South Sudan: Conflict Mapping, Ontological Security and Institutionalised Conflict

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Generations For Peace Institute (GFPI) conducts, invests in, and disseminates applied interdisciplinary research and best practices in partnership with leading universities such as the Georgetown University, the University of Oxford, the University of Western Cape, as well as other institutes, research centres, individual academics and researchers. As well as research on Generations For Peace’s own programmes, the Institute’s research projects also examine peace-building interventions by other organisations, therefore making broader contributions to the fields of peace building and conflict transformation in general.

The overall objectives of the Institute reflect the aspirations of Generations For Peace to make a practical difference to programme work on the ground, supporting a growing community of practice by demonstrating the impact of and advocating for increased use of sport, art, advocacy, dialogue and empowerment activities for sustainable peace building.

About Generations For Peace

Generations For Peace (GFP) is a Jordan-based leading global non-profit peace-building organisation founded by HRH Prince Feisal Al-Hussein and Sarah Kabbani in 2007. Dedicated to sustainable conflict transformation at the grassroots, Generations For Peace empowers volunteer leaders of youth to promote active tolerance and responsible citizenship in communities experiencing different forms of conflict and violence.

In the last five years, Generations For Peace has trained and mentored more than 8,700 volunteer leaders of youth in 50 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe. With our support, their ongoing programmes address local issues of conflict and violence, and have touched the lives of more than 200,000 children, youth and adults.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFP</td>
<td>Generations For Peace</td>
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<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord's Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>SSD</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGONU</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission In South Sudan</td>
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3. Introduction
On 15 and 16 December 2013, violence broke out in Juba, South Sudan, with many thousands killed. The finer details of how it started are unclear and accounts of the violence are often conflicting. What is almost unanimously clear however, is that the conflict started in the political sphere and on 15 December that dispute became violent conflict as it spilled into the military barracks and soon after, into the streets. Bodies “littered” the streets in certain parts of Juba and by 18 December two United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) compounds were housing close to 20,000 citizens who had fled their homes in the wake of the violence.¹ This report will unpack this violence, attempt to explain what created it and perhaps most importantly, how Generations For Peace (GFP) should move forward in creating meaningful work in South Sudan.

GFP is a peace-building non-governmental organisation based in Jordan. It aims to empower, mentor and support volunteers to become change-makers to create a better future in their own communities.² It trains volunteers from conflict or post-conflict regions to implement grassroots peace-building programmes in the communities. Having a firm grip on the context in which they will work is considered important to GFP. Since South Sudan is a country in which GFP has recently registered locally and established an office, it commissioned a report to investigate the facts, perceptions, intricacies, causes and dynamics of the recent crisis in South Sudan. From this knowledge, recommendations and options should be developed so that GFP can implement a context-specific and relevant peace-building programme that tackles the issues pointed out in this paper.

In order to provide this information the paper will proceed in the following way:

• It will begin with a brief description of the key actors: essentially a character and organisation list. This will assist to make sense of the mapping of the conflict that is to follow.

• The second part is a combined section that discusses how the events unfolded leading up to and during the December crisis and what the root causes for this violence were. It will begin with an explanation of the political crisis that was brewing, depending on how long-term one’s vision is, from anywhere between 1991 and 2012. Perhaps the most interesting question for GFP, and inconveniently one of the most difficult questions to answer is how a political conflict became ethnic. It is the researcher’s aim that the answer provided here will go beyond merely explaining that politicians mobilise along ethnic lines. Understanding why citizens are willing to take up arms when mobilised is important in being able to develop a strategy to build peace in the long term. The answer posed in this paper is spread across two sections: ontological security and institutionalised violence.

• Moving on from this part, the paper will discuss the dynamics, influencing factors and context that feed into the conflict. These are those aspects that did not necessarily begin the conflict but that shape its organic nature: those aspects that have the power to fuel and moderate the fighting.

• Given all this information, the paper will then turn to its final and most important task: detailing what Generations For Peace can and should do to support South Sudan’s path to peace and prosperity.

“Perhaps the most interesting question for GFP, and inconveniently one of the most difficult questions to answer is how a political conflict became ethnic. It is the researcher’s aim that the answer provided here will go beyond merely explaining that politicians mobilise along ethnic lines. Understanding why citizens are willing to take up arms when mobilised is important in being able to develop a strategy to build peace in the long term.”
4. Literature Review
This section reviews the literature surrounding three main concepts that are central to this paper: conflict mapping, ontological security and institutionalised violence. In addition to describing each concept in detail, this section will also illuminate the gaps in the literature that this paper hopes to fill.

4.1 Conflict Mapping
There are a number of tools that have been developed to analyse conflict; they provide lenses through which to look at the conflict and prioritise aspects of a given conflict. No one lens provides a full picture however. Taking this into account, this section of the paper will very briefly summarise some of the tools available, and acknowledge what aspects of the December 2013 conflict each particular lens helps to highlight. The relevant aspects from each approach will be amalgamated into the approach that is used throughout this paper.

The first approach worth mentioning is the Harvard approach, which focuses on distinguishing party positions (what people say they want) from party interests (why people have those wants). Consequently, this approach investigates whether the core interests can be satisfied through alternative outcomes that resolve the conflict rather than feed it. It is the duplicity and complexity with which causation is perceived in this approach that is useful for this research. Understanding that there may be a disjuncture between what important political leaders say the core issue causing the conflict is, and the actual reason, is often an important step to understanding and solving the conflict. This approach was kept in mind throughout the research. For example, was Machar’s issue with Kiir the ostensible reason: that Kiir was undemocratic in his dealings, or was it perhaps a more personal gripe over a desire for Machar to have increased power himself?

Similarly, did Kiir genuinely believe that Machar coordinated a coup d’état against him? or was that the opportunity to remove and delegitimise someone he had never trusted and never wanted to share power with? These types of questions, which distinguish the ostensible position from the underlying interest, were vital for unpacking the complexities and realities that constitute the root causes of the South Sudan conflict. It therefore came through in both the Key Actors and Root Causes sections.

The Harvard Approach seeks to deal with conflict by deciphering the positions from interests and attempting to create an agreement that satisfies the interests (although perhaps not positions) of the core actors. The Human Needs Theory however sees the root causes of conflict as the deprivation of basic universal human needs. It is therefore an understanding and fulfilment of these needs that is required for conflict analysis and transformation. Conflicts labelled as identity conflicts are often rooted deeply in competing needs for resources in a scarce environment. This was a particularly important aspect of the conflict between South Sudan and Sudan where the South experienced marginalisation and lack of development investment from the Khartoum government. As much as this is a vital consideration, conflict causes are often more complex and multi-faceted than simply the “empty belly” idea. It is a crucial idea, and therefore will be considered under Root Causes, but it does not explain the ability of the conflict to continue even when peace is in both sides’ economic interests.

Unlike the first two approaches, which focus more on the issues, Conflict Transformation engages more with how the issues are dealt with. This approach seeks to alter the manner in which people deal with conflict, from destructive to constructive interactions: or from violent to non-violent interactions. The emphasis then is on empowering actors and encouraging mutual recognition thereby providing the necessary tools for non-violent conflict resolution. The value in this approach is that the focus becomes not on the differences between the two (or more) groups, but in the manner in which one or both sides are unable to express their needs and concerns. This silencing can either be institutionalised (e.g., where freedom of speech etc. is not protected) or simply because the other side fails to listen. The Conflict Transformation approach is an important part of the work that GFP does, and it became an important part of this analysis. Transforming institutionalised violence essentially requires conflict transformation and will be an important part of any path to a peaceful South Sudan.

Glasl’s Escalation Model: This maps the fluctuations in intensity of the conflict: when levels of violence and commitment are high, or conversely, when the conflict may be ripe for mediation as parties begin to lose public support or financial backing. The value here is understanding that conflict is as organic as the people that partake in it: it becomes inflamed by certain actions, it dies down under certain conditions and it begins and ends when changes occur. Understanding both the fluidity of conflict, and what causes its fluidity can be vital in understanding the causes and nature of the conflict itself. Understanding the two-day flare up of

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5 Ibid.
violence in Juba was certainly a challenge and required an investigation into the
dynamics of escalation. This approach was therefore engaged with under the Root
Causes section: most specifically under the section entitled The Political Conflict.

Another aspect that is important to consider when conflict mapping is the Construc-tivist-Systemic approach. This method views attitudes and behaviours
that would normally be perceived as the qualities of an actor, as qualities of the
overall system. Therefore this argues that what might be considered personal
traits (such as attitudes) exist in the relationships between parties and are located
in the conflict itself rather than within the actors themselves. Therefore, behaviour,
opinions and stances towards peace processes emerge from context rather than
from inner attitudes.\(^8\) The structural approach is therefore the opposite of the
agency approach, which promotes the role of the individual. The value here is
understanding that unless the structure changes, people can come and go, but
the conflict will continue. This was an important part of my analysis: both in terms
of the conflict mapping section (Key Actors, Root Causes, Dynamics) and the
ontological security section.

While the Constructivist-Systemic approach is structural in nature, the Needs-
Fears mapping approach focuses more heavily on agency: actors and their issues,
interests, needs, fears, means and options.\(^9\) It allows for a clear comparison of
actors’ similarities and differences. This analysis is important for the research
because it unpacks not only why certain groups have certain needs or desires, but
also why the opposing side is fearful of acquiescing. Pre-emptive attacks, moving
tanks to borders, minority control of the majority and investing in military power
are all expressions of fear. Understanding this proved important for my research
in South Sudan, and was outlined in the Key Actors section.

Multi-Causal Role model: The focus here is on causality at various levels of depth
and predictability. While most of the approaches mentioned here have an implicit
understanding that causation is not created during one timeframe alone, this
approach draws explicit attention to the influence of time on conflict. It ranges
from long term causes such as structures, to intermediate factors such as actors,
dynamics and channels to the more short-term factors like trigger, catalysts and
targets. What could be a potential trigger is often much more difficult to predict
than long term structural causes.\(^10\) Recognising the usefulness of this multi-layered
causal analysis resulted in the active attempt at incorporating this model into
every section of this research.

In the end, many of the ideas and lenses discussed were agglomerated into four
categories: Key Actors; Root Causes; Dynamics, Influencing Factors and Context;
and Options. As I moved through this section, I have outlined how each approach
has been incorporated into each of the four categories. Key Actors will map the
agency aspects: who the key players are, including individuals, political parties,
guerrilla movements and other important actors. The relationships between the
actors will also be covered. Root Causes will relate the core grievances, issues and

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8 Splinter, Dirk; Wüstehube, Ljubjana. “Discovering hidden dynamics: applying systemic constellation
work to ethnopolitical conflict” in The non-linearity of peace processes. Eds. Körppen, Daniela; Ropers,
Development and Cooperation, SDC. Bern.
10 Ibid.
responses that initiated the conflict. Dynamics, Influencing Factors and Context are those factors that have sustained the conflict, that have caused the nature and tempo of the conflict to change, and that entrench the conflict as a method of interaction. Lastly, the research will propose Options for Generations For Peace moving forward: how and where the Programmes Department should focus its attention, and how the programmes should be structured.

4.2 Ontological Security

Ontological security poses a new way of looking at the identity-conflict nexus: particularly with regard to its role within securitisation (and desecuritisation). The core question is: “How does the Self move from a securitised to a non-securitised relation with the Other while its very identity depends on its relation to the Other?” Ontological security therefore creates a distinction in terms of security: it is the security of the Self rather than physical security. In other words, ontological security is the desire to have a constant and perpetual conception of the Self. Ontological security is formed and sustained through relationships with others, through routinising an individual’s relationships with significant others. Because the actions a person takes require the cognitive certainty that these relationships provide, actors can become attached to these relationships. Importantly, actors can be attached to these relationships even if they do not enhance their physical security in the conventionally rational manner. The search for ontological security is therefore the search for a stable identity. As with all identities, the creation of the Self requires the creation of the Other. It is this identification of the Self and the Other that guides and determines the type of interactions with the Other. Ontological security does not presume the existence of relations characterised by conflict: indeed, it helps to explain the perpetuation of good relations between groups as well. If relations of enmity exist between two groups however, ontological security can help to explain why individuals may choose to hold onto those relations of enmity, even if they do not benefit them in any conventionally rational way. By maintaining relations of enmity, the relationship with the Other is maintained which in turn reinforces and secures the image of the Self. This theory therefore helps to explain and understand intractable conflict: particularly conflict that does not seem rational in terms of the physical security paradigm.

Ontological security was initially conceived in the field of sociology and psychology in particular to deal with man’s relationship with an increasingly modernising world. Its application to conflict has tended to be limited to intra-state relations: explaining why states invest in relations of enmity even when it does not enhance their security. On a theoretical level, the relationship between ontological security and physical security was developed into an incredibly useful framework: a framework which highlights the possibilities for achieving ontological security in the absence of securitisation and limits to desecuritisation that stem from

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12 Rumelili. Identity and desecuritisation. 2.


ontological insecurity.\textsuperscript{17} However, to the researcher’s knowledge, no study has ever investigated whether ontological security plays a role in mobilising civilians to engage in violence: particularly during civil war. This also means that ontological security has never been empirically tested in the field with individuals engaged or exposed to violence and conflict. This paper therefore aims to take the application of ontological security in conflict from the state level to the individual level.

4.3 Institutionalised Violence

All societies have to deal with the problem of violence.\textsuperscript{18} Violence includes both violent acts as well as coercion. The relationship between coercion and violent acts is the belief in the actions of others and in particular the credibility of threats of violence, as well as the conditions under which the use of physical violence will result in a response from other individuals or the state. In other words, violence is both the threat and the use of violence. The trouble with this conception of violence is that the threat of violence is often used to prevent or inhibit the actual perpetuation of violence.

With this conception of violence, it is important to develop a conception of what an institution is. Institutions are the “rules of the game”.\textsuperscript{19} They are the patterns of interactions, rules, norms and social guidelines that both limit and delineate possible and acceptable reactions to actions. These include formal institutions: such as laws, rules and precedents as well as informal institutions such as social conventions, informal norms of behaviour, religious beliefs, cultures and shared beliefs about the world. Both formal and informal institutions have enforcement mechanisms: ranging from prison sentences to social exclusion and ostracisation.

Ways of dealing with violence are embedded in societies’ institutions and in the organisations that create and perpetuate those institutions.\textsuperscript{20} Institutions deter violence by altering the payoffs available from violent acts: for example by stipulating punishments for the use of violence. Often the punishment for a violent act is a violent reaction. Part of the power of these institutions stems from the largely accepted belief that an individual should obey rules or restrictions and if s/he does not, then s/he will be punished. Without institutions and organisations that can create and enforce punishment for violent behaviour – such as a state – the only other manner in which violence will be “organically” eliminated is if it is in both parties’ interests to be non-violent. The lack of reward for violence must exist for all those with the capacity to be violent and this lack of reward must be public knowledge. In this way, no party has the incentive to engage in violence, and, with the knowledge that no other party has the incentive to be violent each party will feel comfortable enough to disarm. Without these conditions a violent equilibrium can easily be ascertained. The following passage describes this condition well.


\textsuperscript{20} North, Douglass C.; Wallis, John Joseph; Weingast, Barry R. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. 16
When reading it, it would be useful to keep in mind the South Sudanese context: 21

Imagine a world where violence is endemic and the population is made up of many small groups with no well-organised governments of military forces. Some individuals specialise in violence, but all individuals must stand ready to defend their rights by force of arms. The violence specialists may provide protection to a small group of clients, but the biggest threat facing the specialists is one another. If they try to agree to disarm, the first specialist to put down his or her arms risks being killed by the other. Thus, it is an equilibrium outcome for both specialists to remain armed and continue fighting.

In order for one specialist to stop fighting, he or she must perceive that it is in the other’s interests not to fight, an expectation that both specialists must share about one another. Only if the cost of not fighting or the benefit from not fighting is tangible and clear to both specialists will they believe that not fighting is a credible outcome. 22

Therefore without these conditions, should it be in the interest of a specialist in violence to engage in violence, the specialist will. This will keep other violence specialists armed, who will use violence either to protect themselves or to punish the use of violence by the other. In some cases, the threat of the violent punishment will reduce the benefits of the violent act to the extent where it will not take place. Therefore, it is through the threat of violence that social order is created. However, if the threat of violence is not credible, or if the positive consequence is still greater even in the face of the punishment, violence will still occur. Therefore this system of social order is not stable or secure.

