Are they Animals or Robots? An Investigation and Analysis of Intergroup Attitudes in Juba, South Sudan

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# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Arts For Peace Programme (ARPP)

Advocacy For Peace Programme (ADPP)

Compehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

Dialogue For Peace Programme (DPP)

Empowerment For Peace Programmes (EPP)

Generation For Peace (GFP)

Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA)

Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)

Social Dominance Theory (SDT)

Social Identity Theory (SIT)

Sport For Peace Event (SPE)

Sport For Peace Programme (SPP)

Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)

Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)

United Nations Mission in the South Sudan (UNMISS)

United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR)

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# Introduction

Currently the world’s youngest country, South Sudan, has been the scene of recurring violence since December 2013. Many people across the world have been horrified by the reports of near genocidal massacres and other atrocities committed. What began as a political schism in Juba has since cascaded into a widespread conflict carved along the lines of ethnicity. The fact that conflict often is caused by, and results in, derogative attitudes and perceptions is well known.[[1]](#footnote-1) This research argues that although the crisis was triggered by political struggle within the leading party Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), historical issues have significantly compounded it. In turn, these developments have been shaped by, and in turn generated, dehumanistic intergroup attitudes between the Dinka and the Nuer, the two main tribes in South Sudan.

Previous research has shown that conflict tends to foster a dehumanisation of an outgroup on behalf of the ingroup as means to explain or justify acts of violence.[[2]](#footnote-2) Simultaneously, infrahumanisation can take place both during and in the absence of conflict, accounting for pervasive negative perceptions and stereotypes between groups. This pilot research combines the frameworks of infrahumanisation and dehumanisation and examines them through mixed methods research in order to gain a complete or near complete understanding of intergroup perceptions, attitudes, and stereotypes. In other words, this research looks to investigate if there are derogative or delegitimising attitudes between the Dinka and the Nuer, how these are expressed, how they were created, and what can be done to transform them. This includes providing recommendations for Generations For Peace as to how programmes can best be constructed in order to best address the issues at hand. Through this process, it will be argued that both groups express mechanistic dehumanising attitudes toward each other, anchored in recent as well as historic events. Moreover, methods through which these can be diffused include reconceptualisation of the ingroup, increased intergroup contact, and intergroup learning.

This report will be structured as follows. First, a background to the conflict including the December 2013 events will be outlined. Moreover, the focus of this research and the relevance to Generations For Peace (GFP) will be provided. Second, the theories and rationale behind infrahumanisation and dehumanisation will be outlined and explained. Third, the methodology and reasons for embarking on a mixed methods approach, including some limitations, will be outlined and clarified. Fourth, the quantitative and qualitative findings will be described in detail and analysed. Fifth, a few conclusions will be drawn and recommendations will be drawn based on the findings of this research. To amend damage occurred, and potentially contribute to solving the current crisis, this research recommends displaying these findings to the parties in the affected area, enable a secure forum for dialogue, increase intergroup contact and learning, and initiate a process of peace and reconcilliation. Of course, these processes have to be coupled by will and agreement of the local populace as well as a political settlement on a national political level.

## Background to the Conflict and the Contextual Setting

The current conflict originates from the internal crises within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). These two organisations are closely intertwined and often inseparable.[[3]](#footnote-3) Officials tend to occupy offices in both organisations, as they are South Sudan’s main political party and its corresponding military branch. These internal crises are as old as the liberation movement itself, which was founded in 1983 as a part of the political and military independence efforts demanding secession from Sudan. From then on, the population of what would later become South Sudan would fight a guerrilla war against the Sudanese Army and the Khartoum government. Already upon creation of the SPLM and SPLA, there were disagreements over the leadership as well as vision of the organisations, which resulted in internal fighting between two factions.[[4]](#footnote-4) One of these factions was made up by ‘separatists’, demanding outright independence for South Sudan to be the primary objective and the other one of ‘unionists’, who wanted to fight for the transformation of the old Sudan into a ‘new Sudan’, with strong federalist characteristics.[[5]](#footnote-5) Although the differences were initially tactical and ideological, the ensuing fighting eventually pitted South Sudan’s two largest ethnic tribes, the Dinka and the Nuer, against each other, beginning the enthnopolitical rivalry. This pattern of conflictual development has been visible ever since in South Sudan. The unionists within SPLM/A eventually won this particular struggle, and the leaders of the separatist faction were either killed or absorbed into the unionists.[[6]](#footnote-6) The political upheavals within the movement continued, however, although with limited outbreaks of violence.

Tensions within SPLM/A escalated in August 1991, when Nuer army officials Riek Machar and Lam Akol announced a coup, claiming to have overthrown the then leader of the SPLM/A, John Garang.[[7]](#footnote-7) The coup failed, but it created the first major split in the movement with the creation of the Machar-led splinter group SPLA-Nasir, named after the village in which it was formed. Although difficult to quantify, research conducted by the Sudd Institute indicates that a majority of Nuer appeared to have supported SPLA-Nasir, while Dinka backed the mainstream SPLA led by Garang, himself also a Dinka.[[8]](#footnote-8) This split did not only have severe impact on the inter-ethnic perceptions in the then Southern parts of Sudan, but also allowed the Khartoum government, SPLM/A’s main antagonist who fought to contain any secession, to get the upper hand in the conflict. As a result, SPLM/A was nearly crushed between 1992-4. The 1991-coup was also the scene of some of the most serious ethnic rivalry between the Dinka and the Nuer, including the well-known ‘Bor-Massacre’, in which thousands of Dinka civilians were killed on orders from Machar. Events like these drove the two ethnic groups apart and planted seeds of bitterness, hatred, and ethnic rivalry and superiority. Although state building efforts have taken place since then to curtail this rivalry, it is still visible in parts of the population today.

As time progressed, SPLA-Nasir weakened militarily. With Machar losing influence and power, he decided to pursue a separate peace agreement with the Khartoum government, known as the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) in 1997.[[9]](#footnote-9) The Khartoum government embraced Machar and used him to fight what would be a relatively effective counter-insurgency against the SPLM/A and Garang. This move further pitted South Sudanese against each other and led to serious internal conflicts between the Nuer and Dinka in particular, culminating in massive displacement and deaths in both communities.[[10]](#footnote-10) By 2002, Machar apparently realised that the Khartoum Peace Agreement was a farce and started channels of communication with Garang. Moreover, it was at this time that negotiations between SPLM/A and the Khartoum government began to show promise of a sustainable peace. Machar likely realised that he would become irrelevant in the future if an agreement was reached without him.[[11]](#footnote-11) A reunion between Machar and Garang took place in Nairobi the same year, and the return of Machar along with fellow former SPLA leading figure Lam Akol into the movement helped to at least temporarily unite the people of South Sudan before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

Following the mysterious death of John Garang in 2005, Salva Kiir Mayardit succeeded him as the leading figure of SPLM/A. Riek Machar became his deputy and Lam Akol the foreign minister. The prospects for the referendum concerning independence likely propelled this change in attitude. In that sense, South Sudan was formally united by the desire for independence, which was something most South Sudanese agreed on.[[12]](#footnote-12) This unity was maintained until the SPLM held its Second National Convention in 2008, where signs of power struggle emerged as Machar sought to run for the position of SPLM chairman. This was a position that would effectively make him president in the 2010 elections.[[13]](#footnote-13) However, Kiir publicly expressed both that he desired to retain his position and that he did not want to work with Machar or then SPLM Secretary General, Pagan Amum, intending to appoint people of his choice. The convention was heavily politicised, but the delegated vowed to maintain the status quo in order to ensure continuity and unity within the party in the light of the upcoming 2010 elections. Thus, Kiir was reaffirmed as chairman, Machar as his deputy and Amum as the Secretary General. The obvious tensions, however, remained underneath the surface.

In the 2010 elections, Kiir settled on Machar as his running mate essentially to keep SPLM and the people united. However, the elections also depicted cleavages between the two leaders, most notably through their backing of different candidates. For example, in Unity State, Machar backed his wife, Angelina Teny, while Kiir supported Taban Deng Gai’s candidacy. However, these were not the only tensions arising from the elections. Undemocratic procedures by the SPLM Political Bureau to select party candidates for various positions caused damage to the inter-party relationships. Several of the candidates who lost the elections rebelled against the SPLM’s regime, most notably among these were the ones led by David Yau Yau, George Athor, Johnson Olinia and Gatluak Gai, all of them from Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states.[[14]](#footnote-14) Despite these evidences of instability, the SPLM leaders stood together and guided the country towards the 2011 referendum and subsequently independence.

However, tensions were renewed in 2012 and early 2013. The members of the Political Bureau decided to visit the ten states of South Sudan in March 2013 to thank the citizens for their continuous backing throughout the years of liberation struggle and for supporting a successful referendum. While visiting the states, the political officials were faced by an unexpected condemnation of the party. The grassroots in the states argued that the ruling party has lost vision, direction, and that it had failed to deliver badly needed essential services such as road networks, health care facilities, security, and education. This sent a chill through the political leadership of the SPLM. The general feeling was that someone had to be blamed for the failure, which prompted political leaders to trade accusations. At the first meeting discussing this, Machar and Amum are said to have challenged the President openly, blaming him for failing the party and declared their intentions to unseat him from the party chairmanship.[[15]](#footnote-15) This development greatly increased political tensions and placed the future of national stability on the edge of a knife. Individual politicians started to rally their supporters and a militarisation to ensure personal support and protection developed.

Following this first meeting the Political Bureau was reportedly divided and several people were bitter and disenchanted following the antagonistic developments within the Party. President Kiir was particularly outraged by the challenges presented against him and interpreted them as an attack on his personality. What unfolded between April and July 2013 was a direct effect on this. Starting in April, a month after the meeting, Kiir withdrew delegated powers from Machar to demonstrate his displeasure. In July, a rift was vivid, with Amum being conspicuously absent from ceremonies such as South Sudan’s 2nd Independence Anniversary. As the situation grew out of control, Kiir decided to dissolve the entire cabinet, removing Machar, Amum, and others who had opposed him. Adding further resentment was the appointment of people from outside the party to senior key cabinet positions. Following the dissolution of the government, Kiir attempted to garner support for his new cabinet and embarked on a regional tour of the Bahr el Ghazal based four states. During this tour, he reportedly told crowds that the dissolution was necessary to remove corrupt individuals who have failed the country.[[16]](#footnote-16) These remarks along with the removal of key officials from office angered those who were removed and ultimately consolidated two rival factions: one under Amum and Machar, and a second led by Kiir.

## The December Events and Aftermath

The divide between the two main camps, the dismissed officials and the President, was demonstrated by the events on December 6, 2013. This was the day when Machar held a press conference along with several senior SPLM officials such as Pagan Amum, Rebecca Garang Nyandeng (the widow of late John Garang), and former minister of cabinet affairs, Deng Alor Kuol.[[17]](#footnote-17) The group outlined the main differences between the two camps, sharply criticised the President and his new government, and blamed him for deliberately dragging the country into chaos. The rhetoric of the conference included veiled threats of violence should the president not respond to their demand for dialogue. Instead of meeting these demands with a compromise, President Kiir responded bellicosely: “…in the light of the recent development in which some comrades have come out to challenge my executive decisions, I must warn you that this behaviour is tantamount to indiscipline, which will take us back to the days of the 1991 split”.[[18]](#footnote-18) This greatly increased threat perceptions both within SPLM and the population at large by referring to the 1991-coup, memories of ethnic conflict between the Dinka and the Nuer, and events such as the Bor Massacre. What now followed was a series of events and actions that let to the spread of the conflict from the political sphere to that of the ethnic grassroots.

Before outlining these events, it is important to mention that the politico-military high command hierarchy of the SPLM, a remnant of the pre-CPA militaristic structure, presents a challenge to civilian leadership in several ways. When faced by severe political tensions within the party and threatening rhetoric, this militaristic structure has in so far led to individual aspirations and competitive politics being prioritised over democratic values and stability. This mentality contributes to uncompromising political behaviour and in some cases unrestrained individual power. Ultimately, the militarisation and gathering of grass root supporters that begun in early-mid 2013 had increased right up until December 2013. The ethnic rivalry between Nuer and Dinka in particular were played upon in this process, with parts of the general population supporting people of their own ethnicity and region.[[19]](#footnote-19)

What happened on December 15 was that Salva Kiir, being Commander in Chief of the SPLA, ordered Major General Marial Ciennoung, commander of one of the battalions of the Presidential Guard, to disarm his troops. Ciennoung implemented the orders, however, for reasons unknown, he then decided to rearm the Dinka soldiers of the battalion. The ensuing argument between him and his deputy, a Nuer officer, attracted the attention of surrounding Nuer soldiers. In the confusion surrounding this argument, the Nuer soldiers broke into the nearby arms depot and armed themselves. This triggered the fighting in the barracks close to Area 107 in Juba that would later spread first to other parts of the city and later the country as a whole, with various militias butchering predominantly Nuer, Dinka believed to be loyal to Machar, as well as unarmed civilians.[[20]](#footnote-20) The specific targeting of Nuer by Dinka government security forces led to thousands of armed Nuer subsequently joining the opposition led by Machar.[[21]](#footnote-21) The following day, President Salva Kiir called a press conference. Clad in full military attire, the president declared that an attempted coup had taken place and that loyal forces had crushed it and was in the process of pursuing the remnants.[[22]](#footnote-22) Whether or not Machar actually had attempted a coup or not is not known for certain at this stage, nor is it the purpose of this research to investigate this.

During the months following the December events, South Sudan has experienced troublesome social, economic and political developments. In August 2014 it was estimated that the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was housing close to 100,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in its camps across the country, living in desperate and humiliating circumstances.[[23]](#footnote-23) Simultaneously, the UN Security Council has since December 2013 deployed 6,000 peacekeepers in addition to the 7,600 already in the country. Aid agencies such as UNHCR estimate that four million South Sudanese are confronted with a risk of famine and starvation since the conflict disrupted the planting season in vast parts of the country. At least 500,000 people have sought refuge in neighbouring countries, while around one million are identified as internally displaced.[[24]](#footnote-24) Although Machar and Kiir have begun to attempt a process of peace and reconcilliation in Addis Ababa, the grassroots of South Sudan remain fragmented and antagonistic. It goes without saying that the current stalemate is costly both for the country, its population and the prospects for peace.

## Focus and Rationale of the Research

This report addresses the social psychology underlying the contemporary conflict in South Sudan. Specifically, it focuses on the intergroup attitudes surrounding Nuer and Dinka residing in Area 107, Juba. Plenty of NGOs, think tanks and news agencies have analysed the conflict, its actors and effects. However, limited research has in so far investigated the attitudes at community-level and how they are shaped by and in turn shape the conflict. Rather, most contemporary research has sought to understand the political nature of the conflict, map the associated actors, or quantify the casualties. In contrast, this research will predominantly aim to investigate and analyse the community-level attitudes and determine whether there are large differences or similarities between those of Nuer and those of Dinka. In doing so, this research will provide an elaborate and integral understanding of how these two main groups perceive each other. Arguably, such an understanding is crucial in order to implement successful peacebuilding programmes and achieve sustainable stability on multiple levels.

