll give you a minute between each word to really think about what colour and why.

- a) **Your own family**
- b) **Neighbour**
- c) **Bosnian**
- d) **Bosnian Croat**
- e) **Bosniak**
- f) **Bosnian Serb**

- g) **Roma**
- h) **Jew**

1. Can you tell us why you wrote down X colour? *(used for (a) to (i))*

a) How do others feel about that association/choice? **OR** Do you agree with the reasons for choosing that colour? *(used for (a) to (i))*

(note: spot the differences and similarities in the associations made and the reasons for those associations, not the colours per se)

b) You have different colours, why did you assign different colours?

- What do others think of that explanation? *(used for (d) to (i))*

c) You [two/three] have the same colours, why did you assign the same colours?

- Do others agree with those reasons? *(used for (d) to (i))*

C. Comparative descriptions – intra-group perceptions

5 mins for intro and 1h 15 mins for discussion

(transition) Now that we have spoken about the other groups a bit more, we're going to focus on your own group, **Bosnian Croats**.

1. What are your reactions to the following statements – how do they make you feel, do you agree or disagree and why. *(text in bold is tailored for the in group)*

(a) I feel safe in my own group.

(b) I am proud of my own group.

(c) I'm afraid that one day my group will no longer exist

(d) I think it is wrong to criticise my own group

(e) I think it is ok to criticise a woman

(follow up question) – I think it is ok to criticise a woman wearing niqab

(f) I think it is ok to criticise a man

(g) I think it is ok to criticise a young person

(h) I think it is ok to criticise an old person

(i) On issues of politics, there is a difference between **Bosnian Croats** in Sarajevo and **Bosnian Croats** elsewhere in Bosnia

(j) On issues of religion, there is a difference between **Bosnian Croats** in Sarajevo and **Bosnian Croats** elsewhere in Bosnia

D. Most important issues facing BIH today – perceptions of the conflict(s)

5 minutes intro and 1 hour discussion

(transition) So we've touched on important issues that could be debated within groups, let's explore what some of these issues might be some more.

1. On separate pieces of paper write down what you think are the three main problems facing BIH today. Hand them to me when you're done.

2. Have a look at all the problems on the table and pick one problem that affects your daily life and explain this problem to the group

(said for each with appropriate modifications)

- a) What do you think are the causes of this problem
- b) Are relations between groups getting worse?
 - Who or what would you say is making things worse?
- c) Are relations between groups getting better?
 - Who or what would you say is doing it?
 - Can you think of any local projects in your area/community that are addressing these problems? Or peacebuilding programmes?
 - What do you think about organisations running sports programmes like the Open Fun Football Schools?
 - Do you think they are effective?

(closing question, done in a round-robin) Imagine that you had a magic wand and could make one change to address BIH's challenges, what would you do? *10min*

Closing and thanks.

Appendix 3: Historical timeline²³⁶

1300s:	Turkic tribe known as Ottomans forms small state in western Anatolia.
1352:	Ottomans invade and begin to occupy Bulgaria.
1371:	Ottomans defeat Serbs and their allies at Battle of Maritsa.
1389:	Ottomans inflict second defeat on Serbs, now led by Prince Lazar, at the Battle of Kosovo, beginning slow conquest of Serbia.
1402:	Ottomans move their capital from Asia Minor to Edirne (Adrianople) in Europe, signalling their intention to become a major European power.
1453:	Ottomans encircle and conquer Constantinople, ending the Byzantine Empire.
1459:	Fall of Smederevo liquidates last remnant of independent Serbian state.
1463:	Ottomans almost complete conquest of Bosnia, executing last king of Bosnia, Stjepan Tomasevic, at Jajce.
1468:	Albanian warrior prince Skenderbeg dies. Within a decade of his death, Ottomans overrun most of Albania.
1493:	Croatian nobility annihilated at Battle of Krbava in Lika, opening way to Ottoman conquest of much of Croatia.
1526:	Hungarian army crushed at Battle of Mohacs, opening way for Ottoman conquest of Hungary.
1557:	Sultan decrees restoration of Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, vacant since the 1460s. Return of Patriarchs to Pec stimulates revival of Serbian identity within Ottoman Empire.
1683-1699:	Habsburgs conquer Ottoman-ruled Hungary and Croatia, forging new frontier between "Austrian" and "Turkish" empires. Failed uprising among Serbs in Kosovo results in mass emigration of Serbs to Habsburg Slavonia and Vojvodina.
1804-1817:	Series of Serbian uprisings ends in establishment of small autonomous Serbian principality within Ottoman Empire under Prince Milos Obrenovic.
1867:	Serbian princes consolidate control over new state by expelling Ottoman garrison from Belgrade.
1876-1878:	Uprising in Bulgaria triggers Russo-Turkish war the following year. This ends in Turkish defeat and creation at Congress of Berlin of autonomous Bulgaria within the Ottoman Empire. Austria occupies Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia throws off last vestiges of autonomy, becoming formally independent and receiving territory to the south. Montenegro also gains territory at expense of Albanians.
1903:	So-called "Ilinden" uprising in Macedonia ends in defeat, as Serbs, Greeks and outside powers hold aloof. Ottomans remain in control of Macedonia.
1908:	Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, humiliating Serbia. Montenegro's prince declares himself a king and Bulgaria's king declares himself a tsar. Young Turk revolution in Constantinople aims to revive Ottoman Empire.

²³⁶ Reproduced from <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-ottomans-six-centuries-in-europe>

- 1909-1910: Anti-Ottoman revolts sweep northern Albania and Kosovo, but rebels' failure to coordinate or gain support of outside powers allows Ottomans to retain control.
- 1912-1913: Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece unite and declare war on Ottomans, overrunning "Turkey-in-Europe", but then fighting with each other over the spoils. First and Second Balkan wars end with most of Macedonia, claimed by Bulgaria, going to Serbia and Greece. Serbia also gains Kosovo. Albania declares independence but is unable to secure most majority-Albanian land for the new state. After more than six centuries, the Ottomans are expelled from the continent, except for Constantinople and eastern Thrace.
- 1914-1918: First World War and the end of Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- 1918-1943: Kingdom of Yugoslavia
- 1943-1990: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito
- 1990: Start of the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
- 1992-1995: Bosnian War