The value of institutionalised violence, as a theoretical approach, is that it does not see violence as a social aberration or anomaly, but rather as an inherent part of societal functioning and social order. This is not because certain societies are primitive, led by or constructed of few capable individuals, but rather because societies face a very different composition of constraints and realities: in the case of South Sudan, no single organ with the monopoly on power, specific interests that align with violence, and the desire for social order and protection. As this theoretical framework sees violence as inherent and in some cases necessary, assessing the extent to which it can be applied and useful within the South Sudanese context seemed a fruitful endeavour.

With a clear understanding of the literature that formed the backbone of the research within the fields of conflict mapping, ontological security and institutionalised conflict, we will now move into a discussion on how these concepts were used in practice. The section that follows outlines specifically what questions the research sought to address, which of the above outlined approaches were utilised to address them, the methods in which the research aimed to address them, and the limitations that the research encountered.

21 For example, keep in mind that while South Sudan was part of Sudan, the Khartoum government essentially marginalised the south and was, in many ways, an absent state. The primary manner in which it was present, was when it was fighting the SPLM. As a result, the South sustained an incredibly traditional way of life, based on tribal living.
5. Research Questions, Methodology and Limitations
5.1 Research Questions

The conflict in South Sudan that will be the focus of the research is the inter-ethnic conflict in Juba between the Dinka and the Nuer. South Sudan has 64 ethnic groups: the Dinka group is the largest ethnic group, although the Nuer ethnic group is not far behind in terms of numbers.\(^\text{23}\) In fact, some Nuer interviewees claimed that the Nuer were the majority group.\(^\text{24}\) As will be elaborated upon further in this paper, December 2013 saw an episode of violence between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. Although December 2013 saw a flare-up of inter-ethnic violence in Juba, this violence has a long history and should be mapped appropriately. The following research questions assisted in the successful mapping of this conflict:

1. Who are the core actors in each conflict?
2. What were the root causes of the conflict when it began?
3. What continues to sustain the conflict? In other words, since the conflict began, have other dynamics or aspects become increasingly important? Are the root causes still as important as they were at the beginning?
4. What are possible options for Generations For Peace moving forward, based on the knowledge gained?

Conflict mapping aims to reconstruct the chain of events from a conflict by gathering data in the field. It essentially unpacks what happened in a conflict, who was responsible and why certain actions were taken. A conflict map should also convey how the conflict evolves and organically shifts as it unfolds.

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approaches:
- Key Actors
- Root Causes
- Dynamics, Influencing Factors and Context
- Options.

While this criteria clearly corresponds to the stated research questions, when considering the matter of “root causes” the following sub-question begs an answer: how did a political conflict become ethnic? The commonly given answer, as will be detailed in the Key Actors and Root Causes sections, is that the ethnicities were mobilised by their political leaders to fight one another. However this response leads to the follow-up question, why are ethnic groups so easily mobilised to violence, particularly when people of different ethnicities have been living side by side for many years? In order to answer these questions a few aspects were investigated, namely:

- Is ontological security a relevant factor when understanding how the conflict is perpetuated? If so, how relevant?
- Does ontological security become more of a consideration when physical security deteriorates?
- Has violence been institutionalised? In other words, has decades of civil war, colonisation and tribal cattle raiding made violence an all too readily option? Indeed the institutionalised option?

The ontological security investigation examined whether relationships of conflict have become a part of the grassroots individual's identity. To what extent does the theory of ontological security explain the seeming willingness of the Dinka and Nuer to hold onto relations of enmity, even when those relations do not promote physical security? Could an argument be made that, in fact, when there are low levels of physical security, the desire for ontological security is stronger, thereby strengthening the desire to hold onto and entrench relations with the Other, albeit violently? If this proved to be the case, it would help us understand why, when elite leaders mobilise along ethnic lines, the people who belong to those ethnicities are actually willing to be mobilised for violent purposes. Years of very good peace-building work are often seen to be unsuccessful as a country reverts once more to conflict. This is well understood in terms of elite manipulation of identity: elites mobilise along identity lines because that is seen as a sure method of political and/or military success. The aspect that is missing from this analysis is an explanation for why the grassroots supporters of the elite are willing to be mobilised along lines of identity. This question becomes even more intriguing when the kind of mobilisation is so extremely violent, and when the benefits of that violence are less clear. As many peace builders note, if its elite calls an ethnicity to arms, and that group refuses to engage in violence, the violence stops before it has begun. The first step however, is to understand why that group is willing to bear arms in the first place. The second part of this research investigated the role that ontological security plays in answering this question.
5.2 Methodology

5.2.1 Approach and Justification

The literature review has outlined the background in the fields this paper has addressed, and from this information and the gaps in the information, research questions emerged. In order to investigate these research questions three investigative methods were employed. The first was the semi-structured interview (please see Appendix B for the interview questions). The idea behind the semi-structured interview is to ask questions that allow for a broad range of answers, and allow the respondent to provide anecdotes, cultural stories and perceptions. Importantly, it also allows the interviewer the time to ask follow up questions to probe and unpack certain answers. This was particularly useful when answers appeared to be given for the purposes of social desirability, rather than truthfulness. This therefore provided in-depth knowledge from people living and working in the conflict in a manner that was both refined enough to be targeted, while broad enough to allow fluidity in the answers. The most significant benefit here was that the interviewee could include factors and variables in their answers (and the discussions that stemmed from those answers) that the researcher may not have considered or otherwise included.

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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Literate</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Illiterate</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Men</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Women</td>
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</table>

Academic Interview: Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute). (He is neither Dinka nor Nuer)

The second method used was a short questionnaire: this was deliberately kept short and concise so that it could be quickly, easily and readily filled in (please see Appendix A for the questionnaire). The aim here was to get as many different observations as possible, and to ensure that as many opinions and ideas from the population were covered as possible. The length and quantifiable nature of the answers meant that datasets could be created, and more broadly applicable conclusions drawn. The assumption is, the more questionnaires answered, the more certain one can be that the conclusions drawn from the datasets are generalisable. Below is a table containing a summary of the characteristics of the respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dinka</th>
<th>Nuer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Men</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Women</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation in age</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>13.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Interviewee details

Table 2: Respondent details
Lastly, desk research was engaged in: this was intended to supplement the information attained through the interviews. This was important for a number of reasons. First of all, to attain facts that do not come through in the fieldwork, or that seem to contradict one another. Secondly, it is important to imbed the facts within a framework that makes sense of those facts, and these frameworks are usually found in academic journals and other academic writing. The work on ontological security and institutionalised conflict in particular required a firm academic grounding, and this was largely acquired through desktop research.

5.2.2 Method of Analysis
The semi-structured interviews were translated and transcribed, and used as a source of information in much the same way as published articles were. They were taken to express ideas and, in certain cases, facts. The documentation of the crisis in December 2013 is fairly limited, and therefore further investigation was required to acquire a more detailed analysis. In addition, much of what is available tends to be the perspectives of the elite in South Sudan: either top political players or employees of intergovernmental organisations. Because Generations For Peace works with communities, it was important that the perspectives enshrined in this research represented those perspectives. When certain aspects of the crisis were commonplace in a number of interviews, or correlated with reports on what happened, these ideas were taken as factual.

As for the questionnaires, they were deconstructed into a single dataset. This data was then worked with: averages and totals calculated and values represented in graphical and/or tabulated form. This gave a better idea regarding both the scope and nature of opinions and ideas held regarding the conflict. In other words, this conveyed the general ideas and perceptions that each group holds.

The desktop research was read, summarised and analysed. Published articles were weighted more highly than newspaper articles, however both were certainly used and usually in different ways. Because the crisis in December 2013 was fairly recent, not many journal articles on the subject have been published: as such, these resources tended to provide either background information on South Sudan or a theoretical framework through which to assess it. Newspaper articles on the other hand, are useful to ascertain facts about what was happening in the lead up to the crisis in South Sudan, how the crisis unfolded and what has happened since. These articles served as a fact check for the interviews and vice versa: newspaper articles sometimes get facts and analysis wrong, and therefore if something that is pervasive across interviews and questionnaires from both ethnicities contradicts an article, the trustworthiness of the article was called into question. Likewise, when a “fact” was represented in an interview that had been contradicted by a number of newspaper articles and in some cases other interviews, that “fact” was considered more as a perception.
5.3 Limitations
The first limitation that emerged in the field was that the questionnaires and semi-structured interviews were significantly less useful for facts that the researcher had anticipated. For example, in many Dinka interviews there was the accusation that UNMISS was supporting the Nuer in an attempt to fuel conflict and ultimately rule South Sudan. For example:

Those guns were brought by Helen Johnson. You know the UN Secretary-General? That thing, we know that the UN is against us. And that is why they do that thing to bring guns for Nuers. They are supporting Nuer. Then if we carry on killing ourselves here in South Sudan, then the UN will come in and rule us: that is what they want, to grab our resources.\(^{25}\)

In addition, the allocation of blame for the December 2013 crisis and the violence that characterised it was incredibly dependent on the ethnic group. It perhaps was to be expected that the Nuer would blame the Dinka and that the Dinka would blame the Nuer, but this made an objective reading of the crisis difficult. This information is incredibly useful for perceptions of what events occurred and how, and of other groups, but different groups have such different ideas about how the events of the December crisis unravelled that clear facts are difficult to distinguish. In and of itself, this is an important finding. As a result, the factual part of the paper tends to come more from desktop research and one or two interviews with researchers in South Sudan, rather than from the “grassroots” interviews.

Secondly, it was not always possible to get the demographic spread for interviews that would make the interviewees gender and age balanced. For example, it was not possible to arrange any female Nuer people to complete the questionnaire or to participate in a semi-structured interview, and six Dinka women were available to fill out the questionnaire only. Because men tend to be the main decision-makers, particularly when it comes to fighting, violence, war and peace, this limitation must be acknowledged and kept in mind when reading the findings and analyses. Perhaps more detrimental was the limited access to illiterate South Sudanese. For practical purposes, the majority of those who participated in the research were literate. While this had major advantages: for example, literate respondents had a greater understanding of the questions and could communicate more complex ideas more easily, it does create the potential for a biased sample. This is particularly the case because the majority of South Sudanese are illiterate, with a literacy rate of only 27%.\(^{26}\) In fact, many interviewees said the willingness to respond to calls for violence is primarily taken up by the illiterate “because they don’t know anything”.\(^{27}\) While this explanation appears overly simplistic, having 50% or more illiterate respondents would have been ideal. Unfortunately, this was not a practical option: our participants had to be arranged by others and there was limited control that could be exerted over this process. Nevertheless, the researcher was able to arrange enough illiterate respondents to be fairly confident that that perspective was not ignored.

25 Interview with Dinka # 7, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 1 August 2014.
27 Interview with Nuer # 3, Juba, South Sudan. 12:00. 1 August 2014.
The main limitations with semi-structured interviews were the language barrier and time constraints. Conversations flow more naturally without an interpreter, and the fact that one was needed certainly hampered this. Even those interviewees that could speak English often had a fairly limited ability to express complex ideas or to understand more complex questions. These interviews were also more time-intensive which limited the number of interviews that could take place.

Regarding the questionnaires, the amount of time required explaining the meaning of the questions and what respondents needed to do was significantly longer than what was originally anticipated. This meant that there was less time to conduct semi-structured interviews afterwards. Nonetheless, the number of questionnaires and interviews conducted and collected by the end of the time in the field was enough to draw meaningful and representative conclusions.
6. Key Actors
Before engaging in an analysis and summary of the findings acquired from the interviews and questionnaires, it is necessary to outline the key actors in the conflict. This is important because many of the findings explicitly refer to these actors and therefore a clear understanding of who the actors are is vital. It also forms a crucial part of the conflict map: understanding whom the core actors are and what role they have played in the conflict. The primary actors to consider are the SPLM, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar.

6.1 The SPLM

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) was founded alongside the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to be the political wing of the army that would fight the Khartoum government. It was founded on 16 May 1983 following the collapse of the Addis Ababa agreement that had ended the first civil war with the Khartoum government. The rebel group Anya Nya fought this first civil war. The SPLM and SPLA were initially designed to be two distinct but interconnected units: the former the political unit, the latter the military. Soon, however, John Garang, the leader of the SPLA deposed the chairman of the SPLM - Joseph Oduho – and made himself the leader of the SPLA/M. John Garang was a Dinka man from Upper Nile in South Sudan who led and founded the SPLM/A. In many ways, his leadership of the SPLM and SPLA combined marked the beginning of a general tendency to intertwine the political and military aspects of leadership that has remained a defining feature of the SPLM even after a separate military leader was assigned to the SPLA. This paper will use the term SPLM, but it is important to keep in mind that the distinction between the SPLM and the SPLA are incredibly narrow and in some ways non-existent.

The newly formed SPLM faced immediate opposition from the Nuer-dominated Anya Nya II\(^{29}\): a military wing that saw the SPLM as Dinka-dominated and committed to Sudan’s unity.\(^ {30}\) The SPLM defeated Anya Nya II and members were either incorporated or fled so that by mid-1989 only one Anya Nya II faction remained and its base of support in South Sudan had essentially disappeared. The SPLM battled to shake off the perception of being Dinka-dominated, and at various points during the civil war with Sudan, Nuer and Dinka factions within the SPLM fought one another.\(^ {31}\) The most serious was when Riek Machar – a top leader in the SPLM and previous Vice-President of South Sudan – broke away from the SPLM to form the Nasir faction. This faction was Nuer-dominated and aimed to overthrow the Dinka-dominated SPLM. The SPLA-Nasir faction received support from the Khartoum government and for a while there was heavy fighting between Garang’s SPLM and Machar’s faction.\(^ {32}\) The most well remembered violence was the Bor massacre of 1991, where at least 2,000 Dinka were killed, 100,000 people displaced and 25,000 died as a result of famine after Machar’s largely Nuer-based forces looted and burned farms, cattle and villages owned by the Dinka.\(^ {33}\) After some time, reconciliation occurred between Garang and Machar, or at least ties were mended in 2002 and he re-joined the SPLM as a senior commander. Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan, led this process of reconciliation in the hopes that a reunited SPLM would mount a stronger fight against Khartoum.

This indeed was the case as the SPLM went on to carry South Sudan to independence, and has effectively become the only political party in post-independence South Sudan. While there is political opposition in South Sudan, there is nothing substantial enough to effectively oppose the SPLM. This means that the leader of the SPLM was effectively secured the highest position in the country: president.\(^ {34}\) Unfortunately, the process of electing who stands for presidency is not open to the public, and tends to be determined more by political bartering, rather than through democratic processes.\(^ {35}\) What this means is that the political competition between potential leaders of South Sudan is not actually decided democratically during the national elections, but rather within the politically opaque processes of the SPLM. In addition, the powers allocated to the president of the SPLM and therefore South Sudan are significant and unchecked in some crucial areas. For example, President Salva Kiir was able to strip powers given to Riek Machar through a decree. In addition, the political processes that exist to deal with conflict within the SPLM are limited and tend to result in deadlock.\(^ {36}\) The combination of these factors results in a situation where political change in the SPLM often requires, and results in violence: on the one hand because the prize is so great.

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29 Anya Nya II was a Nuer-dominated dissident group that broke away from Anya Nya (I): the primary military arm that fought the first civil war against the Khartoum government.
30 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 31 July 2014.
(the assured seat of the presidency) while on the other there is a lack of adequately democratic and transparent mechanisms through which political change can occur in the organisation. As one interviewee noted:

The reason [I would use violence] would be that if the Nuer said that I should run for the next election... I was forced to fight. I was forced to fight by someone who heard that he was planning on running for the next election. So I was forced to fight and then he would fight.37

In other words, the interviewee was communicating that, the only time in which he would need to use violence was if he was to try to gain the presidency. This was a major contributor to the December 2013 crisis.