Essentially, the main purpose of this research is thus to enhance the understanding of intergroup attitudes between the two main tribes experiencing conflict in South Sudan in such a way that this knowledge can be used when implementing Generations For Peace (GFP) programmes (which will be detailed in depth shortly). South Sudan is a particularly interesting case, as it is composed of over 64 ethnic tribes that, until December 2013, had lived together under relative peaceful circumstances of nation building. By applying the lenses of infrahumanisation and dehumanisation onto the main conflict between the Dinka and Nuer tribes, important insights will be gained concerning the structure of the conflict, the factors fuelling it, the expressions of its psychological elements, and potential ways of approaching solutions to it.

In that sense, this research will contribute with integral information about the conflict by applying a perspective of social psychology. Moreover, by applying lenses never previously utilised in South Sudan, this research will also add to the wider academic understanding of these approaches and the answers they can generate under different circumstances. In other words, important insights will be generated regarding the universal application of infrahumanisation and dehumanisation as lenses, and the perceptions Dinka and Nuer have of one another. Finally, by employing a mixed-method framework of analysis, additional insights about both infrahumanisation and dehumanisation per se as well as the conflict itself. By conducting quantitative questionnaires as well as qualitative focus groups, valid and reliable data will be collected allowing for a wholesome analysis of the intergroup perceptions between Nuer and Dinka.

Through these methods of data collection, this research will seek to answer the following research questions:

1) Are there visible signs of animalistic or mechanistic dehumanisation in Area 107, Juba.

2) Are there visible signs of infrahumanisation in Area 107, Juba?

3) What are the respective expressions for these types of intergroup perceptions?

4) What are the main sources of these perceptions?

5) How can these perceptions be overcome?

By answering these questions, this research will be able to map the social psychological part of the conflict. This includes its drivers, expressions, as well as possible ways of overcoming these.

## Relevance for Generations For Peace

Generations For Peace (GFP) is an NGO dedicated to sustainable conflict transformation at the grass roots in communities by promoting youth leadership, community empowerment, active tolerance, and sustainable citizenship. GFP has developed a unique curriculum and cascading model for training carefully-selected volunteer leaders of youth (Delegates and Pioneers) and mentoring and supporting them in the implementation of sustained activities to address issues of cultural and structural violence in their own communities. Contexts include inter-tribal, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious violence; gender inequality; post-conflict trauma response, reconciliation and reintegration; exclusion of minorities including IDPs and refugees among others. To achieve this, GFP uses sport as an entry point to engage with youth, such as Sport For Peace Programmes (SPP). In these programmes, carefully facilitated sport-based games provide a vehicle for integrated education and behavioural change. In addition to the sport-based approaches, GFP also uses Arts For Peace Programmes (ARPP), Advocacy For Peace Programmes (ADPP), Empowerment For Peace Programmes (EPP), and Dialogue For Peace Programmes (DPP). Before and after the implementation of these programmes, the organisation also conducts research dedicated to mapping conflicts and identifying key actors and processes that need to be incorporated into the design and execution, as well as monitoring and evaluating of programme outcomes and impact.

The insights of this research will be gained through a careful analysis and mapping of the social psychology of the intergroup perceptions. Through this, it will become clearer whether dehumanisation and infrahumanisation are taking place and if so, what this attitude looks like in detail. Having an extensive knowledge of these processes in South Sudan will contribute to an improved ability to implement targeted and successful peacebuilding programmes. By focusing on underlying pervasive attitudes rather than more visible ones in connection to direct violence and conflict, this research will add to the complete image of intergroup attitudes necessary to identify best practices. Since one of the key goals of GFP is to ensure sustainable conflict transformation, reduction in different forms of violence, and increased capacity to manage conflict in non-violent ways, this type of knowledge of normative perceptions is a crucial component underlying such programmes.

Moreover, long-term normative change on the community level is also essential for peacebuilding programmes to be successful and prevent new eruptions of violence. In order to achieve these transitions, in-depth knowledge of the current normative intergroup perceptions and stereotypes is needed. Thus, this research will provide a much-needed insight into the current intergroup stereotypes. This knowledge can then be used to implement peacebuilding programmes that will accurately address existing tensions in order to achieve long-term stability and normative transitions.

# Conceptual Framework

## Dehumanisation

### Social Dominance Theory and Dehumanisation

The Social Dominance Theory (SDT) isa general approach to the relationships among social groups. It serves to distinguish whether an individual supports either a society where group hierarchies and inequality are prevalent, or one where group equality and a reduction in hierarchical relations among groups are customary.[[25]](#footnote-25) According to SDT, individuals who are high in social dominance orientation support group hierarchies and inequality in society, they view the world as a competitive place where only the toughest survive, and express a willingness to discriminate against other groups in order to attain or maintain group dominance.[[26]](#footnote-26) Thus, high social dominance oriented individuals may dehumanise other groups, in this case the ethnic outgroup whether they are Dinka or Nuer, in order to maintain group dominance and protect resources. That is, by dehumanising, they may legitimise their own entitlement to resources and justify the plight of ‘the others’.[[27]](#footnote-27)

The SDT has previously been used to examine the perception of refugees or other outgroups in Western societies, or soldiers’ attitudes prior to or after war, but rarely on community-level in fragile states experiencing conflict. [[28]](#footnote-28) The notable exception is Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s account of racial dehumanisation and genocidal victimisation in Darfur, Sudan.[[29]](#footnote-29) However, in that case, the research primarily focused on the sociological rather than psychological aspects of dehumanisation. In a different way, the novel psychological approach used in this research acts both as a limitation and offers possibility both to uncover previously unknown attitudes and perceptions in the newly formed state of South Sudan. Limited benchmarking opportunities means that it will be difficult to validate the findings of this research through comparisons. However, broadening the horizons of research involving SDT is also extremely valuable in terms of increasing the knowledge on the psychological rationale behind conflicts in different contexts.

Social dominance theory is the starting point for an analysis of dehumanisation. The concept of dehumanisation has often been examined in the contexts of mass violence.[[30]](#footnote-30) Kelman conceptualised the process as a perception of victims that weakens the perpetuator’s normal restraints on violent behaviour.[[31]](#footnote-31) When the value of attributes such as the victims’ identity, community, and moral norms are denied, the victims become a de-individuated mass that lacks the capacity to evoke compassion. Thus, these factors show how dehumanisation makes the ‘other’ seem less morally worthy and makes the self less subject to self-condemnation and empathic distress that might otherwise restrain aggressive behaviour.

Early views on dehumanisation established that the phenomenon could take place both when the out-group is perceived as lacking values seen as incongruent with those of the perceiver’s in-group.[[32]](#footnote-32) For example, Bar-Tal conceptualised dehumanisation as a form of collectively shared delegitimising belief in which a group is given a subhuman or demonic label.[[33]](#footnote-33) However, in recent years, Haslam has broadened the theoretical scope by accounting for a dual model of the phenomenon.[[34]](#footnote-34) According to Haslam and colleagues, humans differ from animals on attributes involving cognitive capacity, civility and refinement, while they differ from inanimate objects on the basis of emotionality, vitality and warmth.[[35]](#footnote-35) This is since referred to as *animalistic* and *mechanistic* dehumanisation respectively.[[36]](#footnote-36)

Dehumanisation has been utilised in order to analyse extremely harsh treatment of a given group, such as the blatant genocidal labelling of a people. Historical examples include American dehumanisation of Soviets during the Cold War, dehumanisation during the Vietnam War, mutual dehumanisation between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the late 1980’s, and dehumanising attitudes of Nazi Germany towards Jews.[[37]](#footnote-37) However, the lens of dehumanisation has also been used in cases of more subtle prejudicial expressions. For example, Haslam and Loughnan analysed stereotypes of artists and businessmen based on *human* nature and *human* uniqueness.[[38]](#footnote-38) In this research, a similar framework was used, where participants were asked to assign nine animalistic attributes (friendly, fun-loving, sociable, trusting, aggressive, distractible, impatient, jealous and nervous) and ten mechanistic attributes (broadminded, humble, organised, polite, thorough, cold, conservative, hard-hearted, rude and shallow) to both the ingroup and the outgroup (see Figure 1).

Similar to the work of Haslam and Loughnan (2007), the terms used for this research were selected using the database WordNet and were chosen based on word length, familiarity, frequency and positive/negative connotations. WordNet is a lexical database of the English language where nouns, adjectives and adverbs are grouped into sets of cognitive synonyms, each expressing a distinct concept.[[39]](#footnote-39) Due to difficulty in finding a fifth matching positive animalistic characteristic, these were limited to four and the mean scores later compensated accordingly, as visible in the graphs below in the section entitled “Structured Interviews– General Findings”. All of the attributes, or characteristcs, are visible in Figure 1 below. Essentially, the two strands of attributes, animalistic and mechanistic, used in this research were used in order to detect and analyse how Dinka and Nuer relate to each other in terms of describing characteristics. An attribution of these to both the ingroup and outgroup will provide information about how the participants relate both to their own ingroup and to their outgroup. A person who mainly associates their outgroup with animalistic attributes is likely to implicitly deny them characteristics such as higher cognition and moral sensibility and therefore see them as uncivilised and amoral. In contrast, people who associate their outgroup with mechanistic attributes are denied characteristics that are essential to human nature, such as emotionality and interpersonal warmth, and thus view them as cold and rigid.[[40]](#footnote-40)

Table 1: Depicting the two strands of dehumanistic attributes used in the structured interviews.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Animalistic** | **Mechanistic** |
| Friendly | Broadminded |
| Fun-loving | Humble |
| Sociable | Organised |
| Trusting | Polite |
| Aggressive | Thorough |
| Distractible | Cold |
| Impatient | Conservative |
| Jealous | Hard-hearted |
| Nervous | Rude |
|  | Shallow |

The breadth of cognitive meaning of these attributes allows for considerable flexibility in accounting for, and analysing inter-group stereotyping, both in instances of violent conflict and relative peace. The main benefit of applying this framework is thus an ability to capture and display a wide range of prejudicial attitudes that can both be interpreted as ingroup attraction, outgroup derogation, or both simultaneously. Applying dehumanisation onto a conflictual context is thus likely to reveal intergroup attitudes that can then be addressed to achieve sustainable peacebuilding. However, since the analysis of social psychology is a complex process, this research will also account for more subtle expressions of derogative attitudes by analysing the infrahumanisation between the two groups.

## Infrahumanisation

### Social Identity Theory and Infrahumanisation

Tajfel and Turner first developed the Social Identity Theory (SIT) during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. The fact that humans act towards objects based on the meaning these objects have to them has often been recognised by scholars within various fields of science.[[41]](#footnote-41) For a long time primarily associated with sociology and psychology, the social causality behind these cognitive processes of social construction only recently emerged as an alternative theoretical framework for analysing the impact of normative perceptions, attitudes and prejudice on policy.[[42]](#footnote-42) Thus, social constructivism is in this case related to group mechanisms shaping, and being shaped by, the individuals within the group.[[43]](#footnote-43) In other words, the concept per se involves the dynamic construction of perceptions and categorisations of both the surrounding world and individuals themselves.[[44]](#footnote-44)

Social Identity Theory (SIT) holds that individuals are motivated to derive a positive social identity from their group membership.[[45]](#footnote-45) They do so by perceiving their own group as positively distinctive on salient, highly valued dimensions in comparison with other groups. The need to achieve positive group distinctiveness, in order to protect or enhance social identity, causes people to differentiate themselves from the other and to be biased in favour of their own group, even in the absence of any conflict between the groups.[[46]](#footnote-46) This process can take place in violent as well as peaceful conditions. In a conflictual context, these social identities tend to be reinforced and increasingly polarised. This is often identified as dehumanisation, or the denial of full humanness to members of other groups. In the absence of armed conflict, this is often visible in the more pervasive phenomenon known as infrahumanisation. This involves the denial of certain uniquely human feelings to an outgroup, albeit not as strongly as in the case of dehumanisation.

Starting from the anthropological insight that groups often reserve ‘the human essence’ for themselves, some scholars argue that this form of ethnocentrism is a general phenomenon.[[47]](#footnote-47) Even in the absence of significant intergroup antagonism, Leyens and colleagues have proposed that people tend to perceive out-group members as less human than in-group members.[[48]](#footnote-48) Most importantly, this subtle form of animalistic dehumanisation labelled infrahumanisation is distinct from blatant denials of humanness.[[49]](#footnote-49) It thus allows for the analysis of negative perceptions even in the absence of conflict as well as more pervasive attitudes.

Infrahumanisation is investigated by analysing the attribution of primary emotions (deemed to be shared with other animals, e.g. pain or caring) and secondary emotions (uniquely human emotions, such as hope or guilt) to the in-group and out-group. Regardless of the valence of the emotions, participants tend to attribute more secondary emotions to the in-group while more or less equally attributing primary emotions to both groups.[[50]](#footnote-50) Thus, infrahumanisation is distinct from out-group derogation or in-group favouritism.

This approach has often been used to detect subtle forms of the denial of humanness between groups in contexts without conflict. Examples of case studies include people from the Canary Islands and mainland Spain, Flemish and French Speaking parts of Belgium, and various parts of the United States.[[51]](#footnote-51) However, it has rarely been used in case studies where conflict has been recent or imminent. Instead, dehumanisation has been favoured in these instances. However, by conducting complimenting research involving dehumanisation by infrahumanisation, subtle and pervasive conflict traits may be observed that can lead to valuable insights. For example, the potential impact of social desirability and attribution bias may be detected, ensuring not only a more complete understanding of the situation but also generating more valid and reliable data.

In this research, participants were asked to attribute six primary emotions (anger, fear, excitement, pain, optimism and caring) and six secondary emotions (hope, guilt, love, humiliation, calmness and shame) to both the ingroup and the outgroup (see Table 2). Given this framework, it can be hypothesised that both groups in question would show intergroup bias in allocations to one another and reserve the more uniquely human emotions to their own group. This represents an infrahumanisation in that it denies uniquely human attributes to the outgroup. However, it cannot be reasonably assumed that this would be the case due to the pilot-nature of this research. Alternative patterns of emotion attribution would thus be noted and analysed.