The SPLM consists of National Organs, State Organs, County Organs, Payam Organs and Boma Organs. For the relevance of the conflict mapping, the National Organs are the most relevant. The National Organs are:

   a) The National Convention
   b) National Liberation Council
   c) The Political Bureau
   d) The General Secretariat (including SPLM Chapters).38

This knowledge is important for understanding findings later on as the Political Bureau repeatedly came up in the semi-structured interviews and questionnaires, with many respondents apportioning the blame to that organ. The Political Bureau consists of 27 members including the Chairperson, Deputies of the Chairperson, Secretary General and Deputies of the Secretary General. It was in this organ that the political haggling and tension first occurred. Respondents to the interviews repeatedly emphasised that the December 2013 crisis was ultimately a political conflict: that ethnicity only came in later when it became politically profitable for it to be used. Thus politics were occurring in the SPLM and specifically within the Political Bureau.

6.2 Salva Kiir

Salva Kiir is the President of the SPLM, and consequently of South Sudan. Born in 1951, and joining the rebellion in the late 1960s, Kiir has given much of his life to the struggle for independence.39 Unfortunately, the time given to the struggle limited his time and ability to access education. He assisted Dr Garang to form the SPLM when it was formed in 1983 and came to lead its military wing.40 Within the SPLM, he managed to rise in the ranks, until he was one of the four most important members of the SPLM. He particularly distinguished himself during times when there were divisions in the SPLM, proving to be a vital conciliator and negotiator during the 1990s and early 2000s.41 He was an important part of the negotiations that would lead to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005, that would lead to peace with northern Sudan and ultimately

37 Interview with Dinka # 4, Juba, South Sudan. 13:30. 31 July 2014.
40 Ibid.
South Sudan’s independence. This meant that when Dr John Garang died in a helicopter crash shortly after the signing of the CPA, Salva Kiir was next in line to take over the leadership of the SPLM. He acted as the Vice-President of Sudan from 2005 until 2011 when the referendum was held in South Sudan securing its independence and establishing it as the youngest country in the world.

Salva Kiir has risen to his position based on his military capabilities. Unfortunately, his leadership style has been informed by that military history, with some of his allies admitting that he has failed to make the transition from being a military commander to a democratic politician.\(^{42}\) In fact political decisions and indeed political outcomes in South Sudan seem to be the result of careful manoeuvring and actions taken by the political elite rather than public choice, or even what is in the public benefit.\(^{43}\) He is the President of South Sudan today, and was one of the key actors in the political conflict that translated into ethnic violence in December 2013.

### 6.3 Dr. Riek Machar

Riek Machar was born in 1953 in Leer, Unity State. He studied engineering at the University of Khartoum and went on to do a PhD in philosophy and strategic planning at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom.\(^{44}\) His supporters frequently mention his high level of education as a contrast to Salva Kiir. The same year he completed his PhD, he returned to South Sudan and joined the SPLM. Very soon he was put in charge of the movement’s head office in Addis Ababa and the year after joining was deployed at the rank of major as a zone commander in Western Upper Nile.\(^{45}\) In 1991, he had a disagreement with Garang on how the movement should be run. The disagreement led Machar to split from the SPLM, forming the SPLM-Nasir faction. Initially, the two factions engaged in fighting with one another, with Machar receiving support from the Khartoum government. In 1997, Machar signed a deal with Omar al-Bashir – the President of Sudan and leader of the Khartoum government – and became his assistant. A few years later however, he re-joined the rebels and, in 2002, returned to the SPLM as a senior commander. Unfortunately, his betrayal and political malleability for personal political survival has been a reputation that he has battled to shake off. What became clear from the Dinka interviews conducted in Juba, is that his actions in 1991 which encouraged and led to a massacre of Dinka people, particularly in Bor, has continued to leave a cloud of suspicion over his head, and indeed over the Nuer population as a whole.

After the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the death of John Garang in a helicopter accident, Machar was appointed Vice-President of the South Sudan government. In 2005, the South Sudan government was still governing South Sudan as an autonomous region within Sudan. After independence in 2011, he maintained this position, particularly because of the enormous influence he wields within the Nuer tribe.\(^{46}\) Part of why he possesses this influence is because

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\(^{42}\) BBC News Africa. “South Sudan President Salva Kiir in profile.”

\(^{43}\) Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan, 09:00, 31 July 2014.


\(^{45}\) Sudan Tribune. “Riek Machar Teny | Riak Machar Teny.”

a Nuer prophet prophesised that a Nuer man with a gap in his teeth and who is left-handed will defeat the Dinka and rule South Sudan, and Machar has both of these qualities.47

During 2012 and 2013, tension began to grow between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. Machar was fired by Salva Kiir in July 2013, to which he responded by saying that he would challenge Kiir for the leadership of the SPLM in order to run in the 2015 elections. Unconfirmed claims have been made that Machar was planning a coup against Kiir and this ultimately led to the violent clashes between government forces and army mutineers in Juba in December 2013.48 Since then, Machar has been leading the rebels, and his own White Army in opposition to the government forces and Salva Kiir. While this conflict has quietened in Juba, it is very active in other areas of South Sudan, particularly Bor and Nasir. Both Machar and Kiir are currently engaged in talks in Addis Ababa.49

47 Interview with Paul Mabior Yithak (GFP Pioneer), Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 26 July 2014.
7. Root Causes
Something that came through almost unanimously in the interviews is that the December 2013 crisis started with politics. In fact, many interviewees disputed the ethnic nature of the December conflict. This paper agrees with the political roots of the conflict but will explain further later how that political conflict did take on an ethnic character. The first step in understanding the violence then, is understanding the political conflict: both what caused it and how it escalated.

7.1 The Political Conflict

The SPLM leadership as well as the SPLA has been largely held together by political necessity and sometimes, a desire for peace, rather than a real common affinity or similar goal. Riek Machar was the leader of the 1991 breakaway SPLM-Nasir faction, which resulted in a massacre of the Dinka people before he temporarily joined the Khartoum government. This reputation has certainly not left him: the reputation of a man who desires power at almost any cost. When he was brought back into the SPLM, it was to strengthen the SPLM against the Khartoum government and therefore strengthen the struggle for independence, rather than a genuine reconciliation between the SPLM leaders. In many ways, the SPLA – now the army for South Sudan as a whole – is also a construction of many factions brought into the fold in the lead up to the 2011 referendum on independence.50 Various factions that had been fighting the Sudanese army and/or one another over regional disputes were incorporated into the SPLA in an effort at reconciliation and demobilisation of factions, however this incorporation was never much more than a surface level arrangement. These uneasy alliances were held together in the lead up to 2011, but have crumbled since.

The lack of trust between Kiir and Machar was complicated in 2008 when Machar sought to contest the position of chairmanship at the Second National Convention.51 This would have made him the president in the 2010 elections. While

it was resolved that Kiir would remain President and Machar his Vice-President, the strained relations between South Sudan’s number one and two were apparent. This then was the backdrop for the 2013 political conflict: uneasy alliances, lack of trust between leaders and an SPLA that was a disconnected coalition of factions with divided loyalties. The timeline presented below explains how and why the events that led to the political conflict and the December 2013 crisis unfolded.

In late 2012, members of the political bureau of the SPLM visited the ten states in South Sudan: the goal was to express the government’s gratitude for the support it had received in the 2011 referendum that had granted South Sudan its independence for good. What became clear on this tour however was the deep dissatisfaction that the South Sudanese felt towards the government. There was a strong sense that the government was corrupt and had not done enough to help the people. When the politicians returned from the tour there was a dash to distribute the blame onto others within the party.52 In March 2013, this led Riek Machar and Pagan Amum – a long-time ally of Machar – to openly challenge Salva Kiir, declaring their intention to unseat Kiir and hinting at their willingness to engage in violence in order to achieve this if necessary. This divided those within the Political Bureau into three factions, which will be detailed shortly.

In April 2013, Salva Kiir withdrew powers from Riek Machar by presidential decree. Kiir essentially limited Machar’s power, giving him an increasingly ceremonial role. Kiir also cancelled the National Reconciliation Committee that Machar was overseeing.53 This was clearly in reaction to the March meeting, and quickly escalated the visible tension building in the SPLM leadership.

By July 2013, the situation was rapidly and noticeably worsening. At the second anniversary of independence Pagan Amum was absent and Kiir barely recognised Machar who was supposed to be co-hosting the celebrations alongside him. Party officials began talking openly of the rifts and those rifts began to paralyse both the government and party apparatus.

On the 23 July, Kiir passed a presidential decree in which he dismissed Machar, along with all cabinet ministers.54 All ministers and deputy ministers were removed, with departments being run by under-secretaries until Kiir was able to replace them. Kiir followed this decision with a tour to the four states in the Bahr el-Ghazal region. In some senses this was the beginning of ethnic mobilisation because Dinka people primarily inhabit this region. The ostensible purpose was to tell the people that he had removed those who were corrupt and who had failed the South Sudanese people.

In November 2013, Kiir dismissed the SPLM political structures, thereby threatening the political future of important SPLM leaders.55 This proved to have serious consequences as it further divided the SPLM. As mentioned, many political

52 Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 31 July 2014.
actions are motivated by political survival, and by dismissing political structures that provided many with political positions, support for Machar within the SPLM grew. Although Kiir later retracted this action, the damage was done in the sense that many feared that their political careers were not as secure as previously imagined.

The result was that on the 6 December, members of the SPLM in opposition to Kiir held a press conference in which they insisted that Kiir must correct the changes he has made as well as his ‘dictatorial tendencies’, or the group would resort to the party constitution and act accordingly.56 The government responded angrily, and very quickly the political conflict began to boil over into violent conflict.

The result of these months of political tensions and disputes was the creation of three factions within the SPLM:

I. President Salva Kiir’s faction/the Government faction: with James Wani Igga, the current Vice-President who replaced Riek Machar; Kuol Manyang Juk, the Defence Minister; Daniel Awet Akot, the former Deputy Speaker; Nhial Deng Nhial, the government’s Chief Negotiator at the IGAD-led talks. This faction remains in a fairly strong position, with Kiir having filled the government with his supporters and entering into the negotiations as more or less the legitimate government of South Sudan. Because Salva Kiir is Dinka, the Dinka support largely belongs to this faction.57

II. The Riek Machar/Nasir faction/main opposition faction: his main allies are Taban Deng Gai, the former Governor of Unity State and Chief Negotiator at the IGAD talks and; Alfred Lado Gore, the former Minister of the Environment and self-appointed “Chief Ideologue” for the faction. Machar, being Nuer himself, has formidable support from the Nuer people and controls important areas outside of Juba. This therefore is the Nuer-supported faction.

III. Perhaps the weakest of the three factions is the Garang Boys faction. These were those opposed to Kiir and his actions, but not necessarily pro-Machar. This faction included 11 opposition figures who were held in detention since mid-December 2013 by the South Sudanese government based on claims of their involvement in a coup to bring down the government.58 These did not include Machar, Gore or Gai – the main members of the Machar faction – who have instead been charged with treason. The main members of this faction are Mme Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior, widow of Dr. John Garang; Pagan Amum, former SPLM Secretary General; Deng Alor Kuol, former Foreign Minister of Sudan and former Minister of Cabinet Affairs of South Sudan; and Kosti Manibe, former Minister of Finance.59 In many ways, this faction has been sidelined in the conflict, and without ‘choosing a side’ it may become irrelevant.

7.2 The Violence

On 15 and 16 December 2013, Juba was torn apart by violence. Riek Machar called for a rally on 14 December at the Dr John Garang Memorial Grounds. That was the same day for the opening session of the National Liberation Council (NLC): the highest organ of the SPLM of which the Political Bureau is a part. This prompted community elders and church leaders to appeal to both sides to postpone both the rally and the NLC meeting in order to allow the groups to engage with and resolve the growing political crisis. Riek Machar’s faction acquiesced but the NLC meeting went ahead as planned. The meeting failed to address the concerns of the growing opposition. In fact, Salva Kiir referred to Riek Machar negatively in order to discredit his claims for democratic reforms in the SPLM. The response was that on the second and last day of the NLC meeting (Sunday, 15 December) Riek Machar, Rebecca Nyandeng, and other important SPLM members boycotted the meeting. Dr Nyaba — a politician present at the meeting who was later imprisoned by Kiir — noted that this incensed Kiir.

As the meeting was drawing to a close, Salva Kiir allegedly sent Major General Marial Ciennoung to the Headquarters of the SPLM armed forces in order to disarm troops. However, after dispersing the troops, Major Marial ordered that the Dinka soldiers be rearmed. This resulted in an argument between Marial, a Dinka, and his deputy, a Nuer. Some Nuer soldiers happened to overhear the altercation. Realising that the Dinka soldiers were being rearmed, the Nuer soldiers broke into the storeroom that housed the guns and rearmed themselves as well. This triggered fighting in the barracks between Nuer and Dinka soldiers. This dynamic was more complex than simply opposite ethnic groups fighting one another. As has already been mentioned, after 2005 the SPLA incorporated a number of militias in an attempt to bring about peace in South Sudan. These militias were incorporated in totality: in other words, the same militia group would be placed, complete with its command structure, in the same regiment. Therefore militia groups that had fought one another in the past and who had divided loyalty between Machar and Kiir were now part of the same army. However, when fighting broke out within the SPLA, each soldier and general had a very clear idea of who their enemies were, who their allies were, and to whom each was loyal. This meant that the fighting spread quickly to other army barracks and, in the early hours of the morning into the surrounding areas.

The Dinka soldiers and those soldiers loyal to Kiir defeated the Machar-loyal, Nuer-dominated faction within the army, and in the early hours of the morning spilled into the civilian areas. Dinka soldiers went from house to house, speaking to the inhabitants in the Dinka language. If they were unable to respond in Dinka or understand, they were killed. Other Nuer (and accidentally some Dinka, too) were killed because they had markings on their foreheads: a cultural practice that is more widespread in the Nuer culture than in the Dinka culture.

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61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
known that the Nuer would support Machar and therefore this was an attempt to undermine his support. Still others suggest civilians were merely caught in the crossfire, while others claim it was a broader attempt to assert Dinka dominance over South Sudan. Indeed the ontological security analysis presented below certainly offers a potential solution to this question. While the motivations behind the civilian attack are less clear, what is clear is that approximately 13,000 Nuer people fled to the UNMISS compounds in Juba and elsewhere in a desperate attempt to escape the fighting.64 By the afternoon of 17 December, the fight had extended to the State House and the Residence of the President, triggering the heaviest artillery fight yet. The fighting in Juba only ended on Wednesday, 18 December with members of the presidential militia and other “Dinka elements” when those soldiers loyal to Machar and Machar himself had been driven out of Juba.

It was therefore only when the soldiers had moved into the town strategically targeting Nuer citizens that ordinary citizens joined in the violence. Both Dinka and Nuer civilians targeted members of the other tribe. While accounts of the day would suggest that soldiers carried out the majority of the violence against Nuer people, it is certainly clear that some of the violence was carried out by ordinary Dinka citizens. It should also be clear that while the Nuer population was certainly the most targeted group, Nuer who sought revenge for the attacks also killed some Dinka. Besides the ethnically targeted violence, many were killed in the crossfire.65 In addition to violence, opportunistic crime became widespread. Dinka civilians looted the homes of Nuer families: taking mattresses, cars and other possessions and in some cases moving into their homes altogether.66 This is the story of the ethnic violence that shook Juba over December 2013.

On 19 December, Machar announced that he had appealed to the SPLA and SPLM to remove Kiir from office. Two days later, on 21 December, Riek Machar escaped Juba and announced to the press that he would be leading the opposition against the government of Salva Kiir.67 Meanwhile, Nuer militias fled the capital and took up the fight in other parts of South Sudan. Many Nuer fled into the UNMISS camps or left Juba to return to their rural villages so that the violence in Juba died down fairly quickly. The government claimed – once fighting in Juba had ebbed – that it had successfully managed to foil a coup d’état led by Dr. Riek Machar, and that that was what initiated the conflict. Although at this stage there is not enough evidence to either accept or reject that claim, some commentators and indeed civilians suggest that it is unlikely to have been the case.68 If indeed it was the case, then it is likely that the same situation as described above would have taken place, except that the spark of the fighting would have been a pre-ordained attack by Machar-loyal soldiers on Kiir-loyal soldiers. Either way, what is clear is that both Kiir and Machar ensured that the soldiers loyal to each of them were aware and prepared for potential conflict.69

65 Interview with Dinka # 5, Keren Hotel, Juba South Sudan. 11:00. 30 July 2014.
66 Interview with Nuer # 7, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 13:00. 1 August 2014.
69 Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 31 July 2014.
The violence was not necessarily ethnic when it broke out at the military level. With at least 60 to 70 per cent of the military being Nuer, had it been a purely ethnic conflict, the Nuer would have easily defeated the Dinka element within the army. Instead it was the reverse situation: it was the Dinka soldiers and Kiir-supporting soldiers who managed to defeat the other soldiers in the barracks. It was the Dinka elements in that army that followed their victory in the barracks with a broader ethnic attack on the Nuer communities in Juba. This is because the military is not necessarily divided along ethnic lines, but along former militia lines. Often these former militia lines coincide with ethnic lines, but not always. As has been discussed, after the civil war many militias, who had fought alongside and in many cases against the SPLM, were brought into the army in an attempt to reconcile the various factions and build peace. The difficulty is that factions were incorporated whole with their chains of command intact. And the generals of those factions, in turn, are loyal to certain politicians and therefore the lines of loyalty and affinity are clearly and deeply carved into the army. So on 15 December when fighting broke out, soldiers knew whom to fight: they knew who were their allies and their enemies.

In addition to long-standing divisions in the army, politicians began mobilising along these lines from approximately April 2013 when Salva Kiir withdrew powers from Riek Machar by presidential decree. For example, the Presidential Guard – which played a major role in the violence – consisted of six battalions: four of which were Nuer and two Dinka. As the political tension grew, recruitment into the Presidential Guard increased: solely from Dinka regions. It also received additional training: clearly Salva Kiir was taking precautions. This indicates that ethnicity was still relevant in the SPLA: Kiir still recruited from Dinka regions because he believed these new recruits would be loyal. Indeed the SPLA today – since December 2013 – is comprised primarily of Dinka soldiers, and the rebel factions that have split from the SPLA are primarily Nuer. However, allegiances to specific persons can, and do cross ethnic lines depending on the loyalty of the incorporated militia group. Therefore, to see the SPLA divisions as purely ethnic would be a mistake, but removing ethnicity from the equation would equally be a misrepresentation.

The section above has outlined what happened in the run-up to, and during the December 2013 violence. It has also explained some of the important reasons for the violence and the political conflict that preceded it: the fragmented SPLA and un-reconciled politicians coupled with undemocratic systems in the SPLM. With this knowledge, and with an understanding of the key actors, the Findings section will be significantly easier to understand and analyse.
8. Findings
The findings listed below are a summary of the data collected through questionnaires and, minimally, data from the interviews. This means the graphs and averages are taken from 27 Dinka questionnaires (nine female and 18 male) and 21 Nuer questionnaires (all male). The questionnaires aimed to acquire, and therefore the findings will showcase, two kinds of information. Firstly, it displays attitudes and perceptions: how does the respondent perceive members of the other ethnicity; would the respondent be willing to engage in violence and if so, why; and how important the ethnic dimension was with regard to the respondent’s identity. The broader goal of accumulating this kind of information was to unpack the civilian’s willingness to engage in ethnically motivated violence. The second kind of information that is represented here are facts that assist in the conflict mapping process. For example, who the powerful actors in Juba are and who the peace-seekers in Juba are. This will help to unpack the intricacies of the power relations in Juba that frame the conflict. Knowing who the peace-seekers are will assist Generations For Peace in knowing who they should partner with in their work in South Sudan.

The findings are discussed in separate sections for each question asked. The order in which each question is discussed was carefully chosen in the hopes that findings acquired in one question would feed into the findings unpacked in the following question. In other words, in many cases the most interesting discoveries are in the manner in which findings from different questions correspond or contradict one another. The structure of this section has tried to maximise the findings to be obtained between the questions, as well as within the discussion of each question.

As mentioned, these questions aimed at gathering perceptions of the Other (either Nuer or Dinka as appropriate) and the Self faced a distinct set of challenges. In a fragile post-conflict setting, respondents were understandably aware of the social acceptability of their answers, and therefore may have been unwilling to speak honestly about their feelings. Following some probing however, very different conceptions of the Other would quickly emerge which resulted in datasets that,
on first review, could seem slightly ‘schizophrenic’. The researcher hopes to unpack those datasets in this section as well, alongside an explanation for what they mean for relations and perceptions of opposing ethnicities.

### 8.1 Identity: Perceptions of the Self and the Other

Numerous questions in different sections of the questionnaire (see Appendix A) sought to investigate the degree to which, and the manner in which identity interacted with the conflict. This relied on ascertaining how an individual perceived the Other (either the Dinka or Nuer, as appropriate). In order to have a “control” or baseline from which to compare these perceptions of the Other, it was important to also understand how the individual perceived him or herself. Besides the perception of the Self being important as a control to compare with perceptions of the Other (to ensure that both perceptions were not the same), the researcher also wanted to investigate whether the perception of the Self was directly related to perceptions of the Other. In other words, did feelings about the Other actively support and strengthen firm ideas about the Self? And how could these perceptions feed conflict or antagonistic relations?

One potential manner in which identity and conflict interact is through the idea of ontological (in)security. Ontological security is essentially a secure identity that is made secure through routinised interactions with significant others. The routines and stable social identities are a source of security because they provide order and certainty. Therefore the questions were targeted at understanding how respondents saw themselves, and how they saw the Other group and how the two perceptions interacted, created and supported one another. Because the data was rather ‘schizophrenic’, it will be presented altogether, and then a clear explanation will be given for why the data looks the way it does. The explanations that follow each graph will therefore be a simple explanation of what the question aimed to test, and why, and a fuller more analytical departure will be taken once all the data has been presented.

**Note:** the vertical axis shows the percentage of respondents who selected each of the five options to describe the Other.

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Given that the December crisis was characterised by ethnic violence, this finding is perhaps unexpected. How it will contrast with later findings will be particularly interesting.

The purpose of this question was to see whether respondents would alter their answers when safety was more explicitly brought into the equation. This time, only the three options (‘friend’, ‘enemy’, ‘someone I do not trust’) were provided. The aim of removing the more neutral options (‘neighbour’ and ‘fellow countryman’) was because the question aimed to understand how intimate the respondents were willing to be with the Other, in order to feel safer. In other words, in the context of safety, would respondents want to pull the Other closer (as a ‘friend’), keep the Other at arms length (‘someone I do not trust’) or push the Other away (‘enemy’)? By removing the neutral options, it forced the respondent to select a level of intimacy. Once again, the majority responded that they would continue to see the Other group as their friend. Again, this is perhaps an unexpected finding, given the ethnic violence.

*In other words, if you were in danger, would you still feel safer with the Other as a friend, an enemy, someone I do not trust.*
The purpose of this question was to grant insight into the way the Dinka and Nuer’ perception of the Other group changes when they are in danger. In other words, it may be that relations of enmity and lack of trust only emerge when there is some danger that is being posed. It may be that in these circumstances, groups are more likely to perceive anyone not from their own group as less trustworthy or as a potential enemy. A hypothesis suggested in the ontological security section is that ontological security and physical security have an inverse relationship: in other words, people have a greater need for ontological security when their physical security is threatened. This data certainly suggests that this is a relevant aspect to consider: 38 per cent of Dinka and 36 per cent of Nuer said that their answer would change, and every answer changed from friend to either ‘someone I do not trust’ or ‘enemy’. In other words, when in danger, the only respondents who chose to change their answer were those who had initially stated that they saw the Other as a ‘friend’ (and one respondent who changed his answer from ‘someone I would not trust’ to seeing the Other as an ‘enemy’). Those who viewed the Other as ‘someone not to be trusted’ or as an ‘enemy’ in Chart 1.3 maintained the same answer even in danger. This means that those who would change their answer when in danger would see the Other in a worse light. Therefore, as Table 3 depicts, when there is danger, the total percentage of Nuer who view the Dinka either with suspicion or as enemies stands at 77 per cent (up from 43 per cent), with only 23 per cent viewing the Dinka as friends. Similarly for the Dinka, when in danger, 62 per cent (up from 23 per cent) would choose to view the Nuer with suspicion or as enemies, with only 38 per cent viewing them as friends.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>You feel safer with the Other as your...</th>
<th>When in danger, you feel safer with the Other as your...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friend (%)</td>
<td>Someone I do not trust / enemy (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Comparative data: ontological security

This data suggests that when in danger, or when one’s physical security is threatened, one would value ontological security more highly.
This question wanted to establish whether Nuer and Dinka felt that it would diminish their ‘Nuer-ness’ and ‘Dinka-ness’ if they had many friends from the Other ethnicity. Overwhelmingly both groups replied that it would not: that nothing could change their ethnicity. Many commented on being created this way by God, and that nothing could change that. This has two suggested implications: firstly, that should Generations For Peace aim to integrate the ethnicities and create meaningful friendships between the ethnicities it would not, generally, be hampered by a desire to hold onto Self. (Although the above finding suggests that those friendships may not last in the face of physical insecurity.) Secondly, that any solution should work with the ethnic identity, and not try to remove it from the equation. Individuals appear to be very connected to their ethnic identity, and therefore the solution should take this into account, rather than try to eradicate it.

In another section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to rate how important it was to be Dinka or Nuer. The goal was to determine how important their ethnic identity was to their identity as a whole. The answers given are as follows:

**HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO YOU TO BE DINKA?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Important</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO YOU TO BE NUER?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td>88.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Important</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Important</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: How important is your ethnicity?

[Chart 1.5: How important is it to you to belong to your ethnicity?]
Ethnicity is clearly very important to both the Nuer and the Dinka, supporting the findings above. Interestingly, a significantly larger proportion of the Nuer rated their ethnicity as very important as compared to the Dinka. In the above section, it was noted that when in danger, each group is much more likely to view the other with suspicion or as enemies. The Nuer ethnicity has recently experienced high levels of violence: they were in danger, and indeed those still in the UNMISS camp (who constituted the majority of Nuer interviewees) continue to feel very much in danger. These results could therefore indicate that when a group is in danger, it is more likely to hold its own ethnicity in higher importance. This does not mean this would not be the case when there is no danger, but simply that the importance of one’s ethnicity increases in the face of danger.

The questions that have been discussed so far provided the respondents with the potential responses they could give. In order to also obtain a more nuanced idea of how each respondent perceived the Self and the Other, the first two questions asked on the questionnaire were:

1. Use five words to describe yourself
2. Use five words to describe a Dinka/Nuer (whichever was appropriate) person.

Any five words and, or phrases could be given by the respondent. As will become clear, these answers complement (and sometimes contrast with) the type of answers summarised above, so it is useful to engage with these answers at this point.

Again, this was aimed at unpacking each individual’s identity, and how that identity of the Self interacted with or created the perceptions of the Other. While the initial two graphs (Chart 1.1 and Chart 1.2) suggested that the majority of the Dinka and the Nuer see one another as friends, the evidence presented below, brings this into question. Respondents were given space to give any five answers. From those answers the researcher created categories and calculated how often those categories appeared both in total, and in percentage form. These values are tabulated and not graphed because the important point to take away from the data is the type of categories that were common in the answers. The most commonly given categories have been underlined.

### Answers from the Nuer respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How do the Nuer describe themselves?</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personality traits 74</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter / warrior</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Nuer self-description

74 Examples of personality traits given include: kind, caring, generous, calm and forgiving.
How do the Nuer describe the Dinka? | Total | %  
---|---|---
Bad leadership / corrupt | 13 | 59.09
Selfish / greedy / uncaring | 12 | 54.55
Tribalism | 9 | 40.91
Humiliators / controlling | 6 | 27.27
Criminality | 5 | 22.73
Power hungry | 5 | 22.73
Proud | 5 | 22.73
Killing / violent | 3 | 13.64
Biological | 2 | 9.09
Enemy | 1 | 4.55

Table 6: Nuer: describing Dinka

Answers from the Dinka respondents:

| How do the Dinka describe themselves? | Total | %  
---|---|---
Dinka | 19 | 70.37
Occupation | 16 | 59.26
Personality traits | 11 | 40.74
South Sudanese | 9 | 33.33
Peaceful | 7 | 25.93
Region | 4 | 14.81
Courage / bravery | 4 | 14.81
Religion | 2 | 7.41

Table 7: Dinka self-description

| How the Dinka describe the Nuer? | Total | %  
---|---|---
Aggressive / Conflict prone / troublemakers | 20 | 74.07
Biological | 10 | 37.04
South Sudanese / Brother | 8 | 29.63
Rude / enjoy food | 7 | 25.93
Selfish | 6 | 22.22
Hateful | 4 | 14.81
Proud | 4 | 14.81
Impatient | 3 | 11.11
Nervous / fearful | 2 | 7.41
Warriors | 2 | 7.41
Non-believers | 2 | 7.41
Enemy | 1 | 3.70

Table 8: Dinka: describing Nuer

75 Examples of personality traits include: caring, trustworthy, nervous, marital status and honest.
76 While this category might seem to be a strange combination, it became clear that if you loved food, you would be likely to feed yourself before your guests, which is considered to be very rude in South Sudanese culture. Some Dinka respondents also spoke about how Nuer that were invited into their homes would simply eat all their food and leave, without being interested in real friendship.
A few important points can be gleaned from this data. Firstly, when asked to describe themselves, both the Dinka and the Nuer explicitly mention their ethnicity: often in fact it is the first thing that is mentioned. The second interesting point, is that when the respondents described themselves they tended to do so in terms of personality traits or biological data: for example, their occupation, their region, their religion or whether they were caring, calm, forgiving or generous. When asked to describe the Other however, the nature of the answers was quite different. The Dinka were described as bad leaders, corrupt, criminals, greedy, selfish and uncaring, tribal, power hungry, etc. These adjectives are not only negative but they align with the manner in which many of the Nuer interviewees described the December 2013 crisis and its causes. For example, one interviewee opined that the Nuer had been attacked because they did not want to share their power with the Dinka: “They will say let us kill all Nuer because they are the ones who don’t want us to be in the power.” Another interviewee noted that the cause of the fighting was tribalism because “the Dinka people they think that they were born to rule the people, and this is not true because they are corrupted [sic] people”. What this indicates is that while there is certainly an understanding that the conflict is a political crisis, the perceived causes of the political crisis are not the faults and flaws of individuals such as Salva Kiir, but rather ethnic flaws that Salva Kiir has because of his ethnicity.

The same perceptions can be observed in the Dinka data describing the Nuer. 74 per cent of Dinka respondents describe the Nuer people as aggressive, conflict prone or troublemakers. One interviewee described being told stories about the Nuer:

People say they kill children, they do not compromise with anyone, they like trouble, even if you welcome a Nuer into your house still that person will never be comfortable with you. Anytime he can even kill your wife and your children.

In another interview, the Nuer were described as more willing and ready to rebel, and as “more violent than the Dinka”, tracing the Nuer rebellions from 1991 as evidence of this troublemaking behaviour. Again, this points to the perception that the root causes of the conflict are ethnic flaws of the Other acted out in the political realm.

The story to be told from the Dinka data is slightly less homogenous than the Nuer data. Where the Nuer descriptions were almost completely negative, the Dinka respondents’ second and third most common responses were giving biological information (a fairly neutral description) and describing the Nuer as brothers or fellow South Sudanese (a positive description). In fact, often the same person would describe the Nuer both as conflict-prone and as their brother. There is a similar ‘schizophrenia’ between the data presented above and the data mapped in Chart 1.1 that showed that the majority of the Nuer and the Dinka perceive the Other either as friends or fellow South Sudanese. There are two potential explanations for this apparent discrepancy:

77 Interview with Nuer # 3, Juba, South Sudan. 12:00. 1 August 2014.
78 Interview with Dinka # 7, Regency Hotel, Juba South Sudan. 11:00. 1 August 2014.
79 Interview with Nuer # 3, Juba, South Sudan. 12:00. 1 August 2014.
80 Interview with Dinka # 4, Juba, South Sudan. 13:30. 31 July 2014.
1. Firstly, it could be that the Nuer and Dinka genuinely see one another in a positive light, most of the time, but not when they are in danger. That they acknowledge the faults that the Other’s ethnicity inculcates, but that the Other is ultimately accepted as a fellow South Sudanese and friend regardless.