Table 2: Depicting the set of emotions used in the structured interviews and the focus groups.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Primary** | **Secondary** |
| Anger | Humiliation |
| Fear | Guilt |
| Pain | Shame |
| Excitement | Calmness |
| Optimism | Hope |
| Caring | Love |

# Methodology

## Structured Interviews

Structured interviews were conducted with 47 South Sudanese citizens residing in and around Area 107 in Juba. The research relies on the participants understanding and comprehension of both terminology and tasks that might be unfamiliar to them. In order to maximise validity and reliability of the research, a combination of structured interviews using self-completion questionnaires was therefore chosen as the preferred method of data collection.[[52]](#footnote-52) Structured interviews, also known as standardised interviews, are exactly what they sound like; interviews based on a uniform structure. Self-completion questionnaires are instead a list of questions or tasks that the respondent fills out in his/her own. In other words, for this research, each participant was asked the same questions so that responses to the questions would be comparable.[[53]](#footnote-53) The researcher read out the questions and the participants noted their answers down themselves on identical questionnaires. This enabled a collection of general group attitudes that in turn could be quantified and compared.

Traditionally, the structured interview has been considered a particularly advantageous technique, especially when the researcher has fairly solid ideas about what they wish to uncover during the interview.[[54]](#footnote-54) In other words, researchers assume that the questions scheduled are sufficiently comprehensive to elicit from interviewees all, or nearly all, the information relevant to the topic(s) of the study.[[55]](#footnote-55) However, in this study, the structured schedule of the interview will fill the additional purpose of ensuring participant comprehension of the questions and terminology. Since the research is also relying on interpreters to ensure validity, a structure is even more essential. Each participant will therefore be handed a questionnaire containing all of the questions, which will then be completed, step by step, by the group but as separate individuals. Thus, although the method is a structured interview, the actual answers will for the sake of simplicity be noted down through filling out a questionnaire. The results of these structured interviews will then be quantified.

Not only will this method ensure comparability, but also ensure that the participants understand what and how to answer in order to complete each step. Since the research aims to use the frameworks of infrahumanisation and dehumanisation, which have never before been used in South Sudan, this is a sensible approach aimed to ensure validity and that the research is actually measuring what it is designed to measure. Some of the participants are likely to be illiterate and are bound to have different understandings of words such as ‘heard-hearted’, ‘shallow’ or ‘calmness’. Reliability of the data could thereby be improved by giving a pre-written oral explanation before attributing each emotion to either group. This would be achieved most efficiently through the use of this type of structured interview. However, as the participants will be given limited possibilities to elaborate their answers and the researcher has a limited scope to ask follow-up questions, mixed-method research is a suitable approach to analyse the attitudes more comprehensively. In order to accommodate this need, the structured interviews will be complemented by qualitative focus groups.

## Structured Interviews – Structure and Conduct

The structured interviews (Appendix 1) were structured as follows. Section one is an introductory section, asking participants for short or single-word answers. This section will help to account for age, religious affiliation, tribe, direct experience of conflict and whether or not the participant has recently been displaced and relocated. In the case of the last two questions, the participants will also be asked to elaborate on their answers, e.g. ‘if yes, how and in what ways?’. Section two is where the emotion attribution will take place. The participants will be instructed to attribute every emotion once and to only one group. The researcher will then provide an explanation for each emotion, based on definitions from Encyclopaedia Britannica. Section three involves the attribution of animalistic and mechanistic attributes. This section will follow the same pattern as section two.

Continuing, section four then consists of a measurement of ingroup love, where the participants were provided with 12 short statements ranging from, ‘belonging to (the ingroup) is important to me’ to ‘(the ingroup) should reject those who do not like them’. The participants were then asked to rank the extent to which they agreed with these statements on a Likert scale 1 to 5.[[56]](#footnote-56) This section was included in order to get quantifiable data on the possible positive attitudes the participants have for their own group. Finally, the last section included a question that the participants were asked to answer in three to four sentences. It phrased as follows, “what do (the outgroup) think of (the ingroup) in general?”. This space was essentially given for the participants to express themselves as well as to observe if there were any general attitudes regarding this area.

## Focus groups

Focus Groups have been used as a research method within the field of social sciences since the mid 1920’s.[[57]](#footnote-57) Although predominantly used within the field of marketing during the midst of the century, the method has gained renewed prominence in social science during the last couple of decades due to its advantageous ability to generate concentrated amounts of data on a specific topic of interest.[[58]](#footnote-58) David Morgan defines focus groups as “a research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher”.[[59]](#footnote-59) It thus involves more or less a group discussion on a set topic that, if moderated correctly by the researcher, will generate data that can be more rich and deep, than for example that of a quantitative survey, in terms of identifying socially constructed attitudes and their impact. [[60]](#footnote-60)

Observing people discussing a topic and interacting both as individuals and as a group will facilitate the analysis of infrahumanisation and thereby identify more features of the concept than e.g. a survey. Quantitative methods might be able to establish the existence of infrahumanisation, but focus groups can display how and why these processes are taking place. In terms of qualitative analysis, focus groups offer the opportunity to survey a large group of people at a single session, exploring underlying attitudes and practices of the people involved. Thus, it can be used both as a self-contained method, serving as the principal source of data, or as a supplementary source of data to quantitative data.[[61]](#footnote-61)

Compared to other qualitative methods such as individual interviews or participant observation, focus groups offer some important advantages. It is sometimes regarded as a quick and easy method as it allows for a more efficient collection of large amounts of data, as compared to individual interviews, and the interactions between the participants during a focus group allows for valuable insight into collective opinions.[[62]](#footnote-62) Thus, focus groups are generally credited for gaining in-depth responses from the participants with minimum levels of artificiality.[[63]](#footnote-63) As the method gives the researcher the ability to build on the participants’ responses and ask follow-up questions making them justify their answers, this is an advantageous method to use when investigating the causal mechanisms behind sensitive issues such as outgroup derogation.[[64]](#footnote-64) Moreover, approaches such as infrahumanisation and dehumanisation are also likely requiring follow-up questions in order to ensure validity and reliability.

Above all, focus groups provide an opportunity to observe how individuals interact in and as a group, thereby also how attitudes and perceptions become normative through group interactions. This is especially true when it comes to how in-group perceptions of an out-group are created and expressed. Thereby, factors impacting on the validity and reliability of the data, such as social desirability or attribution error, can be more easily observed than when using quantitative methods alone. These positive aspects of focus groups have been utilised previously in several studies, for example Kitzinger’s (1993 and 1994) studies on how media impacts on the public’s notion of AIDS, where socially constructed norms proved to be an important factor.[[65]](#footnote-65)

## Focus Groups – Structure and Conduct

As mentioned previously, focus groups offer a wide range of opportunities in terms of how to structure and conduct qualitative research. In this case, 18 people were recruited through Snowball sampling.[[66]](#footnote-66) That is, word of mouth and targeted sampling through the connections of local GFP Delegates and Pioneers. Evidence suggests that there are advantages and disadvantages of using large and small groups alike. The mean group size of influential studies summarised by Bryman is around five, which is why that was seen as the ideal number for this research.[[67]](#footnote-67) It was assumed that a relatively small group of five would make the participants more open to share their views on topics that might be controversial compared to a larger group of e.g. ten participants. As infrahumanisation and general attitudes towards an out-group might be considered controversial, smaller groups are preferable in terms of generating constructive in-depth discussions and avoid obstruction of these. However, due to a few problems with no-shows and logistics, the numbers of participants for the groups were 6, 4, 3 and 5.

A few methods will be used during the focus groups to enable a qualitative analysis of infrahumanisation and its causal mechanisms. The main experiment that will be used to facilitate this will be to present the participants in each group with 12 emotions. Six of these are considered primary; anger, fear, pain, optimism, excitement and caring, while six are considered secondary; humiliation, guilt, hope, shame, love and calmness. This is an established conventional measurement of infrahumanisation used in several previous studies.[[68]](#footnote-68) The participants will be asked to attribute these emotions to the Dinka and Nuer, based on their general perception of the two ethnic groups. The experiment has two phases. During the first phase, the participants will engage in a group discussion and justify why a certain emotion should be attributed to a specific group. The moderator as well as other participants will have the opportunity to ask follow-up questions. This will improve the richness of the data and generate valuable insight into the process of infrahumanisation and dehumanisation. Participants will also have the opportunity to attribute the same emotion to both groups. During the second phase, they will, again, engage in a group discussion regarding emotional attribution. However, this time the discussion will focus on the emotions attributed to both sides alone. The participants will be encouraged to attribute the emotions to only one of the groups.

The purpose of this experiment will be to generate more rich and deep data on the process of infrahumanisation compared to quantitative data in general. By asking the participants to attribute the emotions to both the in-group and the out-group, the research will replicate the quantitative structured interviews However, by also asking the participants to motivate and justify why they would attribute a particular emotion to one of the groups, valuable insight will also be gained on the thoughts and processes behind selection. Through this, causal mechanisms and particular factors, such as attribution error, will also be easier to identify. Furthermore, by first giving the participants the opportunity to attribute an emotion to both groups and then asking them to specify one group, they will be further encouraged to elaborate on why they think an emotion belongs to a certain group. Easing the participants into the emotion attribution will also provide them with the opportunity to demonstrate that two groups may share certain emotions, but that one group may be more closely affiliated with it. Finally, this process will also make it easier to detect and account for social desirability. It is likely that participants will opt for ‘the middle road’ when it comes to certain emotions in order to pose as less prejudice or judgemental. Thus, by encouraging them to settle for the attribution to one of the groups only, this will hopefully generate a more honest and thus reliable response.[[69]](#footnote-69)

A second experiment was used mainly in order to facilitate discussions around the perception of, and attitudes against, the out-group. The aim of this was to measure the ingroup attraction of participants, but also to get a concrete sense of the outgroup derogation. The moderator read out loud a wide range of statements about people from the Middle East. These were randomly ordered and both positive and negative in nature. The participants were asked to individually rate to what extent they agreed with the statements according to a Likert scale of 1 to 5 where 1 mean ‘Strongly disagree’ and 5 ‘agree absolutely’. They were then encouraged to engage in a group discussion motivating and justifying their responses.

## Limitations of this Research

The contemporary crisis in South Sudan has impacted on the population in several ways. Mutual trust among the people is very low, and many foreigners and international organisations are viewed with suspicion. As such, this research encountered some difficulty in obtaining the desired pool of data, i.e. an equal number of males and females aged 18-25, despite approaching people along with local GFP Delegates. For example, due to the violence aimed at them, many of the Nuers in and around Juba haven taken to shelter in the UNMISS camps, which complicated access to these individuals. Moreover, many parents were unwilling to let their children out of their sight or allow them to participate in the research. Finally, it proved almost impossible to access female participants due to the current situation as well as cultural norms. This research thus had to rely on a more pragmatic approach to obtain a sufficient amount of data, which, despite generating interesting findings was less crystallised in practice than in theory. Thus, the recruitment of participants had to rely on targeted approaches through the local GFP Delegates who granted access to community leaders or religious leaders.

As mentioned previously, the questionnaire was distributed to 47 South Sudanese currently or previously residing in Area 107 in Juba. The breakdown of the variables accounted for are visible in Table 3. As can be seen, the samples differed slightly. Although an even age distribution was desired, the two groups differed by 1.6 years, with the Dinka sample being slightly older than the Nuer, as well, the standard deviations (SD) differed (13.04 compared to 8.08 respectively), indicating a greater spread in the Dinka sample. This is also likely a result of the difficulty in accessing Nuer below the age of 24, which limited the age span. This is something that has to be considered when interpreting the findings.

The selected approach to provide basic Encyclopaedia Britannica-definitions of the terms used in the research had both advantages and disadvantages. It allowed for uniform interpretation of the terms, which contributed to the comparability of the findings and thus the quantifying analysis. However, this procedure also meant using Western definitions for the terms in a country where the normative interpretations of these might be different. This is something that was difficult to test beforehand. Thus, although the human characteristics and emotions used in this research have a fairly standardised meaning in the Western world, it is unclear whether they have the exact similar meaning to the South Sudanese people. In other words, it is unknown whether the primary and secondary emotions used have a similar meaning to the sample as to the academic research from which they are drawn. This is also a shortcoming of this research that has to be considered, especially when analysing the quantitative findings. In terms of the focus groups, the opportunity for participants to discuss and ask follow up questions intended to assist in capturing the reasoning around the terms and thus help establish their meaning and content to the participants.

Finally, due to language barriers, this research had to rely on local interpreters for translations. These translators were selected upon recommendations from the GFP delegates and screened before employment. However, during one session in particular, a Nuer sample insisted on bringing their own translator. This proved problematic, as the sample was by far the most politicised during the research. Moreover, several of the participants changed their answers after a brief private discussion with the interpreter, and all of them suggested identical solutions to the crisis. Two pairs of people sitting next to each other also answered identically, resulting in two of the questionnaires being omitted from the analysis. This experience suggests that interpreters, in this case at least, played a role in orchestrating the answers. Although this was the only instance during which this was clearly observed, it cannot be ruled out that interpreters impacted on the findings through their wording or personal conviction. For the focus groups, this was less of a problem as they were conducted in English.

# Findings

## Structured Interviews – General Findings

The following section will illustrate the main quantitative findings of the structured interviews. First, some of the general findings will be displayed, before a more elaborate discussion of the main findings regarding the attributions from the two groups.

The findings of section one of the questionnaires are visible in Table 3. As illustrated, the two samples are relatively similar regarding the variables accounted for. The discrepancy with regards to age has already been highlighted, but apart from that, the samples are relatively homogenous. This is important in order to make sure that the attitudes expressed stem from mutual tension or experiences. The exceptions being, the Nuer perceiving themselves as experiencing 5% more violence than the Dinka, as well as the Nuer attributing that experience to the current conflict to a greater extent than the Dinka. This is likely pointing towards the fact that Dinka militias targeted many Nuer civilians in and around Juba. There was also a considerable difference, roughly 14%, in terms of people relocating because of conflict or because of work, education and other reasons. This may indicate that the Dinka group hold more derogative attitudes, blaming the Nuer for their current hardship. With that being said, ‘recently’ was in this case defined by the researcher as the period after the December crisis. Some of the Nuer participants who said that they had not relocated mentioned that they had not moved from the UNMISS camp, which may indicate that some of them misinterpreted the question. Arguably, residing in a UN refugee camp ought to indicate that a person is displaced or otherwise relocated.