2. Alternatively, it could also point to social desirability bias. This is essentially the tailoring of views either to suit what the respondent thinks is socially acceptable to his or her society or to the researcher. Because the December 2013 crisis in Juba was largely the violent targeting of the Nuer group, the Dinka might be less willing to negatively describe the Nuer and therefore implicate themselves in the mindset that contributed to the crisis. The Nuer, who certainly felt victimised, may not have had the same reservations, explaining why they were more willing to label the Dinka almost exclusively negatively.

What is indisputably clear however, is that there are fundamental divides in the manner in which the Dinka and Nuer perceive one another, and in the wake of the December crisis each group is trying to lay as much blame at the Others’ door (either intentionally or because that is what they have been told by politicians, community leaders, SPLM members or other members of their community). As the rest of the findings will show, misconceptions about who caused the conflict and why are commonly expressed in the data. Nonetheless, what is clear from this broad sub-section that began with Chart 1.1 is that clear and often negative perceptions exist within both the Nuer and the Dinka regarding the other tribe. Within these negative perceptions is implicit blame for the conflict (for example, the Dinka describe the Nuer as troublemakers, suggesting that they caused the December 2013 conflict; and the Nuer describe the Dinka as power hungry, implying that it is Salva Kiir’s ethnicity that made him unable to share power with Machar, therefore causing the conflict). The data also indicates reticent and sometimes very present anger that is directed at the Other ethnicity. Thirdly, it is also clear that ethnicity is an incredibly important frame through which the respondents view the world and themselves: not only because ethnicity is clearly perceived to have a great impact on the nature and characteristics of a person, but also because it is an important self-descriptor and something that is ranked as very important to many respondents. Ethnicity becomes increasingly important – for both the Nuer and the Dinka – when either experience danger.

The questions discussed so far have largely dealt with issues of identity. The questions to be highlighted next aimed to acquire knowledge about the conflict and the power environment in which it took place. As will become clear however, ethnicity continues to play an important role in the manner in which events are unpacked.

8.2 Who Are the Main Contributors to Conflict in Juba?

This question aimed to get the perspective of the civilians regarding who they believed caused the conflict, or contributed towards it in some way. Space was left for respondents to write any answer they thought was appropriate. For each group (Nuer and Dinka) the researcher developed categories of answers based on what were common answers. This is why the Dinka group has more categories and different categories as compared to the Nuer group. The percentage of
respondents who gave answers within each category was calculated. The purpose of handling the data in this way was to allow respondents to write whatever they felt was appropriate (without being limited by the categories selected beforehand). But by creating the categories afterwards, the data could still be quantitatively assessed and graphed, which purely qualitative results would not have allowed. The graphs based on these percentages are below:

Chart 2.1: Main contributors to conflict – Nuer perceptions

Chart 2.2: Main contributors to conflict - Dinka perceptions

81 Note that the percentages will not add up to 100% because some respondents gave one answer, while other gave more.
It is interesting that both the Dinka and Nuer seem to have quite a clear idea that the political leaders were the main contributors to conflict. The Nuer group however, explicitly mentions the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) as a key contributor, where the Dinka did not. This is because the GOSS was perceived by many to be Dinka dominated and led by Salva Kiir.\(^2\) This perception does not have much foundation; in fact, Nuer men held many of the important cabinet positions. Indeed, even during the cabinet reshuffle, both Nuer and Dinka who did not express their support for the government were replaced by those who did.\(^3\) Therefore, Nuer were not necessarily more disadvantaged than the Dinka in government. At the political level what was more important than your ethnicity was your support for the government and ultimately that determined your fate in the reshuffle. Therefore, even after the change, Nuer were not significantly more disfavoured.\(^4\) Nonetheless, this was not the perception particularly amongst the Nuer people, who believed that Kiir had removed all Nuer personnel along with Machar. In fact, many believed that Kiir had only been employing Dinka into the government at all levels for many years.

For the Nuer, aside from political leaders and the GOSS, soldiers and military actors are also seen as primary contributors. Salva Kiir and the Dinka group were also perceived as contributors to violence, but only by 18.2 per cent of respondents, indicating that there is a division between the perceived Dinka-dominated GOSS, and the Dinka people as a whole. For the Dinka, Riek Machar is a major contributor: often perceived to have started the crisis by initiating a coup d’état against Kiir, while the Nuer group receives only 7.4 per cent. Again, this indicates an understanding amongst the Dinka that there is a distinction between the leader of the opposition and all Nuer people. This could point to an important base from which reconciliation could develop.

### 8.3 Would You Ever Fight/Partake in Violence in Juba? Why or Why Not?

This question in the questionnaire aimed to assess the extent to which ordinary citizens express a willingness to engage in violence. Was violence institutionalised as an option to take when dealing with issues, and, if so, what kind of issues would citizens be willing to be violent about? Perhaps interestingly, the majority of respondents answered that they would not fight. The graphs are below:

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\(^2\) Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 31 July 2014.

\(^3\) Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 31 July 2014.

\(^4\) Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 31 July 2014.
Reasons given for the answers varied. Those who were Nuer, and said yes, were only four in the sample and no pattern could be ascertained. The Nuer who answered that they would not partake in violence gave largely three main reasons: 31 per cent\(^{85}\) replied that they were not politicians or members of the SPLM, and these were the ones who engaged with violence. For similar reasons 25 per cent replied that they would not partake in violence because they were not a part of the military. And, 31 per cent replied that peace was important and therefore would not engage in violence in order to protect that peace.

The Dinka respondents had a slightly greater willingness to engage with violence, however as is evident from Chart 3.2 this did not constitute the majority. Reasons given to partake in violence included: being victims, or family members who had been victims of violence; the removal of a democratic government; or in defence of one’s family, clan or oneself. Of those who responded that they would not fight, the largest portion (38 per cent) explained that this was because there was no benefit to be had by violence. 19 per cent responded that they would not kill fellow South Sudanese citizens and 13 per cent believed that violence was not a solution.\(^{86}\)

### 8.4 What Would You Fight For?

An interesting question to interrogate further, following on from those above, is, "What would you fight for?". The aim of this question was to ‘double-test’ the respondents’ willingness to engage in violence. Asking if an individual would fight, in the direct manner that the question above did, may result in socially desirable responses. To ensure this did not occur, this question essentially asked the same thing in a more indirect way. In this question, respondents were given nine options that they had to rank in order of importance. Those options were: ‘GOSS’; ‘a better government’; ‘poverty’; ‘employment’; ‘respect’; ‘family’; ‘food’; ‘tribe’; or ‘I would never fight’. The last option was specifically included so that if people truly would never fight, they could select that option. For each questionnaire, the option listed first received one point, the second was given two points and so on. If a respondent left out an option, it was awarded nine points (the lowest

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\(^{85}\) Figures are rounded to the nearest unit.

\(^{86}\) The percentages listed were calculated in the following way: space was given on the questionnaire for respondents to give any answers, those answers were sorted into categories and the number of times each answer appeared was calculated. The percentage was calculated as the portion of answers appearing divided by the number of respondents.
score possible). The logic behind this, is that if an option is excluded when the respondent is explicitly aware of it, it is arguably not an attractive option to that respondent, and therefore that (non-)data cannot be ignored. For each option, an average value was calculated, and those averages are graphed below. Recall when viewing the below graphs that the lower the value, the more likely that group is to fight for that option.

![Graph 1: What would you fight for? – Nuer](image)

![Graph 2: What would you fight for? – Dinka](image)

What is important to note in the Nuer data, is the willingness to fight for ‘a better government’. This is an expected finding given that the current government and its political leaders are viewed as the main contributors to the conflict. The troubling, and yet also not unexpected finding is that the Dinka are most willing to fight for the ‘GOSS’. While ‘a better government’ is ranked as the second choice for most of the Dinka, it should not automatically be assumed that this cause is the same as the cause for which the Nuer seem willing to fight for. ‘Better’ is a subjective term, and it is the researcher’s understanding that the Nuer and Dinka have different conceptions of what the ‘better government’ would look like. The troubling nature of this finding is that each could have opposite conceptions of a better government: the very foundations for any civil war. Therefore, with the Nuer willing to fight for ‘a better government’ (a more Nuer-orientated one) and the Dinka willing to fight for the ‘GOSS’, this pits the groups directly against one another.

87 See the data described above.
As can be seen above, some interesting observations can be made when the Dinka and Nuer averages are graphed next to each other. The Dinka group and Nuer group had remarkably similar feelings towards fighting for their ‘tribe’, ‘food’, ‘family’ and ‘respect’. Whereas, ‘a better government’ and ‘GOSS’ differ quite substantially, which is explained above. Interestingly, the Nuer also seem more willing to say that they would ‘never fight’ as compared to the Dinka who collectively agreed that fighting is necessary. Having said that, for the Nuer, the ‘never’ option was still not too far away from being ranked last.

Overall, despite the graphical difference, both groups were willing to engage in combat for most of the options listed, and this is an important observation. It is particularly interesting given that in the question that asked whether respondents would ever engage in violence, the majority in both ethnicities said that they would not fight. However, when presented with a list of potential options for which they would fight, ‘I would never fight’ was amongst the last options selected. This might be because the first question was a more direct way of asking, with perhaps a more clearly socially desirable answer. With ranking options however, it was perhaps a more indirect way of asking the same question and perhaps respondents felt more comfortable giving honest answers for this question. It may also be that when respondents were faced with certain realities such as a poor government, unemployment or the defeat of the GOSS, that peaceful behaviour was put further down the list. The next question may also shed some light on why the disjuncture exists.

8.5 Why Do You Think People Fight in Juba?

This next question was included on the questionnaire to ascertain how ordinary civilians understood the motivations for violence in Juba. By furthering one’s understanding of why individuals engage in violence, one understands what can be done to remove the desire to engage in violence. Respondents were given free space to write any answer and, once again, from their answers the researcher constructed categories into which most answers fell. Those categories were then graphed as below:
As is quite clear, the respondents suggest “political leadership, interests and power” to be the main cause of conflict in Juba. Responses included three different conceptions of how the political and tribal aspects of the conflict interacted: one was that the crisis was purely political (the largest section of the pie chart), the second was that the conflict occurred because of tribalism (a smaller section) and the third, composing only six per cent of responses, was that the conflict had begun in the political sphere and had turned tribal (Political -> Tribal). This data fits in well with some of the responses received in the longer interviews. Among Dinka interviewees, there was a perception (or perhaps a desire to portray the perception) that the crisis in December 2013 had been purely between the soldiers and the Nuer people: the Dinka people had perhaps participated in opportunistic crime but had not – according to some interviewees – killed anyone. So while there was an awareness that the violence carried out by the soldiers had its roots in the political conflict, the role that Dinka civilians played was either something unclear or something unwilling to be acknowledged by certain Dinka respondents: it seems easier and yet still credible to blame the politicians.

88 Dinka interviews #4 and #5 (see Appendix C).
Amongst the Nuer respondents, there seemed to be four main answers. Whereas ‘political leadership, interests and power’ remained the largest portion of the answers, ‘tribalism’, the ‘military and Presidential Guard’, and ‘political conflict turning tribal’ were also commonly suggested causes of conflict.

What is clear from both charts however, is that both the Dinka and the Nuer do not blame one another for causing the fighting. Rather, the politicians are widely blamed for their role in orchestrating the conflict. While this could mean that the Dinka and Nuer have a clear idea of the causes of the crisis and are not polarised in its aftermath, this would be an unrealistic representation. As will be presented later in this paper, when the Dinka and Nuer were asked to describe the other’s ethnicity, the descriptions were distinctly negative. Not only were they negative, but also they were qualities linked to the political unrest. For example, the Dinka were described as corrupt, bad leaders, selfish and greedy, while the Dinka described the Nuer as aggressive and conflict prone. These findings will be discussed in more detail further on in this report. The point of mentioning them here is to supplement the conclusions that may be drawn from this data: to be emphasised that while the respondents seem very aware that the crisis was initially a political crisis, and that some respondents would want to argue that ethnicity was irrelevant, ethnic divisions remain an important part of this conflict.

8.6 If You Had Started Fighting What or Who Would be Able to Stop You?

This question sought to provide information about the context and power relations within which South Sudanese conflict takes place: power is not only the ability to start conflict, but also the ability to control and stop conflict. Armed with the knowledge of what is able to stop people fighting, Generations For Peace could structure their peace programme to specifically engage with these issues. It could also indicate potential partners with whom Generations For Peace should work with to strengthen peace. As with an earlier question, respondents were given space to write any answer they thought was appropriate. From their answers, the researcher created categories into which most answers fell. Again, this meant the Dinka had more categories than the Nuer, simply because the Nuer answers were more homogenous. The total number of answers within each category has been graphed below:

![Chart 6.1: If you had started fighting, what or who would be able to stop you? – Dinka](image)

*Note:* 3rd Actors includes friends, elders etc.
“Given the long civil war with Sudan, presuming that soldier mentality is deeply engrained is not an unreasonable conclusion to draw. Politician-associated peace, where the Nuer and Dinka are willing to be peaceful when the politicians are satisfied with a peace agreement, is less easily explained. What is perhaps surprising about this, particularly when it comes to ethnic-based violence, is that people who were willing to kill one another on the basis of their ethnicity are so quickly willing to let go of that when told to.”

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Chart 6.2: If you had started fighting, what or who would be able to stop you? - Nuer

Note: Peace tended to refer to peace achieved between the leaders organised at the international level.

What is interesting in the findings of both the Nuer and the Dinka, is that what will stop them fighting first, is not the achievement of the outcome they are fighting for, but rather their respective leaders telling them to no longer fight. For example, the Dinka list five different types of leaders who they would listen to if told to stop fighting: the government or President, religious or community leaders, international actors, a chief or tribal order and a ‘third actor’ (in this case, someone like a friend or brother). Conversely, only a few respondents noted that they would stop fighting when the goal of the fighting had been achieved (for example, defeating the rebels). Similarly for the Nuer, the achievement of ‘a better government’ was only given by one person as the reason one would stop fighting, despite it being listed in the previous question as the most likely reason for fighting. Rather, most Nuer listed the ‘international community’ and the achievement of ‘peace’ as the strongest reasons to stop fighting.

In other words, once the politicians were satisfied that peace had been achieved, the people of South Sudan would automatically be satisfied as well, and stop fighting.

This brings forth two important points worth elaborating upon: the prevalence of soldier mentality and politician-associated peace. Soldier mentality in the South Sudanese context can be defined as individuals fighting when called on to fight, and ceasing to fight when told to stop fighting. Given the long civil war with Sudan, presuming that soldier mentality is deeply engrained is not an unreasonable conclusion to draw. Politician-associated peace, where the Nuer and Dinka are willing to be peaceful when the politicians are satisfied with a peace agreement, is less easily explained. What is perhaps surprising about this, particularly when it comes to ethnic-based violence, is that people who were willing to kill one another on the basis of their ethnicity are so quickly willing to let go of that when told to. This complex relationship between politicians, their ethnic groups and violence is one that will be explained in detail during the ontological security section, but seemed important to highlight here.

89 Note that the achievement of peace was seen in terms of a brokered deal between the politicians in Addis Ababa.
8.7 Who Has the Most Power in Juba?

This question would help to map the power relations in Juba from the civilian perspective. In this question respondents were given seven groups of people in South Sudanese society and asked to rank them from the most powerful group, to the least powerful group. The groups given were: ‘military actors’; ‘political leaders’; ‘wealthy people’; ‘businessmen’; ‘citizens’; ‘religious leaders’; and ‘community leaders’. For each questionnaire, the most powerful group was awarded seven points, the second most powerful was awarded six points and so on. If a respondent did not rank every option given, the options that were excluded were assigned one point each. The average value for each group in society was then calculated and graphed as below:

*Interpretation:* the larger the average value (and therefore the taller the column) the more power that unit of society was judged to have by the respondents.

The most interesting finding is the power ‘citizens’ are thought to have between the two groups. The Nuer – who were the victims of the December 2013 crisis – ranked ‘citizens’ as the least powerful segment of society. This reveals how disempowered they feel after the violence: that as ordinary citizens there was no state body to protect them and perhaps more importantly, very little they could do for themselves except run and seek refuge in an UNMISS camp. This also explains why military actors were ranked as the most powerful actors in Juba.
Conversely, the Dinka ranked ‘citizens’ as the third most powerful segment of society. While Dinka people were also killed in the December 2013 crisis, on the whole they were not the target of the state military-led violence. In addition, in the aftermath of the crisis, looting meant that some people actually benefited from the violence. This suggests that the Dinka perceived citizens to be in a significantly more powerful position than the Nuer.