Table 3: Depicting the results of section one of the questionnaires.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Dinka** | **Nuer** |
| **Mean age of sample** | 31.8  (SD=13.04) | 33.4  SD=8.06 |
| **Percentage having directly experienced conflict** | 72% | 77,3% |
| **Percentage attributing that experience to the current conflict** | 77.8% | 82.4% |
| **Attributing the direct experience to other factors** | 22% | 17.6% |
| **Percentage having recently relocated or being displaced** | 64% | 63.6% |
| **Relocated or displaced because of current conflict** | 56.3% | 42.9% |
| **Relocated or displaced because of work/education/other** | 43.7% | 57% |
| **Religious distribution** | 24 Christian  1 Muslim | 22 Christian  1 Muslim |

## 

## Dehumanisation

The same sample as in the infrahumanisation-measure, 25 Dinka and 22 Nuer, were used for the study on dehmanisation. As a part of the interview, participants were asked to attribute a range of human characteristics to both groups. These attributes in turn reflected the two senses of humanness; mechanistic and animalistic. In this case, people who are likened to animals are denied attributes that are uniquely human, such as higher cognition, moral responsibility etc., a process similar to infrahumanisation. In contrast, people who are likened to automata are denied attributes that constitute human nature, such as interpersonal warmth, flexibility and emotionality. The participants were here asked to attribute human characteristics to the ingroup and the outgroup. A summary of these attributions by the Dinka group is visible in Figure 1, where the staples in blue indicate the Dinka’s attribution to their ingroup and red that given to the Nuer-outgroup. Looking at the overall attribution, where a score of 25 equals a uniform attribution of a characteristic to one group, it is clear that negative attributes, such as rude, shallow, impatient, jealous and aggressive were mainly given to the outgroup, while the more positive like organised, polite, humble and broadminded were given to the ingroup. However, more negative attributes such as conservative were also predominantly given to the ingroup, suggesting a more complex pattern beyond valence alone.

Figure 1: Depicting the summary of attributed characteristics by the Dinka sample.

Moving beyond the positive and negative nature of the attributes, we can unravel some interesting findings. Three-way repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted with tribe, valence, and type of characteristic as between- and within-subject factors.[[70]](#footnote-70) As expected, these analyses showed that there was significant differences in attributions in terms of tribe (1, 15.12 = 13.72, *p* < .001), valence\*tribe (1, 305.04 = 276.69, *p* < .001), tribe\*mechanistic/animalistic (1, 26.62 = 24.17, *p* < .001), and tribe\*valence\*mechanistic/animalistic (1, 13.00 = 11.8, *p* < .001). In other words, significantly more characteristics were attributed to the ingroup, significantly more positive characteristics were attributed to the ingroup, significantly more mechanistic characteristics were attributed to the ingroup, and significantly more positive mechanistic attributes were attributed to the ingroup. Compiled, these findings indicate that there are significant differences in terms of the characteristics attributed to the ingroup and outgroup, especially in terms of mechanistic attributes. These findings thereby also solidify the denial of those particular attributes to the outgroup as well.

In addition, high scores on the mechanistic side would indicate that the ingroup, in this instance the Dinka, perceive themselves as more mechanistic. In other words, this attribution would indicate that the Dinka group consists of non-emotional and cold people while the outgroup, the Nuer, are perceived as the opposite. However, a crucial aspect of this attribution is that while the ingroup attribute significantly more uniquely human, or mechanistic, attributes to their own group, they also deprive the outgroup of the same. This indicates two things. First, the outgroup is largely deprived of uniquely human features such as self control and socialisation while the ingroup was attributed those significantly more. Second, the low number of uniquely human attributes given to the outgroup also deprives them of an emotional response. Both of these aspects serve to portray the outgroup as unfeeling objects while the ingroup is seen as self-controlled and warm beings.

In contrast, high scores on the animalistic side indicate that a group is perceived as more animalistic, displaying more emotionality and warmth. As visible in Figure 2, where blue represent the Dinka’s attribution to their ingroup and red the attribution to the Nuer-outgroup, animalistic characteristics were attributed almost exactly equally to both groups, indicating that the Dinka perceive themselves and the Neur outgroup as equally emotionally and warm. However, the ingroup was also attributed almost double the amount of mechanistic characteristics, indicating that the outgroup is perceived as considerably less warm, emotional and friendly than the ingroup.

Figure 2: The mean attribution of human characteristics by the Dinka sample.

Judging from these findings, it can be argued that a dehumanisation is evident, more explicitly, mechanistic dehumanisation. This follows findings of theorists such as Bar-Tal (2000), Kelman (1976) and Schwartzman & Struch (1989), placing dehumanisation in the context of aggression and violence. In the case of South Sudan, it is clear that dehumanisation is embedded in the perceptions the Dinka harbour against the Nuer. However, it is not clear from these findings alone whether this is an expression of underlying pervasive attitudes between the two groups in the absence of conflict, or whether they have developed or entrenched following the December violence in 2013. The main finding is thus that these attitudes currently exist and need to be addressed in order to achieve a sustainable and stable peace process.

This perception of the outgroup as being emotionless may have been developed during the course of the years that have cemented the tribal rivalry between the two. Presumably, both past and recent conflicts between the two tribes have contributed to this image. Specifically, the two attempted ‘coups’ by Riek Machar have most likely contributed to this negative image of Nuer as aggressive, impatient and untrustworthy. However, for these causal hypotheses to be more than just that, we will have to compare these findings with those on infrahumanisation and the focus groups. Having established that these attitudes now exist, this report will later investigate why this might be the case and suggest ways to amend these.

Turning to the Nuer group, a few similarities and differences are visible in Figure 3, where blue indicate characteristics attribute to the ingroup and red those given to the outgroup. In this case, the ANOVAs displayed similar yet distinctive findings, with significant differences in terms of attribution according to tribe (1, 38.20 = 32.81, *p* < .001), and tribe\*valence (1, 84.57 = 72.62, *p* < .001), but leaving any other relationship statistically insignificant. Similar to the Dinka, it is clear that the Nuer tend to reserve some of the more positive characteristics, such as friendly, humble, organised, sociable and trusting, to their own group. In fact, trusting and friendly were attributed solely to the in-group, indicating a perception of the outgroup as non-trustworthy and unfriendly. Thus, the difference in attribution for the Nuer group can mainly be boiled down to differences in valence rather than animalistic/mechanistic. However, the fact that significantly more characteristics were attributed to the ingroup, the perception of the outgroup as unfeeling objects still remains. Considering the context of these attitudes and the events in December 2013, it is likely that they have been severely impacted by the violence along ethnic lines in South Sudan. Hence, the Nuer seemingly associate positive human attributes with their in-group rather than the Dinka-outgroup. Likewise, some of the more negative attributes, namely, distractible, impatient, nervous and rude are attributed to the outgroup, indicating a derogation. That is, the Nuer strongly associates the Dinka-outgroup with several negative human characteristics, indicating a perception of the latter as nervous, mischievous, and lacking self-control.

Figure 3: Depicting the attribution of characteristics by the Nuer sample.

Moreover, the Nuer attributed significantly more characteristics to their ingroup in general than to the Dinka-outgroup, indicating a mechanistic dehumanisation depriving the Dinka of emotional warmth (See Figure 4). That is, the attributions indicate that by attributing characteristics to their own group, they simultaneously deprived the Dinka-outgroup of the same. A mutual mechanistic dehumanisation is thus visible between the two groups, indicating perceived differences in terms of emotionality and interpersonal warmth. In other words, the Nuer-ingroup is perceived as animals of flesh and blood, while members of the Dinka-outgroup are perceived as unfeeling objects. These attitudes have likely been enhanced through the recent acts of violence, shaping an image of the respective outgroup as cold and calculating.

Figure 4: The mean attribution of human characteristics by the Nuer sample.

The main difference between the two groups is that the Nuer simply attributed both more animalistic and mechanistic characteristics to the ingroup in general. In contrast, the Dinka group showed a more even attribution of animalistic characteristics. In that sense, the Nuer thus reserve a large amount of both mechanistic attributes such as higher cognition, moral sensibility and sophistication and animalistic attributes like emotionality, interpersonal warmth and animation to their own group. This double dehumanisation thus indicates that the Nuer denies a larger array of expressions of humanness to the Dinka than vice versa. Since the Nuer in the area around Juba were more likely to be targets of violence in December, this finding can be interpreted as a way of distinguishing the two groups as well as an expression of suspicion.

## Infrahumanisation

To further analyse the intergroup perceptions, an additional part of the study was conducted concerning the attribution of primary and secondary emotions. Similar to the attribution of human characteristics in the previous section, participants were here asked to attribute a set of emotions to both groups. In order to analyse the attributions, three-way repeated measures ANOVAs were again carried out, with tribe, valence, and primary/secondary nature of the emotion as between- and within- subject factors. These showed significant differences in terms of tribe (1, 11.05 = 17.59, *p* < .001), valence (1, 2.65 = 4.21, *p* < .042), primary/secondary type of emotion (1, 3.13 = 4.98, *p* < .027), primary/secondary type of emotion\*valence (1, 83.20 = 132.5, *p* < .001), valence\*primary/secondary type of emotion (1, 3.13 = 4.98, *p* < .027), and tribe\*valence\*primary/secondary type of emotion (1, 3.64 = 5.81, *p* < .017). That is, significant more emotions were attributed to the ingroup; significantly more positive emotions were attributed to one of the groups overall; significantly more primary emotions were attributed to one of the groups overall; significantly more positive emotions were attributed to the ingroup; and, there is significant tendency for primary and secondary emotions to be differentially distributed in terms of valence. The only interaction that was not significant was the tribe\*primary/secondary type of emotion, which indicates infrahumanisation (1, 0.00 = 0.00, *p* < 0.93). In other words, significantly more primary/secondary emotions were not attributed to the ingroup or the outgroup.

At a glance, it is clear that valence plays a part in the attribution. As visible in Figure 5 below, the Dinka primarily attributed negative emotions such as anger, guilt, humiliation, and shame to the outgroup, while calmness, caring, excitement, hope, love and optimism are given to the ingroup, themselves. The only exceptions to this rule are pain and fear, which are attributed as marginally higher to the Nuer-outgroup and Dinka-ingroup respectively. The fact that most negative emotions are given to the Nuer-outgroup, regardless of their primary or secondary nature, indicates that standard infrahumanisation has not taken place. For this to happen, negative as well as positive secondary emotions need to be attributed to the ingroup over the outgroup. The full breakdown in terms of primary and secondary emotions in terms of valence is visible in Figure 6.

Figure 5: Depicting the mean emotion attributions by the Dinka group.

In addition, a few Pearson-coefficients were computed based on the samples in order to see whether the distribution of emotions reflect infrahumanisation or simply favouritism.[[71]](#footnote-71) The results were 0.17 and 0.16 for the Dinka and the Nuer respectively with regards to the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to the ingroup; 0.43 and 0.21 respectively with regards to the attributed secondary emotions to the outgroup; and 0.28 and 0.49 respectively with regards to the valence of the emotions attributed to the ingroup and outgroup. The relative low correlations in all of the cases mean that the distribution of the two different types of emotions or groups is not the result of the same respondents. In other words, it is not the same people who gave few primary emotions that also gave few secondary emotions to both groups.

Looking at the actual attributions, it can be said that the Dinka view their ingroup as more loving, caring, calm and generally more positive than the outgroup. Simultaneously, the outgroup is perceived as being shameful, humiliated, guilty and angry. In other words, the Nuer are aggressive, conflict prone, and feel humiliated and guilty in relation to the Dinka. This indicates that the Dinka view the Nuer-outgroup both as not having the upper hand in the intergroup conflict as well as contributing to its continuing existence. Simultaneously, they indirectly view the ingroup as being more prone to peace over conflict. Where 25 indicates uniform attribution of a feeling to a specific group, it is visible in Figure 5 that the Dinka attribute caring and love almost exclusively to their ingroup, highlighting the ingroup attraction, while over 80% of the participants attributed anger, guilt and shame to the outgroup, demonstrating outgroup derogation. Looking at Figure 6, it displays a breakdown of the mean attribution by the Dinka (blue) to their own group and the Nuer (red), in terms of valence and primary/secondary nature of the emotions. Since there were three primary, secondary, positive, and negative emotions used in this research respective, a score of three in this case indicates a completely uniform attribution to one of the groups. For standard infrahumanisation to take place, the Dinka are to attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup compared to the Nuer-outgroup regardless of whether they are positive or negative.

Figure 6: Depicting the primary and secondary emotions attributed by the Dinka sample arranged according to valence.

As visible in Figure 6, we can see that more emotions were attributed to the ingroup in all categories with the exception of negative secondary emotions. Although this does not correspond with the conventional findings of standard infrahumanisation of attributing more secondary emotions to the ingroup regardless of valence, it still tells us a lot about how the Dinka perceive themselves and the Nuer outgroup. This overall attribution of more emotions to the ingroup over the outgroup indicates a perceived lack of warmth and emotional expressions among the outgroup rather than uniquely human emotions. In other words, these findings correspond with the consistent findings of mechanistic dehumanisation.

Turning to the Nuer sample, the ANOVAs displayed similar findings to those of the Dinka group. There were significant differences in terms of tribe (1, 45.01 = 87.97, *p* < .001), valence (1, 3.01 = 5.86, *p* < .016), primary/secondary type of emotion (1, 4.14 = 8.01, *p* < .005), primary/secondary type of emotion\*valence (1, 21.14 = 41.32, *p* < .001), valence\*primary/secondary type of emotion (1, 3.55 = 6.94, *p* < .009), and tribe\*valence\*primary/secondary type of emotion (1, 28.64 = 55.98, *p* < .001). That is, significantly more emotions were attributed to the ingroup; significantly more positive emotions were attributed to one of the groups overall; significantly more primary emotions were attributed to one of the groups overall; significantly more positive emotions were attributed to the ingroup; and, there is significant tendency for primary and secondary emotions to be differentially distributed in terms of valence. The only interaction that was not significant was the tribe\*primary/secondary type of emotion, which indicates infrahumanisation (1, 0.05 = 0.1, *p* < 0.75). In other words, significantly more primary/secondary emotions were not attributed to the ingroup or the outgroup.

Looking at Figure 7, we can see the breakdown of these attributions. Here, a score of 22 indicates a uniform attribution of an emotion to one group only. Like the Dinka, the Nuer also primarily attributed some of the more negative emotions, such as fear, guilt and humiliation to the outgroup while reserving ones such as hope, love, calmness and caring to themselves. Moreover, the Nuer also did not show evidence of standard infrahumanisation, as negative secondary emotions were reserved for the outgroup, albeit with a slightly less difference between the groups compared to the attributions of the Dinka group.

Figure 7: Depicting the overall emotion attribution by the Nuer group.

The main difference between this and the Dinka group was then an attribution of certain negative primary emotions, such as anger and pain to the ingroup to a greater extent. The attribution of emotions of such negative connotations to the ingroup also means that the outgroup are deprived of them.[[72]](#footnote-72) In this case, the attribution is likely a consequence of recent events, not necessarily indicating that the Nuer feel more anger or pain in general. Similar to the Dinka group, the Nuer also attributed more emotions to their own group in all categories except for negative secondary emotions (Figure 8). In this figure, like Figure 6, the emotions are broken down in terms of valence, where infrahumanisation requires a greater attribution of positive as well as negative secondary emotions to the ingroup compared to the Dinka-outgroup.