8.8 Who Are the Main Seekers of Peace or Contributors to Peace in Juba?

More broadly, the purpose of this question was to discover who is already working for peace in Juba in the hopes that potential meaningful partnerships could emerge for Generations For Peace in the future. But in addition to providing this, some interesting points surfaced as well.

![Chart 8.1: Who are the main contributors to peace in Juba? – Nuer](chart)

Note: Other* here refers to answers such as: the Equitoria ethnic group, the farmers and Hilde Johnson.

The Nuer responses are not too surprising: for a group that was victimised in the violence, it is perhaps natural to think that the ‘citizens’ are the group most desperate for peace, and therefore the biggest pressure group for peace. ‘Community and religious leaders’ were also known to have played a significant role in attempting to warn the politicians of the brewing violence and often work to mediate conflict between communities.90 ‘Business owners’ were also mentioned: for obvious reasons, businesses suffer during conflict and therefore tend to be fairly invested in peace. It is possible for business to benefit from conflict, especially those involved in arms sales, security provision, drug trafficking, etc. Business however develops in response to the conflict, particularly traditional business, which develops in peaceful circumstances, but in almost all cases is disadvantaged by the presence of conflict.91 Staff members are commissioned to fight or are killed, stores are often looted, investment stops because of uncertainty and increased risk hindering growth and finance is almost completely unavailable. It would appear that it is this kind of business that is advocating for peace.

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Whereas the Nuer placed themselves low on the list of peace-seekers, according to 63 per cent of Dinka respondents, the main peace-seekers in Juba are either ‘Dinka’ or ‘Salva Kiir and the GOSS party’. This means that the majority of Dinka respondents see their role in the conflict as peace-seekers, likely attributing the rebel side as the group wanting the conflict to continue and resisting peace propositions. In other words, Dinka perceive the other side to be at the root of the conflict, with the Dinka side trying to make peace. Of course this is not the case: both Salva Kiir and Riek Machar alongside their respective followers and ethnicities have engaged in peace talks and in violence. The danger with this misconception is that it makes reconciliation very difficult. For South Sudan to move forward, it is important that people know the full story: the good and the bad that both sides engaged in.

The other two groups that were most commonly mentioned were the ‘citizens’ and the ‘community, youth or religious leaders’. This coincides with what the Nuer group mentioned and therefore it is likely that these groups are genuinely active peacemakers in Juba.

92 The researcher has underlined Dinka to indicate that the Dinka side of the conflict is not completely Dinka. In fact, as was mentioned in the Political Conflict section, the Salva Kiir/GOSS faction is not solely Dinka, particularly at the political level. However, at the grassroots level, it is more pervasively divided along ethnic lines.
9. How Did the Politics Become Ethnic?
With a clear analysis of the findings having been completed, this section will make use of those findings to unpack the difficult question: how did the politics become ethnic? Throughout this section and indeed the rest of the paper, the findings discussed above will be referred to as evidence for hypotheses and suggestions made.

When the violence broke out onto the streets of Juba on 14 and 15 December 2013, it was ethnic violence. There were door-to-door executions of Nuer, reports were made of tanks flattening Nuer villages, executions taking place in busy streets and arbitrary detention of Nuer civilians. Neighbours and civilians took part in the violence targeting Nuer, some of who then responded by targeting Dinka. Other Nuer fled into the UNMISS camps. Homes were looted, cars stolen and in some cases homes that were abandoned by Nuer families were taken over by Dinka families. There were instances in which marriages between Dinka and Nuer ended in divorce, and communities that had lived side by side for years became polarised and violent along ethnic lines. There are certainly stories of Dinka families hiding Nuer neighbours and friends, and in a sense these are easier to explain and understand. When an individual has spent many years living next door to a neighbour of a different ethnicity, and in some cases fighting alongside one another during a civil war, it is difficult to explain how they are able to become polarised and violent as quickly as they did in Juba. The general explanation for mass mobilisation for violence tends to be political mobilisation: that communities do not inherently hate one another, but that they are mobilised by their politicians to do their bidding. But this explanation often lacks a fundamental link: why people are willing to listen to those politicians, why they allow themselves to be politically mobilised in that way. After all, killing your neighbour and divorcing your wife are highly personal acts and require explanations that are deeper than political mobilisation.

94 Interview with Nuer # 7, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 13:00. 1 August 2014.
9.1 Ontological Security

Ontological security is essentially the secure identity of oneself. Giddens writes that it is:

The confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments.95

Michael Skey suggests that those who are treated as if they belong ‘without question’ experience a key sense of ontological security.96 It is essentially the need to have a secure identity and with it, stable social identities: it is therefore both a secure sense of the Self, as well as a secure sense of the Other. Often this secure sense of Self, and the manner in which the Self (or individual) interacts with the Other and its environment is determined by routines or habitual interactions: familiar responses to certain events through which a person remains in control of its identity and capacity for action.

The opposite of this, ontological insecurity, refers to a state of disruption where the Self has lost its anchor for the definition of its identity and, consequently, its ability to sustain a narrative and answer questions about doing, acting and being.97

When physical insecurity is coupled with ontological insecurity, the result can be violence. The combination of ontological insecurity and physical insecurity can lead individuals to mark Others as not only different, but also as threats to their survival and morally inferior. In the search for ontological security, the Self constructs Others as threats to their physical security and therefore mobilises their physical defences. Ontological insecurity and physical insecurity therefore reproduce one another.98

On the other hand, ontological security coupled with physical insecurity allows the individuals the comfort of a stable relationship with the Other but where that relationship is characterised by enemy roles. Consequently, they remain locked into conflict-producing routines to maintain their certainty of being.99 Also important to note is the situation where ontological insecurity is combined with physical asecurity (where one does not experience concern about physical harm).100 While in this case, the Other is not constructed as a threat to survival, the Self experiences instability and uncertainty of being in its relationship with the Other. An example of where this can occur is following the resolution of protracted conflicts, which challenges the previously engrained conflictual identities. This situation is likely to deteriorate into a situation of physical insecurity as well because concerns about instability and uncertainty of being can easily be politically mobilised and manipulated into concerns about survival.101

98 Ibid.
The argument of this section builds on the combination of ontological (in)security and physical (in)security, combining them in the unique way that the data and history of South Sudan suggests they should be combined. The challenge in analysing the South Sudanese case is that the recent and protracted conflict with Sudan adds another layer to the conflict/enemy identity. As a result, the analysis has to engage with the Other as being both the Sudanese government and Dinka or Nuer. Because there is more than one ‘Other’, this means that different relations of ontological security and insecurity can exist between the Self and the different Others. Because of the nature of this report, the focus will be on explaining the relationship between Dinka and Nuer, understanding the role that Sudan plays in that is important.

It is suggested in this section that the end of the civil war with Sudan and the opening up of the political space by Machar brought on ontological insecurity. This ontological insecurity combined with the physical insecurity brought on by the fighting in the barracks led the citizens of Juba to search for ontological security. This could be found in an almost unwavering element of the South Sudanese identity: one’s ethnicity. In the face of physical insecurity, the increasing importance of Self, automatically raises the awareness of the Other. A history of conflict and cattle raiding between the Nuer and the Dinka means that relations of enmity were routinised and clear: easy sources of ontological security. The result was polarisation and violence between the Nuer and the Dinka.

South Sudan fought two long civil wars with Sudan culminating in almost five decades of conflict that ended in 2005. As has been already mentioned, the resolution of protracted conflict can result in ontological insecurity because at its resolution, well engrained and routinised relations are challenged and changed. Soldiers and civilians who have had a clear enemy and a clear goal and who have been raised by people who had the same, now no longer have that. This can certainly create a sense of ontological insecurity.

But perhaps the aspect that generated the most ontological insecurity was the opening of the political space. The opening up of the political space has frequently had the unforeseen effect of increasing ontological uncertainty as questions of political identity are pushed to the forefront. There is an intensification of the politics of belonging, igniting fierce debates of who belongs where, coupled with the violent exclusion of ‘strangers’. While the national identity in South Sudan is fairly weak, the unifying factor has tended to be the SPLM and the civil war. As was mentioned earlier, the Nuer and the Dinka elements within the SPLM have not had a smooth history within the SPLM but it is certainly the closest thing to a universal organ. When Riek Machar and his supporters began speaking in March 2013 of running for presidency and taking control of certain important political positions, he and his supporters were effectively opening up the political space at least in the minds of the South Sudanese. The point here is that even though the political manoeuvring was occurring within the Political Bureau, citizens were forced to decide where their political allegiances would lie. The particularly aggressive

102 For example, South Africa in the early 1990s leading up to the elections, the Kenyan elections in 2008, and the Rwandan genocide following the 1993 Arusha Accords that was to establish a power-sharing government.

manner in which the politics were undertaken, how stakes were constantly raised and aggressive rhetoric was responded to with aggressive rhetoric, meant that this opening of the political space was linked with a more threatening environment. If it ever had been, being South Sudanese was no longer sufficient: now one had to be aligned with either Riek Machar or Salva Kiir. In this environment of ontological insecurity, citizens responded by enhancing the importance of an identity that was clear and safe: an identity that would provide ontological security in the face of ontological insecurity and brewing physical insecurity: ethnicity.

An important part of identity in South Sudan is one’s ethnicity. As noted in the Findings, the majority of Dinka and Nuer respondents answered that their ethnicity was very important to them. When asked to describe themselves in five words, 45 per cent of Nuer and 70 per cent of Dinka included their ethnicity as one of the five principal ways to describe themselves. Six out of the seven Dinka interviewees explicitly spoke about their pride in their ethnicity or gave clear ideas of what it meant to be Nuer and Dinka: that ethnicity had significant defining characteristics that effected the type of person those within each group would be. Six out of seven Nuer interviewees exhibited the same pride in their ethnicity and the defining nature of ethnicity. The integral nature of ethnicity is not difficult to imagine given that, outside of Juba, it is essentially the organising principal of society: Dinka live in Dinka areas and Dinka communities and the Nuer do the same. Therefore, it is clear that ethnicity forms an integral part of the individual’s ontological security, providing a clear perception of the Self and alongside it, a clear perception of the Other.

In times of peace, there is no clear evidence in the findings that the relationship between the Nuer and the Dinka is necessarily engrained as one of enmity. In other words, there is no clear evidence that the majority of Nuer and Dinka inherently view the Other as enemies all of the time. In fact, ostensibly the majority see one another as either a ‘friend’ or a ‘fellow countryman’ (refer back to Chart 1.1.). As was mentioned, it is likely that at least some of those results could stem from a social desirability bias. However, there is certainly historic evidence to suggest that the Nuer – Dinka relationship has not always been characterised with violence in the way that it was in December 2013. In fact, during the civil war the two ethnicities fluctuated between fighting together against Sudan and fighting against one another. What this indicates is that the relationship between the Nuer and the Dinka is more complex than a simple enemy relationship.

Having said that, there is also a long history of conflict and, in particular cattle raiding between the two tribes. Cattle raiding is common between the two tribes and began many years ago: in fact, it is almost considered cultural. The primary difference however, came in the 1940s when cattle raiding intensified due to the availability of weapons, transforming the raiding into inter-communal conflict that generated many casualties. The raiding fed into a similar narrative that each ethnicity has about the Other: as people who can come and kill your wife.

104 Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 31 July 2014.
105 This data is taken from the semi-structured interviews, not summarised in the Findings section.
106 Interview with Dinka # 6, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 12:30. 30 July 2014; and Interview with Nuer # 3, Juba, South Sudan. 12:00. 1 August 2014.
107 Interview with Dinka # 2, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 29 July 2014.
The attachment to one’s ethnicity is strong in South Sudan, and for many years and at various stages of South Sudan’s history the Nuer and the Dinka have engaged with one another as enemies: both in cattle raiding which continues today and during the civil war when there were splits in the SPLM. In the search for ontological security, the importance of the Self generates an increased importance of the Other and with it, the resurgence of routinised relationships and routines. It is the researcher’s suggestion that the ontological insecurity that arose with the ending of the civil war and the opening of the political space by Machar resulted in a desire for ontological security in the identity that has always been secure: ethnicity and the relations of enmity that came with it. Those relations of enmity – which were and continue to be generated during the periods of cattle raiding and ethnic violence – were subdued during the civil war by the creation of a broader goal and identity through the SPLM but they certainly did not disappear.

The desire for ontological security, and perhaps particularly the routinised relations becomes particularly strong in the face of physical insecurity. Therefore it is not only the loss of the SPLM and the civil war and the opening of the political space by Machar that brings on the desire for ontological security. In addition to these factors, physical insecurity enhances the desire for ontological security as well. There were a number of factors that could have brought on a sense of physical insecurity: perhaps the trigger was hearing the fighting in the military barracks, or over a longer period of watching the escalation of political rhetoric and threats. It was likely to have been a combination of both: where the political rhetoric and opening of the political space created ontological insecurity that polarised the community increasingly into ethnic groups together with an increasing concern about the possibility of physical insecurity. In the face of violence in the military barracks that spread into the city, those fears of physical insecurity were realised. The data – particularly in Chart 1.3 – suggests that with the degeneration of physical security, ontological security became more important and with that ontological security, the perception of the Other as someone less trustworthy or as the enemy. Chart 1.3 shows that when in danger the total percentage of Nuer who view the Dinka either with suspicion or as enemies stands at 76 per cent, with only 24 per cent viewing the Dinka as friends. Similarly for the Dinka, when in danger, 62 per cent would choose to view the Nuer with suspicion or as enemies, with only 38 per cent viewing them as friends.

108 Visible in the following interviews: Dinka interview # 3, # 4, #7, Nuer interviews # 2, # 3, # 6, # 7. 
109 Sudan Tribune. “Riek Machar Teny | Riak Machar Teny”. 

108 Visible in the following interviews: Dinka interview # 3, # 4, #7, Nuer interviews # 2, # 3, # 6, # 7.
The conclusion to be drawn is that political conflict does not become ethnic conflict through political mobilisation alone: ontological insecurity, routinised relations of enmity and a lack of trust and physical insecurity are all vital aspects in order for political mobilisation to work.

This then, is why political mobilisation works.

People do not simply divorce their wives or kill their neighbours because their politician wants them to. People search for a secure sense of self, more so in the face of physical insecurity and ontological insecurity. Those in Juba were experiencing both types of insecurity in the lead up to December 2013. So that when violence broke out, people relied on the aspect of their ontological identity that they knew to be true: their ethnicity, the political leader that ethnicity dictated they should support, and what that meant for their relationship with the Other.

As one interviewee notes: “Every tribe has leaders in the government and in the parties. And automatically, those civilians belong to their leader.” It is this automatic belonging that defines crisis identity in South Sudan.

“So that when violence broke out, people relied on the aspect of their ontological identity that they knew to be true: their ethnicity, the political leader that ethnicity dictated they should support, and what that meant for their relationship with the Other.”

110 Interview with Dinka # 2, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 29 July 2014.
10. Dynamics, Influencing Factors and Context
10.1 Institutionalisation of Violence

The discussion so far has indicated that the desire for ontological security and with it, routinised relations, increases in the face of physical insecurity: in the case of South Sudan, the opening of the political space, divisions within the SPLM and the conclusion of the civil war. The result is that routinised relations of enmity re-emerge. This argument does not however necessarily imply that relations of enmity should include violence. This section explains why violence is an available option through which conflict and issues are confronted: because violence is institutionalised as an available option for dealing with conflict.

Before defending this claim, it is important to unpack a clear understanding of institutions. Institutions are the non-technologically determined constraints that influence social interactions and provide incentives to maintain regularities of behaviour. There are both formal and informal institutions as well as their enforcement mechanisms. Formal institutions are those created by a state or those with the power to enforce their own interests: for example, laws, organisational rulebooks and constitutions. Informal institutions are social, economic and political norms that are usually engrained in cultural and other social practices, for example, etiquette or gender norms. While formal institutions can be changed overnight, informal institutions take generations to change. Institutions develop in order to limit the scope of options for human behaviour and in order for society to function. Because of the role of interests and power in the formation of institutions, there is no guarantee that the resulting institution will create the most efficient outcome. The institutions that develop tend to support the interests of the elites, rather than what achieves the best for the majority of people. Indeed violence, militarism and non-democratic procedures can become institutionalised because it both serves the interests of the elite and sustains order for most of the time. There is evidence

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to suggest that this is a dynamic that interacts with conflict in South Sudan, and it is this evidence that this section will discuss.