Figure 8: Depicting the primary and secondary emotions attributed by the Nuer sample arranged according to valence.

As visible, there was less of a difference in terms of negative secondary emotions attributed to the Nuer-ingroup and Dinka-outgroup compared to the Dinka sample, but more were still attributed to the outgroup, indicating more of a general derogation than infrahumanisation. In other words, based on this part of the research, it can safely be said that standard infrahumanisation has not taken place among the samples. However, the measure of infrahumanisation has displayed some interesting findings that will be jointly summarised with the dehumanisation-measure in the following section.

## Comparisons of the two groups in terms of Infrahumanisation

Disregarding valence, the Dinka attributed both more primary and secondary emotions to the outgroup compared to the Nuer. According to traditional infrahumanisation theory as developed by Leyens *et al.*, this finding might suggest that they are granting the outgroup more unique humanness than the Nuer grant the Dinka in return.[[73]](#footnote-73) However, as visible in Figures 6 and 8 where the emotions are arranged according to valence, the Nuer actually grant the Dinka more unique humanness as they attribute more negative secondary emotions to their own group. With this being said, both groups still primarily attributed more negative secondary emotions to the outgroup. All of this implies that both groups do not necessarily regard the each other as less human, but rather deprive each other of the ability to feel. Thus, an outgroup derogation is taking place which is not necessarily linked to depriving the outgroup of uniquely human emotions, but rather depriving them of any emotions.

Moreover, this deprivation of the outgroup’s emotions also corresponds with an attribution of a significant amount of emotions to the ingroup, with the Nuer attributing more emotions to their ingroup than the Dinka. This indicates that they perceive their ingroup as being more capable to *feel,* regardless of the primary or secondary nature of the emotions. There are two possible explanations for this. The first is that the Dinka and Nuer simply do not infrahumanise each other. In other words, there is a different type of outgroup derogation and ingroup attraction at work in this case, and that infrahumanisation simply is not the universal phenomenon Leyens *et al.* argue. Infrahumanisation is just not an adequate framework to utilise when analysing intergroup perceptions in South Sudan. The second alternative is that infrahumanisation is a pervasive phenomenon, but that this research has not been able to capture it. Possible reasons for this could be the use of emotion-based attributions and whether these are able to capture the expressions of infrahumanisation in South Sudan.

## Ingroup Love

As a part of this pilot study data collection, a specific section on ingroup love was included. This was also done in order to specifically investigate whether the intergroup attitudes were at all correlated with a strong positive association, a *suprahumanisation*, of the ingroup, a negative association, an infrahumanisation, of the outgroup, or both. That is, if the attribution of human emotions and human characteristics is not necessarily a sign of outgroup hate but rather an effect of ingroup love. If a suprahumanisation of the ingroup is present, it would mean that the conflict is associated with high levels of ethnic nationalism or patriotism. Knowledge about these traits of the conflict would therefore be useful in the establishment of programmes for sustainable peaceful solutions.

The participants were asked to complete a 13-item measure of nationalism-patriotism. The measure was developed on the basis of previous research such as that of Viki & Calitri conducted in 2008.[[74]](#footnote-74) Of these 13-items, seven items measured nationalism. These items were: ‘It is right to feel passionate about (the ingroup)’; ‘It is right to feel passionate about the actions of other members of (the ingroup)’; ‘(the ingroup) should reject those who do not like them’; ‘(the ingroup) should not share their resources with refugees’; ‘Refugees need to go back home, even if their home is in conflict or very poor’; ‘It is right to criticise (the ingroup), even if they are your own group’; ‘It is better for other groups if (the ingroup) cannot control them’. Of these seven, the last two items were reverse scored. In addition to those measuring nationalism, six items measured patriotism. These items were: ‘I love (the ingroup)’; ‘Belonging to (the ingroup) is very important to me’; ‘It is right to be emotionally attached to (the ingroup)’; ‘I am not proud to be a member of (the ingroup)’; ‘I do not feel a strong commitment to (the ingroup)’; ‘I do not care about (the ingroup’s) welfare’. Of these six, the last three items were reverse scored. Participants responded to these items on a five-point Likert-scale (1= *Strongly agree* to *5= Strongly disagree)*. The means of these scores were then arranged according to the positive/negative nature of the statements. A summary of the adjusted means for both Dinka and Nuer arranged according to valence is visible in Figure 10. In this figure, the blue staples indicate the positive/negative associations Dinka expressed about their ingroup and outgroup and the red staples indicate the same for Nuer. The scores on the Y-axis indicate where the participants agreed, on average, according to the Likert scale outlined above.

Figure 9: Depicting the summary of means from the measurement of ingroup love

While analysing the data, it became clear that none of the groups express significant ingroup love (See Figure 10). A series of T-tests were also carried out. For a T-test to indicate a significant difference between two samples, the value needs to be below the conventional limit of 0.05. In this case, the measurements showed non-significant differences between the negative attributions of each respective group (0.81), the positive attributions (0.24), as well as within the Dinka (0.36) and the Nuer 0.07) samples. Here, the only value indicating a near-significant difference was the within-Nuer measurement, which visibly demonstrates the greatest difference in terms of positive/negative attributions in Figure 10 above. Looking at the graphs, the basic inference that can be drawn is that both groups tended to disagree slightly more with the negative statements about the ingroup while agreeing more with the positive ones. However, all of the means were relatively close to the middle of the scale (3= *Neutral*), displaying a less polarised view than expected. As with the quantitative infrahumanisation measure in the pervious section, these scores may indicate either that the measure, based on previous research, was either flawed in its design or did not account for the possible suprahumanisation of the ingroup. However, it may also indicate that the outgroup derogation, evidently taking place, is separate from a possible suprahumanisation of the ingroup.

**Open-Ended Questions**

At the end of the interview, the participants were asked two open-ended questions and were encouraged to explain their answers in three to four sentences. This was done to provide the participants with an opportunity to express themselves as well as to capture some additional stereotypical values in a less predetermined format. The questions were “What does (the outgroup) think about (the ingroup) in general?” and “What should be done to improve the lives of (the outgroup) in general?”. The answers were then coded and arranged into categories according to the main words with which were used. A breakdown of the answers to the first question by the Dinka sample is visible in Figures 11 while the answers of the Nuer sample are visible in Figure 12. In both of these figures, the Y-axis indicates the percentage of participants providing a particular answer.

Figure 10: Depicting a breakdown of the answers of the Dinka group to the question: “What do Nuer think about Dinka in general?”.

As visible in Figure 11, all of the words used to describe how the Dinka believe they are being perceived were negative, with the only exception being ‘I don’t know’. Almost 40% of the Dinka respondents believe the Nuer perceive them as being corrupt or power-hungry, which emphasise the political nature of the conflict. Moreover, it shows how the attitudes towards the political elite in South Sudan has spread to the grass root level, with the opposition of Riek Machar seemingly reflecting the attitudes of all Nuer in the eyes of the Dinka. In addition, other references are made to the political landscape, in that around 15% of the respondents believing that the Dinka are perceived as a political force marginalising the Nuer. Again, it becomes visible how great of an impact the political squabble has had on intergroup attitudes at the grass root level. Even if the majority of the Nuer do not perceive the Dinka as marginalising or power-hungry, it can safely be said that this threat perception exists and can partly explain the intergroup tension and antagonism that is currently expressed in acts of violence.

Turning to the answers of the Nuer group in Figure 12, we can see that the Nuer also had an exclusively negative idea of what the Dinka thought of them. Over 25% of the Nuer believe that the Dinka perceive them as unable to govern South Sudan. This statement once again connects the ethnic outgroup to the politics of South Sudan. Moreover, roughly 15% believe they are being perceived as the enemy, an unwanted group, or a group the Dinka want to destroy. This finding corresponds with the findings depicted in Figure 10, regarding the Dinka perceptions of the Nuer as feeling marginalised. It is equally clear that the Nuer do indeed feel marginalised, with such a large part of the Nuer sample feeling, in different ways, negatively perceived and side-lined.

Figure 11: Depicting the answers of the Nuer group to the question: “What do Dinka think about Nuer in general?”

The answers to the question, “What does (the outgroup) think about (the ingroup) in general?” indicate that a mutual threat perception is evident between the two groups. Most of the answers related to political aspects, how the two groups perceive each other in terms of power. The Nuers’ stereotypical perception of Dinka as clinging to power is visible here. As is the Dinkas’ perception of Nuers as renegade enemies that cannot rule and who desire power for their own personal gain. Both of these attitudes have likely been entrenched by the recent political turmoil and ensuing violence that engulfed the country. To a certain extent, the above scores may also explain the greater attribution of emotions to the ingroup over the outgroup in the previous section on infrahumanisation.

Moreover, participants were asked to provide an answer to the question “What should be done to improve the lives of (the outgroup) in general?”. This question provided an opportunity for the respondents to articulate and propose solutions to the current problems and tensions in South Sudan. Looking and the breakdown of the coded answers of the Dinka sample in Figure 12, it is visible that most respondents, aside from the 12% answering “Nothing can be done”, remains quite positive. Most of the solutions are on the macro-level in the sense that they refer to broad, national, policies such as peace and reconciliation, development, education policies etc. Moreover, these answers also suggest a widespread knowledge among the Dinka of the various issues underlining the current problems in South Sudan. It is also clear that there is a widespread belief that inter-ethnic tensions will be reduced with economic and political development.

Figure 12: Depicting the answers of the Dinka group to the question ”What should be done to improve the lives of Nuer in general?”.

Turning to the Nuer sample, we can see a slightly different set of answers. The perhaps greatest difference is that 23% of the Nuer respondents suggest that a “Federal system” will improve the lives of the Dinka. In all likelihood, this answer is likely a product of the advantages of federalism as proposed by the current political opposition in South Sudan, which has particularly strong support among Nuer communities.**[[75]](#footnote-75)** Moreover, similar to the Dinka answers, there is a lot of emphasis on the importance of peace, with at least 42% of the answers referring to peace, reconciliation, or the negotiations in Addis Abeba. Simultaneously, slightly more respondents (14%) state that nothing can be done, while 18% refer to increased political influence for Nuers or a new national government. This displays a more negative attitude compared to the answers of the Dinka, which focused a lot on national policies of development and education. Instead, it becomes clear that a lot of Nuer see political transformations in terms of federalism or increased political influence as important factors for improvements in the lives of Dinka. These discrepancies are undoubtedly factors that need to be considered to ensure sustainable peace-building efforts.

Figure 13: Depicting the answers of the Nuer group to the question ”What should be done to improve the lives of Dinka in general?”.

## Summary of Quantitative Findings

A short reflection on the structured interviews is in order. Regarding the findings, it is clear that standard infrahumanisation is not taking place in South Sudan. That is, the perception of the outgroup as lacking unique humanness and civility is not visibly prevalent. Whether the framework proposed by Leyens *et al.* regarding the attribution of emotions is an adequate method or not to use when investigating infrahumanisation in South Sudan remains unclear.[[76]](#footnote-76) It can be the case that the population of South Sudan simply do not use emotions in primary or secondary terms similar to previous groups analysed by scholars of infrahumanism. In other words, that infrahumanisation, or at least infrahumanisation based on emotion-attribution, is not a universal phenomenon in all cultures. With this being said, it could also be the case that the emotions defined in this research as primary and secondary do not have the same meaning or value for the participants. However, regarding the accuracy of the dehumanisation framework, this assumption is dubious. As this research serves as a pilot study in this area of research, future scholars should take these findings into consideration before conducting field research.

When it comes to the dehumanisation framework, the findings indicate that a mechanistic dehumanisation is taking place. In this type of dehumanistion, people do not see outgroup members as more animal-like, as in the case of infrahumanisation, but as more object-like or machine-like. This is not due to the attribution of mechanistic over animalistic characteristics to the outgroup, but rather a general attribution of more characteristics to the ingroup. Thereby, the main part of this process involves perceiving the outgroup as lacking emotions or unique human characteristics. Arguably, both groups perceive the outgroup as having less emotional responsiveness in general, not just for secondary emotions. The findings in terms of the animalistic and mechanistic scales confirm this finding. This creates an intergroup stereotyping of the ingroup as beings of flesh and blood while the outgroup is perceived as unfeeling objects.

# Focus groups

To compliment the quantitative research and gather more data on the causality of the intergroup attitudes, a focus group study was conducted. The research consisted of four focus groups in total, with two consisting of only Dinka and two of only Nuer. The breakdown of the variables accounted for in the participants is visible in Table 4.

Table 4: Depicting the breakdown of the focus group members

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Group** | **Mean Age** | **Age SD** | **Nr. of members** | **% Relocated** | **% Experienced Violence** |
| Dinka 1 | 23.8 | 0,75 | 6 | 50 | 83 |
| Dinka 2 | 26.3 | 2,1 | 4 | 25 | 50 |
| Nuer 1 | 34.3 | 3,1 | 3 | 0 | 75 |
| Nuer 2 | 24.2 | 0,84 | 5 | 100 | 80 |

As visible in Table 4, the participants in the focus groups differed somewhat on all variables. In terms of age and the SD of age, In terms of age and the SD of age, within the Nuer groups, one had a slightly larger spread and one had a slightly smaller spread. The Dinka groups were similar; one had a slightly larger spread and one had a smaller spread.. The case is similar when it comes to the members of the groups. Regarding the percentage of participants being relocated, one of the Nuer groups contained only people who had relocated since December and one contained only people who had not relocated. In contrast, this spread was more even in the Dinka groups. When it comes to the percentage experiencing violence, the Nuer groups were more even than the Dinka groups in this regard, albeit higher on average. All of these factors need to be considered when looking at the focus group discussions in the following sections.

During the focus groups, the participants were asked to complete the same attribution of emotions as in the structured interviews. While doing so, they were individually asked to justify their choice of attribution and then discuss, and agree collectively as a group which emotion belonged to which group the most. This was done in order to obtain richer and deeper data on the possible processes of infrahumanisation or dehumanisation. Moreover, the participants were also asked to complete a measure on outgroup derogation. This consisted of ten randomly ordered statements: ‘(The outgroup) are peaceful’; ‘(The outgroup) are rational’; ‘(The outgroup) are tolerant’; ‘(The outgroup) are cruel’; ‘(The outgroup) only understand the use of force’; ‘(The outgroup) are conflict prone’; ‘(The outgroup) need to be shown the peaceful way’; ‘(The outgroup) are civilised’; ‘(The outgroup) are different from (the ingroup’; ‘(The outgroup) like to fantasise’. The participants then had to reflect upon the statements and whether they agreed or not as a group. This would then mainly serve the purpose of stimulating discussions between the participants.