At the formal institutions level, the SPLM and therefore the government are highly militarised. Being a general tends to mean you can get a governmental position without any skills or experience in that sector. As a result, President Kiir and his cabinet would be referred to as General Kiir and so on: because one’s military standing is relevant for political legitimacy. The SPLM (the political wing) and the SPLA (the army) are intrinsically linked, from their inception up until now. Militarised institutions do not make for good democratic institutions. Every crisis within the SPLM, in 1991, in 2004 and the most recent one in 2013, has been based on at least ostensible desires for democratic reform. Non-democratic functioning is a common problem that post-independence liberation movements face. Military style leadership was what the liberation movement required, and shifting away from that to the democratic style leadership that state governance requires is often a slow and difficult process. The SPLM is in the same position.

On a social level in South Sudan, violence is a readily taken option. For example, when the interviewees were asked if violence was always a bad thing 93 per cent responded that it was. When asked if there were any reasons for which they would engage in violence, 64 per cent responded that there were. Therefore, even though there was an acknowledgement of all of the negative impacts of violence, the majority still seemed willing to use violence. Similarly, when respondents were asked in the questionnaire if they would ever fight or partake in violence in Juba, the majority of both Nuer and Dinka responded that they would not (see Charts 3.1 and 3.2). However, when they were asked to rank a number of options in terms of what they would fight for, the ‘I would never fight’ option was ranked amongst the last ranked options. For the Nuer, that option was ranked third from last (see Chart 4.1) and for the Dinka, it was the very last option (see Chart 4.2). This indicates that when faced with actual options, rather than an abstract ‘would you fight?’ there seems to be a willingness to engage in violence. An interesting point that also emerged in the Findings was that, while people listed causes or grievances as the reason to engage in violence, when noting what would make them stop fighting, the most common answers relied on being told to stop fighting (see Chart 6.1 for Dinka results and Chart 6.2 for Nuer results). In other words, the reason for putting down one’s arms was not the achievement of the goals that the violence aimed to achieve. Rather, once peace has been brokered (usually by a third party or a leader of some sort) there tends to be a broad-based acceptance of that peace, regardless of its substantive outcome. What this could indicate is a soldier mentality: a willingness to engage in violence when commanded to, and to stop fighting when commanded to.

113 Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 9.00 31 July 2014
116 This data was taken from the semi-structured interviews: generally not included in the Findings sections due to the overwhelmingly qualitative nature of the data. Instead, quotes and ideas from those interviews have informed the body of this paper outside of the Findings section.
117 Again, this data was abstracted from the 14 semi-structured interviews.
This is not wholly difficult to imagine when considering the history of South Sudan. The commonplace nature of violent engagement over power suggests that violence could be an institutionalised form of problem solving when it comes to power discrepancies or struggles. Besides the almost five decade conflict with Sudan, there was British-Egyptian rule over the Sudanese region before that, and various power struggles between neighbouring African civilisations who sought to extend their control of the South Sudanese region.\textsuperscript{118} This is in addition to cattle raiding. As one interviewee noted: “Because many civilians, they know how to shoot; they were once soldiers and they retired. And if something happened again, they can take up guns and you know how to do it.”\textsuperscript{119} Still another interviewee notes: “Those proxies of violence they make a lot of those who are civilians in the village to like the gun, and to take the gun and to shoot someone. Easy.”\textsuperscript{120} The types of conflicts that the South Sudanese have had to deal with – largely those of seeking independence – have generally required some kind of violent response, and the quotes given suggest that this has instilled a willingness to engage in violence. Consistently, throughout South Sudanese history, violence (or a struggle for independence) appears as a solution for power discrepancies and struggles. This violence becomes institutionalised as an option through which power struggles could be resolved. While some interviewees blamed this willingness to engage in violence on illiteracy, this is a very broad generalisation to make; not attending school does not necessary correspond to the willingness to kill. Instead, this is where the institutional analysis becomes important.

Every civilization develops institutions to control people’s behaviour, to limit the available responses and usually, to protect interests. In the absence of the state (which was and continues to be the case in much of South Sudan) and formal rules, a dense social network leads to the development of informal structures with substantial stability.\textsuperscript{121} Order in these societies is the result of a dense social network where the threat of violence is a continuous force for preserving order because of its implications for the members of society. Deviant behaviour cannot be accepted, as it is a fundamental threat to the stability and insurance features within the group.\textsuperscript{122} In other words, violence and other actions similar to it, such as revenge killings, become important methods of maintaining order. In addition, a secure sense of belonging and tribal obedience, beyond providing a firm sense of ontological security, in a more functional way institutionalises order and tribal security, most of the time. Therefore the willingness to use violence is not simply a lack of understanding, but a long-term evolution of institutionalised responses to protracted colonisation and inter-tribal violence.

In as much as violence is an option in South Sudan, it is not the only option, and this is where Generations For Peace has a real opportunity. Mechanisms for mediation are also engrained in the institutional make-up of South Sudan’s ethnic groups. Both Nuer and Dinka interviewees explained the manner in which disputes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Interview with Dinka # 5, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 30 July 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Interview with Dinka # 2, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 29 July 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 31 July 2014.
\end{itemize}
are resolved: although the details of the process varied between individuals, ultimately almost every interviewee spoke about the role of mediation in resolving disputes.\textsuperscript{123} The differences focused largely on the mediator: sometimes it was someone known to the disputants, sometimes it was a community leader or a family member or someone that the other person trusts, but ultimately this person would take the role of listening to the case, and deciding on the validity of each person’s behaviour. This process was remarkably similar regardless of whether the interviewees were Nuer or Dinka, and regardless of whether the dispute was with someone of the interviewee’s ethnicity or of the Other group. It may seem strange that there is both a willingness to engage in violence and institutionalised mediation. It is, however fairly common in the area: a similar situation exists in Somalia for example, where the threat of violence is often the impetus that brings a person to the mediating table, or conversely, it is mediation that brings the violence to the end once it has been used.\textsuperscript{124} In this way, violence is both able to be a threat to sustain order (but as mentioned, this only works some of the time) and mediation exists to control and limit the impact violence can have on the community. With the proliferation of arms however, violence has a significantly more deadly impact than before, generating with it more resentment and greater need for reconciliation.

10.2 Regional and International Players

\textbf{UNMISS:} Perhaps the most influential player in the December 2013 crisis was the United Nations Mission In South Sudan. By 18 December, UNMISS camps were sheltering close to 20,000 people.\textsuperscript{125} This has done incredible things for the legitimacy of UNMISS in the eyes of the Nuer. In fact, six out of seven Nuer interviewees, and one Dinka interviewee answered that if they needed protection, they would go to UNMISS.\textsuperscript{126} On the other hand, there is also evidence that this has lost UNMISS some credibility in the eyes of the Dinka people. Interestingly, this loss of credibility is not solely because UNMISS opened their gates to the Nuer, but also because of rumours that UNMISS actively armed and supported the Machar-led opposition. For example, one interviewee said:

UNMISS was been taking guns through the road of [Rumbeck?], those guns were captured in Rumbeck, and those guns were being taken to the rebels. That is make me scared of the international community. Of course they have been giving guns to the rebels and they were giving their cars to the rebels...\textsuperscript{127}

Another Dinka interviewee spoke of how he believed the UN was providing the Nuer soldiers with machine guns in the hopes that if the South Sudanese continued to kill one another, the UN could come and rule South Sudan and take its resources.\textsuperscript{128} Regardless of the differing perceptions, UNMISS continues to be perceived as an important player in this conflict, and certainly forms part of the context of this conflict.

\textsuperscript{123} Interview with Dinka Interviews # 2 and # 5 and Nuer Interviews # 3 and # 6 (see Appendix 3).
\textsuperscript{125} Ban Ki-moon. Secretary-General’s remarks to press on the situation in South Sudan. (2013).
\textsuperscript{126} Nuer interviews # 1, # 2, # 3, # 4, # 5, # 6 and Dinka interview # 2.
\textsuperscript{127} Interview with Dinka # 4, Jub, a South Sudan. 14:00. 26 July 2014.
\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Dinka # 7, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 1 August 2014.
**Uganda:** Ugandan troops have been sent to fight alongside the Government of South Sudan against the rebels. President Museveni and President Kiir have a long history and the two leaders remain close. Initially the troops were sent to evacuate Ugandan citizens, but they have since stayed and joined in the fight against the rebels.\(^{129}\) Public views on the presence of Ugandan troops range from actors helping to bring peace to the region to actors actively making the conflict worse.\(^{130}\) What is clear however is that the troops are not merely peacekeepers, but are actively backing Kiir.\(^{131}\) They are therefore an important influencing factor to consider when assessing the conflict.

**IGAD:** The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – of which South Sudan is a member – is currently taking the lead on the mediation between Kiir and Machar, with the African Union supporting IGAD in the background. Unfortunately, so far these talks have not been gaining much momentum, with mediators still working with the participants in order to simply decide on an agenda. On 9 May 2014, both Kiir and Machar signed an Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan, but since then not much substantial development has taken place.\(^{132}\) The most recent suggestion from IGAD maintained Salva Kiir as President of what would be a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU). A position for a Prime Minister would be created and chosen by the SPLM - in opposition but ironically, approved by the President.\(^{133}\) Perhaps predictably Machar rejected this. An important criticism that has been levelled at the IGAD peace process is that it appears to be geared toward accommodating the vested interests of a few South Sudanese elites and the economic and political interests of the IGAD heads of state and governments.\(^{134}\) The result is that, without much progress, war continues in certain parts of South Sudan. Nonetheless, the respondents to the questionnaire appeared to have faith in the process and its ability to bring peace to South Sudan. In response to the question: “If you had started fighting, what or who would be able to stop you?” the largest portion of Nuer answers were an ‘International or 3rd actor’. ‘International actors’ was the third most common answer amongst the Dinka respondents. IGAD is therefore an important regional player in this conflict.

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130 Interview with Nuer # 2, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 15:00. 28 July 2014. Interview with Nuer # 7, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 13:00. 1 August 2014.


11. Options
With a firm understanding of the complexities and layers of the conflict in South Sudan, this section will pose options for Generations For Peace. These options have been selected based either on what South Sudan needs, or where there are specific peace-building opportunities that should be capitalised on. The section begins with an analysis of the needs, truth and reconciliation and ontological security, and then goes on to pose options for Generations For Peace to cater to these needs. This is done by assessing the tools that Generations For Peace has developed, and making a judgement on which tools would be useful and how they would be useful.

11.1 Truth and Reconciliation

The need for truth and reconciliation became glaringly apparent while the researcher was still in South Sudan, particularly at the community level. The Nuer-dominated rebellions against the SPLM, and in particularly the one in 1991 have left strong and lingering resentment in both the Nuer and the Dinka communities. As was noted in the Findings section, amongst the Dinka there is a strong perception that the Nuer are a rebellious people, that they are troublemakers or conflict-prone. Similarly, the Nuer feel that the Dinka are power hungry and constantly want to dominate the country and the other ethnicities in South Sudan. This stems from the idea that the Nuer constantly rebel for no reason (held by the Dinka), and that the Nuer are forced to rebel because the Dinka constantly violate the rights of the Nuer. This was the lingering resentment, but there was also a festering anger particularly amongst the Nuer interviewees. For example, one interviewee said:

This fighting it is tribalism. Because the Dinka people they think that they were born to rule the people, and this is not true because they are corrupted people, they are tribalistic people and they don’t know how to rule the people. Yes, and we the Nuer, we correct them. We say this is false for you: the president will not stay for many times as the president, because now when we see our country, our country is in [try-off?] now: yes for the insecurity and the lack of food.135

135 Interview with Nuer # 7, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 13:00. 1 August 2014.
In numerous parts of the interview, the interviewee also committed to fighting should Salva Kiir remain in power. While this level of anger was not present in every Nuer interview, it frequently became clear that reconciliation would be crucial in the aftermath of any successful peace deal.

Apart from reconciliation, there is also a need for truth. It became ever apparent in the Findings that the Dinka and the Nuer often have very different perceptions of what exactly happened: both in the recent crisis in December, and in the Bor massacre of 1991. When both ethnic groups perceive their groups as constant victims of the other group’s behaviour it is very difficult to break through walls of prejudice. It would therefore be the researcher’s suggestion to engage in truth and reconciliation both regarding the recent crisis, as well as the 1991 rebellion. In this way, both ethnicities would have to deal with their victimhood as well as their guilt. Therefore both truth and reconciliation are crucial to South Sudan’s progress.

11.2 Ontological (In)Security
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of this research is the conclusion drawn regarding ontological security and physical security: how when physical security decreases, the desire for ontological security appears to create a willingness to engage in ethnically motivated violence. Reports of husbands and wives divorcing, of neighbours attacking one another and of friendships ending in the face of the December 2013 crisis indicates that, in certain cases, even intimate relationships do not survive in the face of a combination of ontological insecurity and physical insecurity. As Table 1 indicates, in the face of danger, an additional 34.3 per cent of Nuer and 38.4 per cent of Dinka view the other as either ‘someone not to be trusted’ or as an ‘enemy’. Training people to alter the way they seek security in the face of physical insecurity is venturing further into the complex psychological realm than is appropriate for this paper, and is likely to require the skills of a psychologist rather than a conflict researcher. However, the research suggests two important loopholes for Generations For Peace:

1. Firstly, the relations of enmity are expressed in terms of violence, because of its institutionalised option. However, mediation is certainly also institutionalised in both Nuer and Dinka culture, and therefore this is a culturally relevant entry point for Generations For Peace. This will be discussed soon.

2. The 34.3 per cent and 38.4 per cent of Nuer and Dinka respectively, suggest that not every respondent reacts in this manner in the face of danger. Some respondents continued to view the Other as ‘friends’ in the face of danger, whilst other respondents simply always view the Other with a lack of ‘trust’ or as ‘enemies’.

There are therefore three categories of respondents: two that have consistent perceptions of the Other (either positive or negative) and those whose perspectives change. Those who view the Other in a positive light consistently are the types of attitudes Generations For Peace would like to foster. The types of attitudes that are consistently negative about the other are the types of attitudes Generations For Peace is accustomed to dealing with and, as will be shown below, Generations For Peace already addresses techniques to target those types of attitudes.
How to address attitudes that are affected by the combination of ontological security and physical insecurity is a new field that requires research. An entry point for Generations For Peace now however, would be to target children in order to prevent ontological security forming in a manner that creates an enemy of the Other.

11.3 The Generations For Peace Options
This section will briefly explain each of the five GFP Vehicles for Peace Building and make a judgement of whether that particular vehicle would be useful in South Sudan and if so, in what particular way it should be used.

11.3.1 Advocacy For Peace
Advocacy For Peace essentially aims to create a constituency for peace: it is a process through which support for behavioural change and conflict transformation is generated within the community or society. Tools include print or broadcast media, social media, rallies, marches, demonstrations, or other means.

1. This vehicle is useful in terms of breaking down the (informally) institutionalised violence that was discussed in the Dynamics, Influencing Factors and Context section of this paper. Changing informal institutions requires people to change the mental or cognitive models through which they perceive the world. These mental models are derived culturally (through intergenerational transfer of knowledge) and they are partly acquired due to environmental factors. If Generations For Peace Advocacy For Peace Programmes could advocate for a more peaceful manner of engagement, to advocate for the use of mediation over conflict, these projects could help shift civilian’s willingness to engage in violence. However, because mediation is also a culturally relevant practice, this advocacy would still be functioning with cultural bounds of the South Sudanese. Therefore the advocacy could help to shift mental models in a culturally relevant manner.

2. Advocacy For Peace also assists in raising awareness of Generations For Peace: both in terms of attracting stakeholders and partners as well as potential volunteers. Therefore, because Generations For Peace is in its early stages of establishing an office in South Sudan, this could be an important step in gaining credibility within the community.

3. The benefit of using advocacy is that it is less physical than sport, it is something that can include elder members (both men and women) of the South Sudanese community. This is important because, as was demonstrated in Charts 8.1 and 8.2 community and religious leaders are one of the main supporters of peace in Juba. These leaders tend to be elderly and therefore advocacy will create a space in which these individuals can come together and jointly advocate for peace.