## General Findings: The Dinka Group

The main purpose of obtaining these findings was not to quantify them, but rather investigate and analyse intergroup perceptions and attitudes in a more qualitative way. However, a few quantitative remarks can still be made before proceeding. In the Dinka groups, hope, excitement, love and optimism were exclusively reserved for the ingroup, while guilt, anger, humiliation and pain were exclusively given to the outgroup. More emotions in general were also given to the ingroup. Interestingly enough, the attributions between the two groups did not differ particularly. These findings echo those of the questionnaires of a general deprivation of feelings from the outgroup. That is, the differential attribution of a human essence to the ingroup and the outgroup. The following passage arguably portrays the outgroup as an anonymous mass unable to feel fear:

**Dinka Focus group 2:**

***Moderator: You put fear on the Dinka side, why is that?***

Participant 1: *We are afraid because we are defending the government. They are attacking because they have no fear, but we are afraid because we are defending the government. We need all South Sudanese to be free, and we need all to live in peace, not to fight… those who are fighting they have no fear, but we are afraid. They are terrorising our civilians. That is why fear belongs on the side of Dinka.*

Participant 4: *I agree, because this here, has fear. In the case of you, you are a foreigner. And if something would happen here, we will die here. But for them, they have no any fear. They have to bring fighting here, Juba is very populated, there are foreigners here. But those people they just die for no reason, and somebody who has fear cannot bring fighting here. That is why, Dinka have fear. You need to have fear of the people you are governing.*

***Moderator: You say if you bring fighting here the way they do, you cannot feel fear?***

All: *Yes.*

***Moderator: Does everyone agree? No one disagrees? What about you?***

Participant 2: *I agree, the main reason being that this here in December, when the fighting erupted, when you have fear you do not to crazy things, but they do. Innocent people died because bad things happened in the city.[[77]](#footnote-77)*

As visible in the excerpt above, it is clear that the Dinka perceive the Nuer as an impatient and careless group of people that do whatever they feel like with focus on short-term individualistic goals. Arguably, the Dinka perceive the Nuer as being distinct and different from them. Yet, this is sometimes concealed by as members of both groups use expressions such as “we are all South Sudanese”, “they are my brothers” or “we are one people in one nation”.[[78]](#footnote-78) Thus, the tension and pervasive attitudes can be interpreted as being concealed or mitigated by a national identity. Often, however, this national identity proves relatively weak and prejudicial attitudes and negative stereotypes underneath become apparent. Although this national identity renders the Dinka and Nuer similar in relation to, for example the Sudanese as diverse groups under a single national label, their main differences are predominantly drawn from ethnicity rather than religion or geography. This echoes the findings of what Bar-Tal calls the delegitimisation of a group based on the main perceived difference, in this case ethnicity.[[79]](#footnote-79) Thus, perceived differences seem to become actual differences between the two groups as ethnic differences lead to stereotyping and delegitimisation of cultural norms and values. In case of the excerpt above, the process of delegitimisation rendered the Nuer-outgroup a fearless mob while the Dinka-ingroup was perceived as socially responsible, reflecting and victimised. This process gives us an idea of how and why the political conflict was able to trickle down to the grassroots and lead to socially constructed distinctiveness and, ultimately, violence.

## Limited attribution of emotions to the Outgroup as a form of Dehumanisation

Regardless of whether one looks as the findings from the focus groups in quantitative or qualitative terms, it becomes clear that the Dinka attributed more emotions in general to their ingroup compared to the outgroup. This not only mirrors the general findings from the structured interviews, that the outgroup is deprived of most emotions, but also indicates a more polarised attribution, in that most positive primary and secondary emotions were reserved for the ingroup. This emphasises the delegitimisation and dehumanisation taking place between the Dinka and the Nuer. Similar to the findings from the structured interviews, this is most likely an expression for mechanistic dehumanisation. In that sense, the attribution of emotions predominantly to the ingroup renders a humanisation of the ingroup and a dehumanisation of the outgroup at the same time. Moreover, the Dinka also tended to blame the Nuer tribe at large for triggering the December violence. The following passage illustrates this point:

**Dinka Focus group 1:**

Participant 4: *On this point, I do not know who is the most guilty. The government says it is right. But it could be both sides, because crimes has been committed by both sides.*

***Moderator: And you, do you agree?***

Participant 2: *For me, Riek Machar has been known as a rebel, he has rebelled many times. He rebelled in 1991 against Garang. He was defeated and went to Khartoum to stay there. This guy, is a power hungry person, and this is the same thing he has done now, he wants to topple Salva Kiir. Of course, after failing to state the coup, he left and started rebuilding. So he’s guilty. He’s guilty.*

***Moderator: Do you think that the Nuer as a group, are more guilty?***

Participant 2: *Of course they are more guilty. Of course they are the ones looking for power, and if judgement is to be made, you will see a greater punishment for Nuer.*

***Moderator: What do you think?***

Participant 1: *According to me, Nuer are guilty. Nuer are more guilty than Dinka. They want to overthrow the elected government. They voted for the president and Riek Machar was the vice president. I do not see the reason to rebel against the government when you are a part of the government. If he wanted to do something, he could have done it. So, I think he is guilty, and that is what he usually does. Like my colleague said, he did it before in 1991.[[80]](#footnote-80)*

Most, if not all participants thus based their attribution of several emotions not only on their personal experience but historical events. This kind of delegitimising stereotyping is not an uncommon phenomenon and will henceforth, in the case of South Sudan, be referred to as ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism, as originally introduced by Sumner (1906), denotes a tendency to accept the ingroup and reject the outgroup.[[81]](#footnote-81) The ethnocentric tendency to perceive the other group as different and devalued is likely the underlying tendency for this. This type of delegitimisation is often a cognitive mechanism for first explaining the conflict and then later justifying the violence perpetrated by individuals.[[82]](#footnote-82) In the case of South Sudan, the delegitimisation of the outgroup, originating in the perceived differences, likely lead to a constructed threat perception. In order to prevent the danger, both the Dinka and the Nuer arguably harmed the outgroup they perceived as threatening and later justified the harm by delegitimisation.

## A Political Conflict that Transitioned to grass root Violence

A standing feature in all of the Dinka focus groups was the continuous references to the political turmoil. Above all, almost every member of the focus groups attributed this turmoil to Riek Machar. Not only is Riek Machar personally blamed for the political malaise and the violence, but is also accused of spreading misinformation to South Sudanese people in general and the Nuer in particular. This general perception does not only reinforce that ethnocentrism exists in South Sudan, polarising peoples attitudes, but also that most citizens are aware of the political origins of the crisis. By equally often referring to Riek Machar and Nuer in general in derogative terms, the participants essentially fuse the actions and attitudes of the leading Nuer political figure and the tribe at large. This adds to the previously established mechanistic dehumanisation in that it portrays the Nuer not as individuals, but as a mass following the will of an illegitimate leader that wants to destroy South Sudan. The following excerpts clearly displays this process:

**Dinka Focus group 1:**

***Moderator: You put guilt on the Nuer side, why is that?***

Participant 1: *I do that because those of Nuer are ever guilty. What they are doing, one of them cannot tell the other one ‘you cannot do this’.*

Participant 3: *They are guilty, they are really guilty. This man [Riek Machar], who are causing the problem here this year, are also the man who made the other problem some years ago. Now we are in the process of making peace and making elections so that he will come as the new leader. He was feeling guilty for not getting voted, for if he would not have become the president. He will not get any votes. That is why he want to make a conflict, because he feel guilty.*

***Moderator: So his actions are symptoms of his guilt?***

Participant 5: *Yeah, he [Machar] does these things because he is guilty. And other people are following him, blindly, they do not know what he’s doing. So they are also guilty. The ones who did some thinking, they are not the ones who made these problems here now.[[83]](#footnote-83)*

**Dinka Focus group 2:**

*Participant 3: Concerning humiliation, it belongs on the Nuer side. Because, when you make a decision to take an action, and you fail, you fail to achieve and you feel humiliation. So it is the Nuer who feel humiliation stronger. They desired to overthrow the government, they decided to overthrow to defeat the government and they failed. So they feel humiliation, the Dinka don’t. The Nuer now in the bush, they are more humiliated.*

***Moderator: What do you feel?***

*Participant 1: Nuer are humiliated, because they have failed to fulfil their desire. Their desire was to topple the government and maybe get what they want to get out of it.*

***Moderator: And you, what do you feel?***

*Participant 2: We are also embarrassed, not only Nuer. As Dinka, we are now in power, people are fleeing under our leadership. As Dinkas, we do not like that. But Nuer feel it more than we, because it was their desire…*

*Participant 3:…And they will feel more humiliated when they come back.[[84]](#footnote-84)*

In relation to this association between the Nuer in general and Riek Machar, the notion of power was also often brought up during the focus groups. This was expressed in terms such as “the Nuer are too impatient to rule, they cannot wait for the elections”, “the Nuer are unable to rule”, or “they think we (Dinka) are power-lovers”.[[85]](#footnote-85) The labelling of Nuer as unable to rule in particular paints a picture of an incapable or mechanic group that needs to be controlled by, rather than control, another group. It can thereby be argued that the political nature of the conflict plays a central role in the mechanistic dehumanisation taking place. When discussing the attribution of emotions, participants often motivated their attribution with reference to the struggle over political power in South Sudan. That is, alluding equally much to whether Dinka or Nuer feels more or less guilty, angry, or optimistic in relation to politics as in nature. Thereby, most of the dehumanisation is taking place with reference to the political crisis or the governing of the country. As visible in the following section political power played a great role in the mechanistic dehumanisation.

## Focus groups rendered more polarised findings

The final common theme in all the three focus groups consisting of only members of the Dinka tribe, was that people expressed a more elaborate outgroup derogation than in the questionnaires. That is, people expressed stronger outgroup derogation in the qualitative format of the focus groups as they were more able to develop their answers and opinions as well as bing influenced by other members of the group. There are two possible explanations for this. First, the qualitative nature of the data collection may have recorded more derogatory answers. Arguably, one may get more accurate answers by asking follow up questions. This format eliminates possible misunderstandings and enables an analysis of the motivations behind each answer. As these motivations often include the description of negative or derogative stereotypes and perceptions, the qualitative nature of the data collection may record more derogative answers by allowing for increased richness of answers. The following excerpt serves as an example of the derogation mentioned above, including the motivations for doing so:

**Dinka Focus group 1:**

Participant 3*: When we come to caring, I want to say that Riek Machar, I want to talk about Riek, Riek Machar do not care about South Sudan. I think if he cared about it, he could not establish violence. Fighting doesn’t bring any good. Many people are, we lost a lot of people in this war. So I think…*

***Moderator:…You want to put it on this (the Dinka) side?***

Participant 3*: Yes, they do not care.*

***Moderator: Why do you think that is?***

Participant 2: *Concerning this one, I may agree with my brother. That the Nuer are not caring. Because what they care about is their leadership, to be a leader. That is what they care about. They doesn’t want a Dinka to be a leader. If they were caring, they would have not supported the… Riek Machar. …These actions do not show any care, they are not caring at all.*

***What do you think?***

Participant 1: *Specifically speaking, Dinka are caring people. They are hospitable and are very compassionate about others. We show the same care to Nuer. It was the Dinka that appointed Nuers in the government, that shows a sense of caring. They are trying marginalise others. We are so caring, we offered ourselves to die for this country, in the previous war. That is a sense of care, we did not care for ourselves but for the whole country.[[86]](#footnote-86)*

Second, social desirability likely caused many participants initially showed a tendency to attribute emotions more ‘fairly’ between the groups in some cases, or attribute the same emotion to both groups in others. However, after discussions they often displayed consensus-based polarised attributions. Moreover, the strong consensus in the focus groups regarding the attribution of emotions indicates that people may have sought consensus or been impacted by, for example, social desirability. The latter is perhaps the most likely reason for why the participant expressed such little disagreement over the attribution of emotions. In other words, social desirability as means of fitting in with the other participants. Furthermore, the tendency to attribute emotions fairly to both groups can be described as another type of social desirability, that of attempting to be just in the eyes of other participants as well as the researcher. Ultimately, however, this may also simply indicate strong normative negative perceptions.

## General Findings: The Nuer Group

Similar to the Dinkas, the Nuer groups also reserved hope, caring, love and optimism for the ingroup. However, they also attributed humiliation and pain to the ingroup exclusively, and only excitement exclusively to the outgroup. This indicates a more complete denial of the outgroup’s humanness than previous measurements. In other words, the Nuer groups essentially attributed almost all emotions to the ingroup, depriving the outgroup of almost any emotional capacity. These findings thus reaffirm the indications from the structured interviews that the outgroup is perceived as mechanic and cold to a greater or lesser extent. Before even looking into the qualitative content of the focus groups, it can be mentioned that both Nuer groups yielded more polarised attributions of emotions than the structured interviews, and that the Nuer groups also generated more polarised findings than the Dinka groups. In other words, the Nuer more blatantly dehumanised the Dinka-outgroup in terms of the lack of emotional attribution as well as the attitudes expressed. The following excerpt depicts a discussion concerning the emotion humiliation:

**Nuer Focus group 2:**

***So you are saying that the Nuer feel humiliation stronger than the Dinka?***

Participant 2: *Yes, I agree. The Dinka are still in Juba and we are still in the UNMISS camp. And our people have been killed in Juba, and that is why I feel like this.*

***They do not feel humiliated because they have not lost or because they cannot feel it?***

Participant 2: *They cannot feel this, like us. I am feeling like this because I have lost my home. I have lost a lot of people. And now, I am not staying in my home, I am in the UN camp, that is why I am feeling like this.*

Participant 4: *I think, between Nuer and Dinka, Nuer feel more humiliated.*

***You think that they feel more humiliated than Dinka?***

*Yes. What happened only affected the Nuer tribe. Many people died. People have lost their properties, they left their home. Many people who are responsible are still in government, That is why Nuer people feel more humiliated.[[87]](#footnote-87)*

## Limited attribution of emotions to the Outgroup as a form of Dehumanisation

Similar to the Dinka groups, the Nuer deprived their outgroup of more emotions compared to their ingroup. However, the Nuer were more depriving than the Dinka, attributing only excitement and anger to the outgroup. The main reason given for granting these characteristics was that the Dinka are more excited as they have more to be excited about, being perceived as holding onto power and distributing the state resources to their own group, while the Nuer are left in the cold. Simultaneously, regardless of valence, most emotions were reserved for the ingroup in the Nuer case. This attribution effectively demonstrates a perceived emotionlessness of the Dinka-outgroup by the Nuer. Again, the argument put forward here is that this can be labelled a case of ethnocentrism, where the ingroup is legitimised and the outgroup delegitimised.

**Nuer Focus group 1:**

Participant 2: *According to Nuer nature, Nuer also, they love and hate another, everyone. As we are now in South Sudan, we love everybody who are in South Sudan.*

***And Dinka doesn’t?***

Participant 4: *Dinka, they do not love. They can love, but they do not love more than us. If they can love, then what is happening now? Whenever you love your country and your people, you cannot bring someone to defeat your whole people, then you do not love your nation.*

***Do you all agree?***

Participant 4: *Regarding this love. I can support it strongly also. In our nature, in our Nuer community, we interact with many people, this show the kind of love. Even other people, like Dinka, they come to us, they get into our community. We love a lot, it is in our culture. It is difficult for us to hate others, if they come to us (…) there are many things that show love among us.*

*(…)*

Participant 4: *If they really love, then they could not have done this to all of us, to our country.[[88]](#footnote-88)*

Regarding the excerpt above it can be argued that the attributions of emotions were based on similar perceptions as those mentioned in the previous paragraph, a sort of emotional-based theodicy that ‘if they could feel X, they would not do Y’.[[89]](#footnote-89) Although this process of reasoning is evident in both tribes, it is evidently stronger in the Nuer group. Presumably, the large-scale killing of civilians around Juba contributed to the construction of the perception of Dinka as cold, calculating and emotionless. As such, the identities of the tribes below the relatively weak national identity of South Sudan also becomes visible. The strengthening of this identity is likely a part of the solution to the contemporary threat perceptions between the two tribes.

## The political nature of the conflict: Federalisation as the only solution

Like in the Dinka groups, references were often made to how the origins of the conflict lay in the political struggles within SPLM. In turn, this conflict spread to the grassroots and the communities, leading to the killing of civilians. Similar to the Dinka, the Nuer often referred to their respective outgroups’ desire for power as a reason for the conflict. The argument put forward in justification of this is that the Dinka-outgroup knew that what happened in December was not a coup but they acted in this way regardless to solidify their position of power. Like the Dinka referred to the actions of Riek Machar as representative of those of Nuer, the Nuer also generalised the actions of the government with those of the Dinka at large. However, an interesting observation is that the members of both Nuer focus groups repeatedly referred to a federalisation of South Sudan as the only solution to the current turmoil. This was never suggested by any of the Dinka members within their focus groups. The following excerpts from the first and second Nuer focus groups illustrates both the point concerning the Dinka’s perceived inability to cooperate as well as federalisation being a solution to the problems:

**Nuer Focus group 1:**

Participant 3: *They say, ‘even when there will be a peace, we will just defeat this one’.*

***You mean that that is the Dinka opinion?***

Participant 3: *Yes. They do not know how to live peacefully. How could they otherwise come and kill these people? Because, Nuer, we will just wait anyway, to be killed by Dinka. A federal system will be good.*

Participant 2:*…A federal system…*

***A federation?***

Participant 3*: The state should be a federation.*

Participant 1: *Yes. A federal government*

Participant 3: *No federal system, the Nuer will kill the Dinka. That is what we know.*

***That is what you think is going to happen?***

Participant 3: *Yes, yes. We just wait for it to happen. When there will be peace, we will divide the country. Equatorial, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile. We cannot kill ourselves. If we do not divide it, this will happen.*

***You do not think it could be one country? Without being a federal state?***

Participant 3: *We need a federal state.*

Participant 1: *People do not want to live together. If we live together, we will just fight again.*

***But since Dinka and Nuer live everywhere, what is going to happen with the people if you divide the country?***

Participant 1: *The states will be divided by the citizens. We do not have any problem with the Dinka living with the Nuer. We even live together, we are married. But we need our own government. [[90]](#footnote-90)*

**Nuer Focus group 2:**

Participant 1: *We still have hope, maybe change will come to us now, maybe a new system will come. Like what is proposed by the opposition. We hope that… a federal system will come.*

***What does that federal system look like?***

Participant 1: *Like the US…*

Participant 2: *Look, it is very good to us here.*

***What kind of system do you have now? A financially decentralised system?***

Participant 1: *No no, we don’t have this one…*

Participant 2: *Yes, so, by the moment time, we don’t have a proper federal system. For this way also, we hope that when we come into a formal federal system, we can also lead this country to what we also want. We will also support this idea. The federal system will also guide the South Sudanese. Every state will have its own freedom.*

***Do you have anything to add?***

Participant 5: *Yes. With regards to this point, we hope that it, if it comes, it will solve many problems. The current system is not good for us. There is no development. Many people are not happy with the system that is now. Of course, you can accept other people, but currently, there have almost been 10 years in isolation from Sudan, but nothing has happened. Maybe a federal system can change this.[[91]](#footnote-91)*

National and oppositional media are the most likely sources of the federalist ideas in South Sudan.[[92]](#footnote-92) According to Zacharia Diing Akol of the Sudd Institute, one of South Sudan’s most esteemed political think tanks, these ideas have been circulating for years, but increasingly so since the December events.[[93]](#footnote-93) They are often considered a solution to the problems faced by the country and its citizens, but is also “one of the most misunderstood political concepts in South Sudan”.[[94]](#footnote-94) In their focus groups, the Nuer participants unanimously agreed that this would be the best solution for both their tribe and for the country. However, the idea of how to implement such a reform remains vague. Regardless of where the participants got the idea of a federalist system from, the excerpts above indicate that the Nuer feel excluded from the current government and desire their own. Moreover, it shows that the grass root Nuers are less willing to share a country with the Dinka. This is likely an effect of both the violence and the delegitimising dehumanisation of the Dinka. Arguably, these normative attitudes need to transition in order for a sustainable peace to emerge.

## Focus groups rendered more polarised findings

Similar to the Dinka focus groups, the Nuer groups tended to display more polarised attitudes than the structured interviews. Interestingly enough, the pattern of the Nuer sample showing stronger outgroup derogation than the Dinka sample during the structured interviews, was replicated during the focus groups. In other words, in both modes of data collection, the Nuer tribe displayed stronger outgroup derogation and ingroup legitimisation than the Dinka. During the focus groups, this was especially evident. As mentioned previously, both focus groups attributed primary, secondary, negative and positive emotions almost exclusively to their ingroup. This indicates a high level of mechanistic dehumanisation, depriving the outgroup of any emotional capacity, aside from ‘excitement’, or the ability and will to celebrate. As visible throughout the focus groups, this was justified by stating that the Dinka have more to celebrate than the Nuer, retaining power and influence in South Sudan. The following excerpt illustrates this point:

**Nuer Focus group 1:**

Participant 3: *The feeling of Nuer is not good. Because, some of the Nuer live here, more and more. They arrive from everywhere. When there will be peace, when there will be a good peace, that peace we will love. But peace is not the solution. Because, Dinka they kill Nuer, they kill more of Nuer, even old and even women. When there will be peace, we will accept it but the peace is not the solution.*

***Moderator: Do you feel that Dinka think that the peace is better than the Nuer?***

Participant 3: *No. Because, the Nuer accept the peace. The Dinka cannot accept the peace. Those of Dinka, they don’t need a Nuer at all to be leader. The solution is to divide it (the country) up.*

***Moderator: What do you think?***

Participant 2: *If people follow the peace, it will be ok. But if people do not follow it, it will not. Right now, people are like animals. The international community is talking about a peace in South Sudan. (…) People have been killed, people have been looting. Some things will be ok, other things will not be ok.[[95]](#footnote-95)*

Arguably, the strong delegitimisation of the outgroup visible above is serving as an explanation for the violence that has taken place. The perception of the ingroup as the victim and the outgroup as the opportunistic perpetrator without a conscience likely represents a delegitimisation of the outgroup, implying the moral superiority of the ingroup. This devaluation of the outgroup represents a basic element of ethnocentrism. Similar to the Dinka focus groups, this strong consensus-based derogation is likely an effect of social desirability. That is, the need or will to fit in with the rest of the group. However, the Nuer groups showed considerably less desire to attribute emotions fairly between the ingroup and outgroup, indicating a more blatant dehumanisation than the Dinka groups. This echoes the findings from the structured interviews as well, displaying a clearer denial of humanness among the Nuer towards the Dinka than vice versa.

# Concluding remarks

This research has investigated intergroup perceptions and attitudes in South Sudan by applying the conventional frameworks of dehumanisation and infrahumanisation. This research adds to the contemporary literature by investigating the applicability of these two frameworks in unexplored territory and by applying a mixed methods approach. Arguably, the Dinka and Nuer groups in South Sudan form social categories and identities through cognitive processes generating dynamic attitudes towards the outgroup. These categories are then in turn created and reinforced by the attribution of different degrees of humanness. These degrees of humanness both serve as explanations for why violence has erupted as well as justifying and reinforcing the negative and delegitimising perception of the outgroup. The lack of attribution of emotions as well as human characteristics to the outgroup by both the Nuer and the Dinka across both the structured interviews and the focus groups indicate that a mechanistic dehumanisation is taking place between the two groups. Furthermore, all evidence indicates that the Nuer in the Juba area express a stronger mechanistic dehumanisation, or denial of warmth and empathy, towards the Dinka.

The quantitative data in the form of the structured interviews and questionnaires unravel some interesting findings. Arguably, neither the Dinka nor the Nuer shows evidence of standard infrahumanisation, although both of them externalise both the origin and the solution to the conflict. The pilot nature of this study falls short of determining whether this absence of standard infrahumanisation is due to the actual lack of infrahumanisation in South Sudan in general or whether the emotions selected for this research do not fall within the corresponding perimeters of primary, secondary or even valence as required to be valid. Scholars such as Nick Haslam have, in contrast to the likes of Jacques Philippe Leyens, argued that infrahumanisation is not a universal phenomenon. That is, all people do not necessarily perceive the outgroup as lacking refinement or civility, but sometimes instead focus on the lack of warmth and emotionality. This is the basic foundation of the dual model of dehumanisation. In the case of South Sudan, as mentioned previously, standard infrahumanisation was not evident although the findings showed strong indications of mechanistic dehumanisation taking place. However, it is likely that these attitudes are strongly influenced by reactions towards the recent violence rather than a general perception of the human nature of the outgroup. This is something this research has not been able to determine the extent of, and thus further research into this is required.

The qualitative data provided important insights into why participants attributed both emotions and human characteristics the way they did. Three main processes were identified: the limited attribution of emotions to the outgroup; continuous references to the political origins of the conflict; and relatively strong polarisation of the attitudes compared to individual structured interviews. The qualitative findings of the focus groups thus reaffirm the indications from the structured interviews of a mechanistic dehumanisation. The limited attribution of any emotion regardless of its nature or valence arguably suggests a perception of the outgroup as object-like and lacking emotionality. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly clear that the mechanistic dehumanisation is influenced or strengthened by the recent conflict. Continuous references to the December violence, but above all the political nature of the conflict, indicates a strong association between the outgroup derogation and the political power of South Sudan. Finally, the group processes during the focus group sessions indicated that a more polarised attitude towards the outgroup emerged. Whether this was due to social desirability or not is beyond the scope of this research. However, it is not unlikely that the participants triggered each other and that the discussions contributed to a stronger outgroup derogation through the reaffirming of negative stereotypes. In both the qualitative and quantitative measurements, the Nuer expressed stronger outgroup derogation and ingroup victimisation, which is likely due to the targeted killings of Nuer civilians in particular in and around Juba.

# Recommendations

## The Contact Hypothesis

Although the findings of this research will not be able to provide solutions to the conflict in South Sudan per se, a few suggestions can be made of how to improve the situation on community level. First of all, the contact hypothesis is regarded as the most influential social psychological models for change in intergroup relations.[[96]](#footnote-96) This model specifies the conditions under which conflicting groups should have contact with each other if the aim is to reduce prevailing intergroup tensions or stereotypes. According to the traditional approaches of Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1998), four essential conditions need to be fulfilled in order for such an approach to be successful: 1) conflicting groups must have equal status within the contact situation; 2) there should be no competition along group lines within the contact situation; 3) groups must seek superordinate goals within the contact situation; and 4) relevant institutional authorities must sanction the intergroup contact and endorse a reduction in intergroup tensions.[[97]](#footnote-97) If these four are not met, it increases the change of bringing people together actually exacerbating intergroup tensions.

This more general approach offers the GFP volunteers, known as Delegates and Pioneers, the ability to themselves construct situational contexts that can ultimately reconceptualise one’s individual and group attitudes. An example could be Dialogue For Peace Programmes (DPP), which in this case could open the minds of the participants to different truths or perspectives. For Generations For Peace, DPP refers to the creation of a safe space for honest exchange, and facilitation to ensure security, but without significantly guiding the conversation. When it comes to dialogue, honest exchange promotes behavioural change that can transform relationships on individual and collective levels. DPP functions as a vehicle for peace building in that it encourages verbal exchanges among individuals and thereby improves relationships in the community. In turn, this would build towards expressions of change such as building acceptance, fostering cooperation, ensuring inclusion, developing respect, taking responsibility, and building trust. In such a diverse community as Area 107, all of these factors are imperative to securing sustainable peace building. In other words, representatives of both groups would be encouraged to come together and discuss their respective intergroup perceptions.

The most effective way to achieve sustainable change in this case is arguably not to change the views of the outgroup, as those are entrenched, but to instead focus on views towards the ingroup. If the ingroup is defined as tolerant and inclusive, which often is the case, this perception can be redefined by introducing the ingroup members to the various findings of this research. Doing so would then reconceptualise the outgroup by redefining the ingroup.[[98]](#footnote-98) However, as mentioned previously as well, this is a complicated approach that can easily backfire. This stresses the inclusion and competence of local GFP Delegates and Pioneers into the process. Approaching various community leaders and gaining information through a sort of ‘pilot study’ about preferred modes of contact would be a first step. Based on this information and on the local knowledge and contacts of local GFP Delegates and Pioneers, these instances of contact can then be designed to fulfil the four essential conditions to as great of an extent as possible.

## Holding up the Mirror

Second, similar to the previous suggestion, the researcher would recommend the local GFP Delegates and Pioneers to consider the encouraging of Dinka and Nuer to simultaneously confront their own attitudes through a DPP. In this case, the focus would be on discussing the findings of this research. This process of ‘holding up the mirror’ in front of the people of concern could possibly spark reflection, which in turn could then initiate a normative transition away from the current outgroup derogation. Such a process would take the form of group dialogue at a community level and focus on changing group sentiments, building acceptance, fostering cooperation, and developing respect for one another.[[99]](#footnote-99) By exposing the antagonistic attitudes uncovered in this research and explaining the obstacles they create for the continuing peaceful existence of South Sudan, such a change can potentially take place.