11.3.2 Sport For Peace
Sport For Peace is used by Generations For Peace to change behaviours and

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136 Generations For Peace. “Vehicles for Peace Building.”
138 Generations For Peace. “Vehicles for Peace Building.”
transform conflict. It involves an ongoing, regular series of activities, bringing participants together for sport-based activities in order to foster cooperation, build acceptance, ensure inclusion, develop respect, understanding, tolerance, trust, and, ultimately, positive behaviour change. The goal is that Sport For Peace also integrates peace-building education.

1. The value of Sport For Peace is that it targets the youth and children well. As the ontological security sub-section of this Options section suggested, targeting and altering attitudes held by the youth regarding the Other before those ideas become entrenched is certainly ideal. While further research is necessary, the preliminary examination carried out in this research suggests that altering the type of relations in which individuals find ontological security will be a complicated endeavour. In particular this is suggested by the fact that long-term relationships appear unable to be enough to survive a combination of ontological insecurity and physical insecurity in certain cases: solving this issue will therefore require more than contact and meaningful engagement with the Other. For those who experience a consistently negative attitude towards the Other – that is, those whose attitude does not alter in the face of physical insecurity – contact and meaningful engagement through sport would go a long way to foster the necessary understanding, tolerance, acceptance and positive behaviour change required by South Sudan.

2. Sport is also a fantastic vehicle for reconciliation. By bringing different groups together, one engages the sides of the conflict with each other as ‘humans-in-relationship’. Sport can assist in breaking down the conflict-prone relationships and constructing positive ones. Sport programmes also provide a ‘locus’ of reconciliation: a space in which reconciliation can take place where all are equal and know the rules of the game. It is also possible that a new and inclusive social identity will be created. This creation of an inclusive social identity is crucial in order for the South Sudanese to enjoy an identity that is more universal than ethnicity, but that is not inherently linked to the civil war or the SPLM, because both have proved to be unstable foundations for an identity. Therefore a Sport For Peace Programme should enhance reconciliation.

3. Sports For Peace also includes peace-building education: this is vital to build on the mediation aspects of Nuer and Dinka culture. By expanding this element of the problem-solving institutions available to participants, the willingness to engage in violence could be decreased, with mediation being favoured as the tool for dealing with conflict.

4. So far, we have spoken broadly about sport. In recommending a particular sport-based game, the researcher would recommend adapted team sports, such football and basketball, simply because those appeared to be the most popular sports in Juba. Traditional sports, such as wrestling and mock battles, are probably not the ideal sport disciplines because they are aimed at enhancing the players combat skills: obviously not Generation For Peace’s goal.

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11.3.3 Art For Peace

Art For Peace brings individuals together through art-based approaches such as drama, painting, dance, animation and music. This allows individuals the creative space in which they can portray their experiences of conflict, as well as picturing their community free of conflict and violence.

1. The value of this technique is that if Dinka and Nuer could be brought together, and asked to depict their experiences of violence, it could convey to both groups that the experience of violence at the hands of the Other is universal. In other words, as it was mentioned in the Truth and Reconciliation sub-section of the Options section, both Nuer and Dinka have strong narratives of being victimised by the Other tribe. If it became clear to the Nuer and the Dinka that both ethnic groups have been victims at different times in South Sudan’s history, this might lead them closer to reconciling. With the knowledge that at different times each group was the perpetrator and the victim of ethnic violence, an empathy may emerge. If this information is expressed through art, it might be a more subtle and gentle way to express the truth, with the view that the subtlety will diminish the inflammatory nature of the truth being told. Meaningful change could be created if this truth-telling experience is followed by an artistic expression of what participants want South Sudan to be in the future, and a discussion surrounding the responsibility of each civilian to make that South Sudan a reality.

2. Because this recommendation of the Art For Peace Programme deals with traumatic experiences of violence in a non-verbal manner, it is well suited to dealing with any literacy level. Because South Sudan has an incredibly low literacy rate, this truth-telling process is an attractive option. In terms of age, it is well suited to children, teens and youths.

11.3.4 Dialogue For Peace

Dialogue For Peace aims to create a safe space in which honest exchange of ideas, experiences and perspectives can take place. This promotes a better understanding of each other, thus promoting shared learning to collectively transform conflict. This would certainly be useful in South Sudan. During the process of fieldwork in South Sudan, it became clear that community elders meeting to discuss and talk through processes was a common practice. It has already been mentioned that mediation is an important part of both Nuer and Dinka culture and therefore a Dialogue For Peace Programme could take advantage of this to engage elders and adults in the peace-building process.

Dialogue For Peace programmes should aim to achieve and include the following elements:

1. Truth-telling: exchanging experiences of violence can help to remove the idea that either group has been more victimised than the other. Stories should be told in a context in which it is clear that that type of violence should no longer be a part of South Sudanese society. A challenge that might be encountered in South Sudan’s case is that each side might

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141 Generations For Peace. “Vehicles for Peace Building.”
142 Generations For Peace. “Vehicles for Peace Building.”
expect acknowledgement of their loss from the other side, without feeling willing to give acknowledgement. Because of this, and because the violence between the Nuer and the Dinka have such a long-term history, the goal here should not be to link the victim with the perpetrator – as in conventional truth and reconciliation attempts – but rather for each side to hear the treatment that the Other has received. In this way, the truth-telling is a more general process of conveying how ethnic violence has affected both sides, in the hopes that this knowledge will lead to a resolution to leave the violence that both sides have experienced behind, and to build a new South Sudan devoid of ethnic violence.

2. Another challenge that is likely to be encountered in the Dialogue For Peace process in particular is that ethnic violence and cattle raiding between the Dinka and the Nuer is still ongoing in the rural areas of South Sudan. Therefore, this truth-telling process should not be considered as something occurring after conflict but rather it should engage with the fact that violence in ongoing in other parts of the country.

11.3.5 Empowerment For Peace
This approach combined the provision of vocational skills or income training with conflict transformation approaches and education. In particular, this approach aims to address girls and women in domestic violence situations, gender inequality and youth involved in gang-related violence. These factors have not come through as major elements of the December 2013 violence, and therefore, the recommendation of this paper is to put the majority of Generation For Peace’s resources into the first four vehicles for peace building.

Having said that, as has been mentioned the research collected had a significant gendered bias towards male respondents (apart from six Dinka questionnaire respondents who were women). Therefore, this could become an important need that arises when Generations For Peace works in the field, in which case Generations For Peace should certainly engage with empowering women and youth through vocational training.

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144 Generations For Peace. “Vehicles for Peace Building.”
145 Generations For Peace. “Vehicles for Peace Building.”
12. Conclusion
This paper has addressed three main concepts: conflict mapping, ontological security and institutionalised violence. In truth, ontological security and institutionalised conflict were tools for mapping the contours of South Sudan’s conflict, but because of the complexity and depth which these concepts required, it was important for them to be set apart and dealt with individually. Conveying what happened when is one aspect of conflict mapping and it is important, but understanding why the conflict happened on a broader systematic level is crucial. It is this systematic level that ontological security and institutionalisation attempted to grapple with.

The main conflict map consisted of four parts: the Key Players/Actors; Root Causes; Dynamics, Influencing Factors and Context; and the proposed Options for Generations For Peace.

The Key Actors section unpacked the history and context of Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and the SPLM. This was vital in order to understand the two main protagonists in the political conflict and the characteristic of the organisation which both aim to control: particularly the SPLM’s institutional weaknesses and history.

The Root Causes section aimed to both explain what had occurred in the December 2013 conflict and why. It therefore engaged with and explained the political conflict and the ethnic violence that followed it. The findings of the field research required a clear understanding of what the conflict consisted of, and therefore this section followed the narrative and analysis of the political and ethnic conflict. These findings fed into the unique suggestion for how the political conflict translated into ethnic violence. This suggestion aimed to go beyond mere political mobilisation, and attempted to unpack why civilians were able to be politically mobilised. This was ontological security: the idea that humans seek routinised interactions in order to make sense of the world, and that this desire is enhanced in the face of physical insecurity. The application of ontological security to intractable conflict is not only new but poses some interesting ideas that require further investigation. This study suggests that it could be an important – though certainly
not the only proponent for perpetuating conflict. Moving forward, it would be incredibly interesting to test the idea on other populations that have lived with conflict for extended periods. Examples of such populations include those in Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, the eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, amongst others. Specific groups of individuals that could be investigated would be adult soldiers that began their careers as child soldiers: for example, members of the Lord’s Resistance Army. These populations have been exposed to conflict over extended periods, including across generations, and therefore conflict could have become part of their ontological identity. Once the concept has been investigated further, psychological research should be carried out to research how to deal with this issue on a country-wide scale.

The Dynamics, Influencing Factors and Context section dealt with the other major concept used in this paper: institutionalised violence. This section suggested, that because of South Sudan’s unique history and current context, violence is an institutionalised option that is available in order to deal with conflict. Without a single organ with the complete monopoly over violence, violence becomes an important means through which social order is obtained. Unfortunately, as was proved in December 2013 in Juba, this kind of social order is unstable, as is the case for most natural states. This is a well documented concept, and it was important to apply to South Sudan in order to understand that hackneyed terms like ‘bad governance’, ‘conflict prone’ and ‘ethnic politics’ do not convey the complexity of the conflict. They may – or may not – be relevant, but they are not sufficient. This section also outlined the primary regional actors in order to have a clear idea of how South Sudan fitted into its geo-political context.

Lastly, the paper outlined the Options that Generations For Peace should consider when designing their programmes and long-term plan for Juba, South Sudan. Should Generations For Peace wish to expand beyond Juba into other areas of South Sudan, it would be wise to enlist another research paper to engage with the conflict dynamics that exist in different parts of South Sudan, because they are likely to vary from the border regions to the more peaceful areas. Nonetheless, the organisation and its volunteers are well positioned to engage in Juba and Juba is certainly in need of what Generations For Peace has to contribute.

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13.1 Bibliography


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• Interview with Dinka # 6, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 12:30. 30 July 2014.
• Interview with Dinka # 7, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 1 August 2014.

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• Interview with Nuer # 5, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 15:00. 31 July 2014.
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13.2 Appendix A
Questionnaire

Tribe: Age: Job: Male/Female

Use five words to describe yourself.
1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________
3. ____________________________
4. ____________________________
5. ____________________________

Use five words to describe a Dinka/Nuer person.
1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________
3. ____________________________
4. ____________________________
5. ____________________________

How important is it to you to be Nuer/Dinka? (Please underline)
Very Important / Important / Fairly Important / Not important

Which of these actors are most and least important in Juba? Can you rank them?
Military actors, political leaders, wealthy people, businessmen, citizens, religious leaders, community leaders
1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________
3. ____________________________
4. ____________________________
5. ____________________________
6. ____________________________
7. ____________________________

Who are the main contributors to conflict in Juba?

Who are the main seekers of peace or contributors to peace in Juba?

Why do you think people fight in Juba?

Would you ever fight / partake in violence in Juba? Why or why not?
Rank these in terms of importance to you: [what you would fight for or because of first]

Employment / tribe / food / South Sudanese government / poverty / family / a better government / respect / you would never fight
1. ________________________________
2. ________________________________
3. ________________________________
4. ________________________________
5. ________________________________
6. ________________________________
7. ________________________________
8. ________________________________
9. ________________________________
10. ________________________________

If you had started fighting, what or who would be able to stop you?

Please circle the answer that suits you:

1. As a Nuer/Dinka, I see the Dinka/Nuer as my: friend, neighbour, fellow countryman, enemy, someone I am wary of.
2. I feel safer when I have a Dinka/Nuer as a: friend, enemy, someone I am wary of.
3. Does the answer above change when you are in danger? __________________
4. If you have many friends who are Dinka/Nuer, does that make you less of a Nuer/Dinka?
13.3 Appendix B
Semi-structured Interview

STARTING POINT:
• Tell me about yourself.

• If you had to describe yourself in a few words, how would you do it? / How do you see yourself?
• How do you see a person who is Dinka / Nuer?
• Why?
• What does peace look like to you?
• What would need to happen in South Sudan in order for there to be peace, do you think?
• What would you give up for peace?

• What is a conflict?
• Are there any conflicts in your city?
• Why do you think there are these conflicts?
• Who do you think is important in those conflicts?
• Who do you think is to blame for those conflicts?
• Once the conflicts start, how do they stop? Or what is able to keep them going?
• How can peace be secured in Juba?
• Who are the main seekers of peace or contributors to peace in Juba?

• What is violence?
• Is violence a bad thing?
• What would make you do something violent? / When is it ok to be violent?
• If you needed protection, where or who would you look to?

• Who do you respect in your community?

• Are you happy when you meet someone who is Dinka / Nuer?
• If you had a disagreement with a fellow tribesman, how would you resolve it?
• If you had a disagreement with someone from another tribe (Dinka / Nuer), how would you resolve it?
• How important is it to you to be Dinka / Nuer? Why?
• What does it mean to be Dinka / Nuer? (What makes you Dinka / Nuer, besides birth?)
13.4 Appendix C

Interview Guide

- Interview with Dinka #1, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 09:30. 29 July 2014. Student; literate; male
- Interview with Dinka #2, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 29 July 2014. Student; literate; male
- Interview with Dinka #3, Juba, South Sudan. 12:00. 31 July 2014. Student; literate; male
- Interview with Dinka #4, Juba, South Sudan. 13:30. 31 July 2014. Literate; male
- Interview with Dinka #5, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 30 July 2014. Student; literate; male; 23 years
- Interview with Dinka #6, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 12:30. 30 July 2014. Literate; male
- Interview with Dinka #7, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:00. 1 August 2014. Farmer; illiterate; male; 28 years
- Interview with Nuer #1, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 13:00. 28 July 2014. Lieutenant; literate; male
- Interview with Nuer #2, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 15:00. 28 July 2014. Civil society activist; literate; male; 32 years
- Interview with Nuer #3, Juba, South Sudan. 12:00. 1 August 2014. Literate; male; 35 years
- Interview with Nuer #4, Juba, South Sudan. 14:00. 1 August 2014. Illiterate; male
- Interview with Nuer #5, Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 15:00. 31 July 2014. Office administrator; literate; male; 45 years
- Interview with Nuer #6, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 11:30. 1 August 2014. Internally displaced person; literate; male
- Interview with Nuer #7, Regency Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 13:00. 1 August 2014. Internally displaced person (previously a student); literate; male
- Interview with Paul Mabior Yithak (GFP Pioneer), Keren Hotel, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 26 July 2014. GFP Pioneer; literate; male
- Interview with Zacharia Diing Akol (Director of Training at The Sudd Institute), Sudd Institute headquarters, Juba, South Sudan. 09:00. 31 July 2014. Academic; literate; male
Rachel Morrow
Between 2009 and 2012, Durban-born Rachel Morrow attended the University of KwaZulu-Natal where she completed a BSS in Political Science and Economics and a B Comm in Economics. From South Africa, Rachel moved to the UK in 2013/2014, where she studied for a MSc in Global Governance and Diplomacy at the University of Oxford. Throughout her studies, Rachel has developed interests and gained knowledge of peace building, conflict transformation and development. She was an intern at the Peacebuilding Unit of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) before joining Generations For Peace as Summer Field Research Intern and conducting the research project in South Sudan. Rachel has been awarded several scholarships and awards, such as the Skoll Social Innovation Case Competition, Skye Foundation Scholarship, and Mandela-Rhodes Scholarship.

Generations For Peace awards two research grants annually to selected postgraduate students pursuing Masters or Doctorate studies at the University of Oxford. The awardees conduct a field research which takes place during the University’s summer vacations. The multi-disciplinary field research is focused on an activity or programme implemented in one or more countries in which Generations For Peace volunteers operate. In terms of outputs, each awardee is expected to provide a full research report focused on the local activity/programme, including a detailed write-up of the research conducted and any practical recommendations for the activity/programme organisers; and a supplementary report with further meta analysis and recommendations for Generations For Peace regarding activity/programme adjustment and opportunities for further research. A key objective of Generations For Peace in supporting research grants is to support knowledge transfer and capacity development therefore, it is also expected that the awardees will use their best endeavours to demonstrate (within the limits of practical context of their particular research situation) some knowledge transfer to and capacity development of the local actors.