However, there are obvious risks with such an approach. For example, the current ethnic tension between the Dinka and the Nuer could render this approach less efficient and result continued conflicts or simply in people not showing up at these meetings or initiatives. Moreover, considering how blatantly these attitudes were expressed during the focus groups, it highly possible that they are normatively accepted and pervasive. This makes them difficult to change through a mode of confrontation. Rather, they require long-term questioning. It is thus uncertain to what extent confronting people with these widespread attitudes will generate a response different from ‘so what, that is all true’. Therefore, emphasis has to be placed on the future effects of the continued existence or even strengthening of these derogatory attitudes. Perhaps reference can be made to relative ‘success stories’ such as Rwanda or South Africa to emphasise the positive feedback of normative transition.

## Education as a Tool for Piercing the Stereotypes

A third approach would be to focus on DPP or EPP (Empowerment For Peace Programmes) in terms of education rather than intervention. While DPP here again would refer to building acceptance and developing respect, empowerment would concern the building of capacity for people who are trapped in a conflict as a result of their lack of power, influence, status, or as in this case, education. An example is enlightenment as a source of increasing understanding of and sensitivity to the plight of others or to ones role and responsibilities in creating social change.[[100]](#footnote-100) In other words, different types of targeted education serving to undermine the current generalising prejudice and stereotypes. Simultaneously, these programmes would work to reduce imbalances of power between groups through educational empowerment. If these imbalances are not real but fictionally perceived, the programmes should work to pierce these imaginative reasons for prolonging the conflict. This education should then come in the form of cooperative learning processes where students must teach and learn from one another.[[101]](#footnote-101) In South Sudan, these programmes would focus on fostering cooperation, building acceptance, and trust between the Dinka and the Nuer. In other words, placing emphasis on what brings them together, not what sets them apart. Moreover, these programmes can also involve education concerning the country’s political system. This would have two main effects. First, it would help pierce the myth of Dinka as being completely in control over the government by demonstrating that this is simply not true. Second, it could display that South Sudan currently have a decentralized political system and the highlight potential effects of federalism.

Of course, these are all sensitive issues, and arguably the person in charge of this enlightenment needs to be viewed as legitimate and impartial for this process to be successful. That is also what makes it a complicated approach to use in this case, as whoever bring this information is likely to be greeted with suspicion. Thus, the GFP Delegates and Pioneers in South Sudan need to take these factors into consideration before designing the appropriate DPP or EPP. In all likelihood, the education regarding South Sudan’s political system will be extremely complicated to conduct. However, the author still considers it an essential part in any peace process at a community level in order to break down the stereotypes.

## Sport For Peace as a Catalyst for Reconciliation and Positive Interactions

Fourth, this approach focuses on the use of sport to create a completely new system of reference, promoting unity, equality, empowerment and representation rather than competition. Previous initiatives in, for example, South Africa, have displayed promising results in terms of inter-community reconcilliation as well as intra-community reconcilliation.[[102]](#footnote-102) Since sport offers an easy and low-cost opportunity for interaction in which the rules of interaction and socialisation are, or can be made, clear, it can serve as a foundation on which other casual intergroup activities can be structured. Aside from promoting reconcilliation, SPP can of course also reduce apathy and boredom, which is often prominent in societies experiencing conflicts. SPP focusing on increased integration can thereby not only contribute to a strengthened national identity in promoting equality and tolerance, but also bridge previous tensions in a community, especially among the youth. In the long run, these SPP can promote the attitude of ‘humans-in-relationship’ and through this process break down conflict-prone relationships and mechanistic dehumanistic attitudes.[[103]](#footnote-103) In other words, positive and co-operative interactions can be restored, generating a new and inclusive social identity.

Similar to the previous sections, the main difficulties in conducting these SPP are the potential lack of trust in the person in charge and the potential for no-shows. The local GFP staff will in all likelihood be equipped with considerable capacity and connections to overcome both of these. Moreover, it is also crucial to emphasise the casual and friendly side of sport to begin with and avoid competitions that can potentially result in eruptions of conflict during these events. Simultaneously, some youths might be more interested in competing rather than sporting for fun.[[104]](#footnote-104) This balance needs to be carefully considered when designing these programmes.

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# Appendix 1

The Questionnaires used for the structured interviews for the Nuer sample:

What is your religion?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

What is your ethnicity/race?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

What is your age?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Have you recently moved from one province to another?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

If so, what was the main reason for this?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Have you ever directly experienced violence?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

If so, how and in what ways?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Please attribute the following emotions to Nuer and Dinka. Tick the box for the group you think the emotion matches best with. You can only tick one box per emotion. Remember, there is no right or wrong answer.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Nuer** | **Dinka** |
| Anger |  |  |
| Calmness |  |  |
| Caring |  |  |
| Excitement |  |  |
| Fear |  |  |
| Guilt |  |  |
| Hope |  |  |
| Humiliation |  |  |
| Love |  |  |
| Optimism |  |  |
| Pain |  |  |

**Please indicate which of the following characteristics fits best with which group. You can only tick one box per attribute.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Nuer** | **Dinka** |
| Aggressive |  |  |
| Broadminded |  |  |
| Cold |  |  |
| Conservative |  |  |
| Distractible |  |  |
| Friendly |  |  |
| Fun-loving |  |  |
| Hard-hearted |  |  |
| Humble |  |  |
| Impatient |  |  |
| Jealous |  |  |
| Nervous |  |  |
| Organised |  |  |
| Polite |  |  |
| Rude |  |  |
| Shallow |  |  |
| Sociable |  |  |
| Thorough |  |  |
| Trusting |  |  |

**Please rate how much you agree with the following statements. 1= Agree strongly; 2= Agree; 3= Neutral; 4= Disagree; 5= Strongly disagree.**

I love Nuer\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Belonging to Nuer is very important for you\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is right to be emotionally attached to Nuer\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

The Nuer should reject those who do not like them\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

The Nuer should not share their resources with refugees\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Refugees need to go back home, even if their home is in conflict or very poor\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is right to criticise Nuer, even if they are your own group\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is better for other groups if Nuer cannot control them\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is right to feel passionate about Nuer\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is right to feel passionate about the actions of other members of Nuer\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

I am not proud to be Nuer\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

I do not feel a strong commitment to Nuer\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

I do not care about Nuer’s welfare\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Please answer these general questions briefly in 3-4 sentences.**

What do Dinka think about Nuer in general?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

The Querstionnaire used for the structured interviews for the Dinka sample:  
  
What is your age?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

What is your religion?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

What is your ethnicity/race?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Have you recently moved from one province to another?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

If so, what was the main reason for this? \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Have you ever directly experienced violence?\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

If so, how and in what ways?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Please attribute the following emotions to Dinka and Nuer. Tick the box for the group you think the emotion matches best with. You can only tick one box per emotion. Remember, there is no right or wrong answer.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dinka | Nuer |
| Anger |  |  |
| Calmness |  |  |
| Caring |  |  |
| Excitement |  |  |
| Fear |  |  |
| Guilt |  |  |
| Hope |  |  |
| Humiliation |  |  |
| Love |  |  |
| Optimism |  |  |
| Pain |  |  |

**Please indicate which of the following characteristics fits best with which group. You can only tick one box per attribute.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dinka | Nuer |
| Aggressive |  |  |
| Broadminded |  |  |
| Cold |  |  |
| Conservative |  |  |
| Distractible |  |  |
| Friendly |  |  |
| Fun-loving |  |  |
| Hard-hearted |  |  |
| Humble |  |  |
| Impatient |  |  |
| Jealous |  |  |
| Nervous |  |  |
| Organised |  |  |
| Polite |  |  |
| Rude |  |  |
| Shallow |  |  |
| Sociable |  |  |
| Thorough |  |  |
| Trusting |  |  |

**Please rate how much you agree with the following statements. 1= Agree strongly; 2= Agree; 3= Neutral; 4= Disagree; 5= Strongly disagree.**

I love Dinka\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Belonging to Dinka is very important for you\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is right to be emotionally attached to Dinka\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

The Dinka should reject those who do not like them\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

The Dinka should not share their resources with refugees\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Refugees need to go back home, even if their home is in conflict or very poor\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is right to criticise Dinka, even if they are your own group\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is better for other groups if Dinka cannot control them\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is right to feel passionate about Dinka\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

It is right to feel passionate about the actions of other members of Dinka\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

I am not proud to be Dinka\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

I do not feel a strong commitment to Dinka\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

I do not care about Dinka’s welfare\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Please answer these general questions briefly in 3-4 sentences.**

What do Nuer think about Dinka in general?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Guide for the section on outgroup derogation used during the focus groups:

**Please rate how much you agree with the follow statements on a scale 1-5. = Agree strongly; 2= Agree; 3= Neutral; 4= Disagree; 5= Strongly disagree (This could potentially be included in the structured interviews as well, but the author is not sure how much the research will gain from it)**

X are peaceful\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

X are rational\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

X are tolerant\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

X are cruel\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

X only understand the use of force\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

X are conflict prone\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

X need to be shown the peaceful way\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

X are civilised\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

X are different\_\_\_\_\_\_

X often like to fantasize\_\_\_\_\_

# 

## Appendix 2

## ANOVAs regarding the attribution of emotions:

**Key:**

**Ingroup: Dummy variable. Number of emotions attributed to the ingroup (1) and the outgroup (0).**

**Positive: Dummy variable. Number of positive (1) and negative (1) emotions attributed to both groups.**

**Primary: Dummy Variable. Number of primary (1) and secondary (0) emotions attributed to both groups.**

**Value: Actual number of emotions attributed.**

**Abbreviations:**

**Ing. = Ingroup**

**Pri. = Primary**

**Pos. = Positive**

Terms:

**Ingroup Positive Primary Ing.:Pos. Ing.:Pri. Pos.:Pri. Ing:Pos:Pri.**

**Sum of Squares**45   3.01   4.14         21.14         0.05           3.55 28.64

**Deg. of Freedom**1         1         1                1              1                1 1

**Residuals**

**Sum of Squares**                 85.95455

**Deg. of Freedom**                    168

Residual standard error: 0.7152861

Estimated effects may be unbalanced

**Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)**

**Ingroup** 1   45.01 45.01 87.965 < 2e-16 \*\*\*

**Positive** 1 3.01     3.01    5.875   0.01642 \*

**Primary** 1    4.14     4.14    8.096   0.00499 \*\*

**Ingroup:Positive** 1   21.14    21.14   41.323 1.28e-09 \*\*\*

**Ingroup:Primary** 1    0.05     0.05   0.100   0.75229

**Positive:Primary** 1    3.55     3.55    6.941   0.00921 \*\*

**Ing.:Pos.:Pri.** 1   28.64    28.64   55.981 3.90e-12 \*\*\*

**Residuals** 1 68   85.95     0.51

---

Signif. codes:  0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Terms:

**Ingroup Positive Primary Ing:Pos. Ing:Pri. Pos.:Pri. Ing:Pos:Pri.**

**Sum of Squares** 11.05     2.65    3.13          83.2           0.005            3.13 3.65

**Deg. of Freedom**1         1        1                1                1                 1 1

**Residuals**

**Sum of Squares**                  120.56

**Deg. of Freedom**                   192

Residual standard error: 0.7924119

Estimated effects may be unbalanced

summary(aov(Value ~ Ingroup\*Positive\*Primary, data=ANOVA.Dinka))

**Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)**

**Ingroup** 1 11.05 11.05 17.590 4.18e-05 \*\*\*

**Positive** 1 2.65 2.65 4.212 0.0415 \*

**Primary** 1 3.13 3.13 4.977 0.0268 \*

**Ingroup:Positive** 1 83.20 83.20 132.510 < 2e-16 \*\*\*

**Ingroup:Primary** 1 0.00 0.00 0.008 0.9290

**Positive:Primary** 1 3.13 3.13 4.977 0.0268 \*

**Ing.:Pos.:Prim.** 1 3.64 3.64 5.805 0.0169 \*

**Residuals** 192 120.56     0.63

---

Signif. codes:  0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

## ANOVAs regarding the attribution of human attributes

**Key:**

**Ingroup: Dummy variable. Number of attributes attributed to the ingroup (1) and the outgroup (0).**

**Positive: Dummy variable. Number of positive (1) and negative (0) attributes attributed to both groups.**

**Mechanistic: Dummy Variable. Number of mechanistic (1) and animalistic (0) attributes attributed to both groups.**

**Value: Actual number of attributes attributed.**

**For example: 3 positive mechanistic attributes attributed by one person to the outgroup would have the following values:  
Ingroup: 0, Positive: 1, Mechanistic: 1, Value: 3**

**Abbreviations:**

**Ing. = Ingroup**

**Mec. = Mechanistic**

**Pos. = Positive**

Terms (Dinka):

**Ing. Pos. Mec. Ing:Pos. Ing:Mec. Pos:Mec. Ing:Pos:Mec.**

**Sum of Squares** 15.125 3.125 3.125 305.045 26.645 3.125 13.005

**Deg. of Freedom** 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

**Residuals**

**Sum of Squares** 211.680

**Deg. of Freedom** 192

Residual standard error: 1.05

Estimated effects may be unbalanced

**Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)**

**Ingroup** 1 15.12 15.12 13.72 0.000277 \*\*\*

**Positive** 1 3.13 3.13 2.834 0.093887 .

**Mechanistic** 1 3.12 3.12 2.834 0.093887 .

**Ingroup:Positive** 1 305.04 305.04 276.685 < 2e-16 \*\*\*

**Ingroup:Mechanistic** 1 26.65 26.65 24.168 1.89e-06 \*\*\*

**Positive:Mechanistic** 1 3.13 3.13 2.834 0.093887 .

**Ing.:Pos.:Mech.** 1 13.00 13.00 11.796 0.000727 \*\*\*

**Residuals** 192 211.68 1.10

---

Signif. codes: 0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Terms (Nuer):

**Ing. Pos. Mech. Ing.:Pos. Ing.:Mec. Pos.:Mec. Ing:Pos:Mec.**

**Sum of Squares** 38.205 2.75 2.75 84.568 2.75 2.75 1.841

**Deg. of Freedom** 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

**Residuals**

**Sum of Squares** 195.636

**Deg. of Freedom** 168

Residual standard error: 1.079121

Estimated effects may be unbalanced

**Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)**

**Ingroup** 1 38.20 38.20 32.808 4.59e-08 \*\*\*

**Positive** 1 2.75 2.75 2.362 0.126

**Mechanistic** 1 2.75 2.75 2.362 0.126

**Ingroup:Positive** 1 84.57 84.57 72.622 8.65e-15 \*\*\*

**Ingroup:Mechanistic** 1 2.75 2.75 2.362 0.126

**Positive:Mechanistic** 1 2.75 2.75 2.362 0.126

**Ing.:Pos.:Mec.** 1 1.84 1.84 1.581 0.210

**Residuals** 168 195.64 1.16

---

Signif. codes: 0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

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